Section 32
Original German
32 Die Bestimmungen in der Entwicklung des Begriffs sind einerseits selbst Begriffe, andererseits, weil der Begriff wesentlich als Idee ist, sind sie in der Form des Daseyns, und die Reihe der sich ergebenden Begriffe ist damit zugleich eine Reihe von Gestaltungen; so sind sie in der Wissenschaft zu betrachten.
In speculativerem Sinn ist die Weise des Daseyns eines Begriffes und seine Bestimmtheit eins und dasselbe. Es ist aber zu bemerken, daß die Momente, deren Resultat eine weiter bestimmte Form ist, ihm als Begriffsbestimmungen in der wissenschaftlichen Entwicklung der Idee vorangehen, aber nicht in der zeitlichen Entwicklung als Gestaltungen ihm vorausgehen. So hat die Idee, wie sie als Familie bestimmt ist, die Begriffsbestimmungen zur Voraussetzung, als deren Resultat sie im Folgenden dargestellt werden wird. Aber daß diese inneren Voraussetzungen auch für sich schon als Gestaltungen, als Eigenthumsrecht, Vertrag, Moralität u. s. f. vorhanden seyen, dieß ist die andere Seite der Entwicklung, die nur in höher vollendeter Bildung es zu diesem eigenthümlich gestalteten Daseyn ihrer Momente gebracht hat.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
32 The determinations in the development of the concept are, on the one hand, themselves concepts; on the other, because the concept exists essentially as Idea, they are in the form of existence. The series of concepts that emerge is thus at the same time a series of configurations. This is how they are to be considered in science.
In a more speculative sense, a concept’s mode of existence and its determinacy are one and the same. It must be noted, however, that the moments whose result is a more fully determined form precede that form as conceptual determinations in the scientific development of the Idea, but do not precede it as configurations in temporal development. Thus the Idea as determined as family presupposes the conceptual determinations of which it will be presented as the result in what follows. But that these inner presuppositions should also already be present on their own as configurations—as the right of property, contract, morality, and so on—is the other side of development, which has achieved this distinctively configured existence of its moments only at a more fully developed stage of cultivation.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
32 The determinations in the concept’s development are themselves concepts. But because the concept exists essentially as Idea, they also have the form of existence. The series of concepts that emerges is therefore also a series of shapes. Science must consider them in this way.
In the more speculative sense, a concept’s way of existing and its determinate character are one and the same. But a distinction must be noted. The moments whose result is a more fully determined form precede that form as conceptual determinations in the scientific development of the Idea. They do not precede it as shapes in development over time. Thus the Idea, as determined in the family, presupposes the conceptual determinations from which it will be presented as resulting below. But these inner presuppositions also exist independently as shapes—as property rights, contract, morality, and so on. This is the other side of development: only at a higher, more fully developed stage has it brought its moments to an existence with these distinctive shapes.
About this section
Section 32 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 34 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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