Section 31
Original German
31 Die Methode, wie in der Wissenschaft der Begriff sich aus sich selbst entwickelt und nur ein immanentes Fortschreiten und Hervorbringen seiner Bestimmungen ist, — der Fortgang nicht durch die Versicherung, daß es verschiedene Verhältnisse gebe, und denn durch das Anwenden des Allgemeinen auf solchen von sonst her aufgenommenen Stoff geschieht, ist hier gleichfalls aus der Logik vorausgesetzt.
Das bewegende Princip des Begriffs, als die Besonderungen des Allgemeinen nicht nur auflösend, sondern auch hervorbringend, heiße ich die Dialektik, — Dialektik also nicht in dem Sinne, daß sie einen dem Gefühl, dem unmittelbaren Bewußtseyn überhaupt gegebenen Gegenstand, Satz u. s. f. auflöst, verwirrt, herüber und hinüber führt und es nur mit Herleiten seines Gegentheils zu thun hat, — eine negative Weise, wie sie häufig auch bey Plato erscheint. Sie kann so das Gegentheil einer Vorstellung, oder entschieden wie der alte Skepticismus den Widerspruch derselben, oder auch matterweise eine Annäherung zur Wahrheit, eine moderne Halbheit, als ihr letztes Resultat ansehen. Die höhere Dialektik des Begriffes ist, die Bestimmung nicht blos als Schranke und Gegentheil, sondern aus ihr den positiven Inhalt und Resultat hervorzubringen und aufzufassen, als wodurch sie allein Entwicklung und immanentes Fortschreiten ist. Diese Dialektik ist dann nicht äußeres Thun eines subjectiven Denkens, sondern die eigene Seele des Inhalts, die organisch ihre Zweige und Früchte hervortreibt. Dieser Entwicklung der Idee als eigener Thätigkeit ihrer Vernunft sieht das Denken als subjectives, ohne seinerseits eine Zuthat hinzu zu fügen, nur zu. Etwas vernünftig betrachten heißt, nicht an den Gegenstand von Außenher eine Vernunft hinzubringen und ihn dadurch bearbeiten, sondern der Gegenstand ist für sich selbst vernünftig; hier ist es der Geist in seiner Freyheit, die höchste Spitze der selbstbewußten Vernunft, die sich Wirklichkeit giebt und als existirende Welt erzeugt; die Wissenschaft hat nur das Geschäft, diese eigene Arbeit der Vernunft der Sache zum Bewußtseyn zu bringen.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
31 Here too, we presuppose from logic the method by which, in science, the concept develops out of itself and is only an immanent progression and production of its determinations. Progress is not made by asserting that various relations exist and then applying the universal to such material taken from elsewhere.
I call the moving principle of the concept—which not only dissolves the particularizations of the universal but also produces them—dialectic. Dialectic, then, is not meant in the sense that it dissolves or confuses an object, proposition, and so on, given to feeling or to immediate consciousness in general, shuttles it back and forth, and is concerned only with deriving its opposite—a negative procedure that also frequently appears in Plato. In this way, dialectic may regard as its ultimate result the opposite of a conception, or, more decisively, its contradiction, as in ancient skepticism; or again, more feebly, an approximation to truth, a modern half-measure. The higher dialectic of the concept consists in producing and grasping the determination not merely as a limit and an opposite, but in producing and grasping from it the positive content and result. Only in this way is dialectic development and immanent progression. This dialectic is then not the external activity of subjective thinking, but the content’s own soul, which organically puts forth its branches and fruits. Thinking, as subjective, merely watches this development of the Idea as the activity of its own reason, without adding anything on its own part. To consider something rationally means not to bring reason to the object from outside and thereby work upon it; rather, the object is rational on its own account. Here it is spirit in its freedom, the highest summit of self-conscious reason, which gives itself actuality and brings itself forth as an existing world. Science has only the task of bringing to consciousness this work of the matter’s own reason.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
31 Here too, the method is presupposed from logic: in science the concept develops out of itself, in an immanent advance that produces its own determinations. The advance does not consist in asserting that various relations exist and then applying the universal to material taken from somewhere else.
I call the moving principle of the concept dialectic: it not only dissolves the particular forms of the universal but also produces them. This does not mean dialectic in the sense of dissolving or confusing an object, proposition, and so on given to feeling or immediate consciousness, turning it this way and that, and merely deriving its opposite—a negative method that also appears frequently in Plato. Such a method can take as its final result the opposite of a representation, or, more decisively, its contradiction, as ancient skepticism did; or, more feebly, an approximation to truth, a modern half-measure. The higher dialectic of the concept does not treat a determination merely as a limit and an opposite. It brings out and grasps the positive content and result within it. Only in this way is dialectic development and immanent progress. This dialectic is not an external act of subjective thinking. It is the content’s own soul, organically putting out its branches and fruit. Subjective thinking merely watches this development of the Idea through the activity of its own reason, adding nothing of its own. To consider something rationally does not mean bringing reason to the object from outside and working on it in that way. Rather, the object is rational in its own right. Here that object is spirit in its freedom, the highest point of self-conscious reason, which gives itself actual reality and produces itself as an existing world. Science has only to bring this work of the thing’s own reason into consciousness.
About this section
Section 31 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 33 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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