Section 46
Original German
46 Da mir im Eigenthum mein Wille als persönlicher, somit als Wille des Einzelnen objectiv wird, so erhält es den Charakter von Privateigenthum, und gemeinschaftliches Eigenthum, das seiner Natur nach vereinzelt besessen werden kann, die Bestimmung von einer an sich auflösbaren Gemeinschaft, in der meinen Antheil zu lassen, für sich Sache der Willkühr ist.
Die Benutzung elementarischer Gegenstände ist, ihrer Natur nach, nicht fähig, zu Privatbesitz particularisirt zu werden. — Die agrarischen Gesetze in Rom enthalten einen Kampf zwischen Gemeinsamkeit und Privateigenthümlichkeit des Grundbesitzes; die letztere mußte als das vernünftigere Moment, obgleich auf Kosten andern Rechts, die Oberhand behalten. — Familien-Fideicommissarisches Eigenthum enthält ein Moment, dem das Recht der Persönlichkeit und damit des Privateigenthums entgegensteht. Aber die Bestimmungen, die das Privateigenthum betreffen, können höhern Sphären des Rechts, einem Gemeinwesen, dem Staate untergeordnet werden müssen, wie in Rücksicht auf Privateigenthümlichkeit beym Eigenthum einer sogenannten moralischen Person, Eigenthum in todter Hand, der Fall ist. Jedoch können solche Ausnahmen nicht im Zufall, in Privatwillkühr, Privatnutzen, sondern nur in dem vernünftigen Organismus des Staats begründet seyn. — Die Idee des platonischen Staats enthält das Unrecht gegen die Person, des Privateigenthums unfähig zu seyn, als allgemeines Princip. Die Vorstellung von einer frommen oder freundschaftlichen und selbst erzwungenen Verbrüderung der Menschen mit Gemeinschaft der Güter und der Verbannung des privateigenthümlichen Princips kann sich der Gesinnung leicht darbieten, welche die Natur der Freyheit des Geistes und des Rechts verkennt und sie nicht in ihren bestimmten Momenten erfaßt. Was die moralische oder religiöse Rücksicht betrifft, so hielt Epicur seine Freunde, wie sie, einen solchen Bund der Gütergemeinschaft zu errichten, vorhatten, gerade aus dem Grunde davon ab, weil dieß ein Mistrauen beweise, und die einander mistrauen, nicht Freunde seyen. (Diog. Laërt. l. X. n. VI.)
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
46 Since in property my will becomes objective to me as personal will, and thus as the will of an individual, property acquires the character of private property. Common property that by its nature can be possessed separately acquires the determination of a community of ownership dissoluble in itself; whether I leave my share in it is, in itself, a matter of arbitrary choice.
By its nature, the use of elemental objects cannot be particularized into private possession.—The agrarian laws in Rome contain a struggle between common and private ownership of land; the latter, as the more rational moment, had to gain the upper hand, though at the expense of other right.—Property held under a family entail contains a moment opposed by the right of personality, and thus of private property. But the determinations concerning private property may have to be subordinated to higher spheres of right, to a commonwealth, to the state, as is the case with private ownership in the property of a so-called moral person, property in mortmain. Such exceptions, however, can be grounded neither in chance nor in private arbitrary choice or private advantage, but only in the rational organism of the state.—The Idea of the Platonic state contains, as a universal principle, the wrong done to the person in denying them the capacity for private ownership. The conception of a devout or friendly, or even enforced, brotherhood of human beings with community of goods and the banishment of the principle of private ownership may readily appeal to a disposition that misconceives the nature of the freedom of spirit and of right, and does not grasp it in its determinate moments. As for moral or religious considerations, Epicurus dissuaded his friends, when they intended to establish such a union for the community of goods, precisely on the ground that it showed mistrust, and that those who mistrust one another are not friends. (Diog. Laërt. l. X. n. VI.)
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
46 In property, my will becomes objective for me as a personal will, and therefore as the will of an individual. Property thus has the character of private property. Common property that can by its nature be held separately has the character of an association inherently open to dissolution: leaving my share in it is in itself a matter of choice.
By its nature, the use of natural elements cannot be divided into private possessions. The agrarian laws in Rome involve a struggle between common and private ownership of land. Private ownership, as the more rational moment, had to prevail, though at the expense of other rights. Property tied up in a family trust includes a moment opposed by the right of personality and therefore of private property. But the determinations governing private property may have to be subordinated to higher spheres of right, to a community or the state. This is the case, as regards private ownership, with property belonging to a so-called legal person—property held in perpetuity. Such exceptions, however, can be grounded only in the rational organization of the state, not in chance, private whim, or private advantage. The Idea of the Platonic state contains as a universal principle the injustice to the person of being incapable of private ownership. The idea of a pious or friendly, even a forced, brotherhood of people with common ownership of goods and the banishment of the principle of private property can easily appeal to a disposition that misunderstands the nature of the freedom of spirit and of right, and fails to grasp it in its specific moments. As for moral or religious considerations, Epicurus discouraged his friends when they planned to establish such a community of goods, precisely because it would show mistrust, and people who mistrust one another are not friends (Diog. Laërt. l. X. n. VI.).
About this section
Section 46 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 48 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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