Section 30
Original German
30 Das Recht ist etwas heiliges überhaupt, allein weil es das Daseyn des absoluten Begriffes, der selbstbewußten Freyheit ist. — Der Formalismus des Rechts aber (und weiterhin der Pflicht) entsteht aus dem Unterschiede der Entwicklung des Freyheitsbegriffs. Gegen formelleres, d. i. abstracteres und darum beschränkteres Recht, hat die Sphäre und Stufe des Geistes, in welcher er die weitern in seiner Idee enthaltenen Momente zur Bestimmung und Wirklichkeit in sich gebracht hat, als die concretere in sich reichere und wahrhafter allgemeine eben damit auch ein höheres Recht.
Jede Stufe der Entwicklung der Idee der Freyheit hat ihr eigenthümliches Recht, weil sie das Daseyn der Freyheit in einer ihrer eigenen Bestimmungen ist. Wenn vom Gegensatze der Moralität, der Sittlichkeit gegen das Recht gesprochen wird, so ist unter dem Rechte nur das erste, formelle der abstracten Persönlichkeit verstanden. Die Moralität, die Sittlichkeit, das Staatsinteresse ist jedes ein eigenthümliches Recht, weil jede dieser Gestalten Bestimmung und Daseyn der Freyheit ist. In Collision können sie nur kommen, insofern sie auf gleicher Linie stehen, Rechte zu seyn; wäre der moralische Standpunkt des Geistes nicht auch ein Recht, die Freyheit in einer ihrer Formen, so könnte sie gar nicht in Collision mit dem Rechte der Persönlichkeit oder einem andern kommen, weil ein solches den Freyheitsbegriff, die höchste Bestimmung des Geistes, in sich enthält, gegen welchen Anderes ein substanzloses ist. Aber die Collision enthält zugleich dieß andere Moment, daß sie beschränkt und damit auch eins dem andern untergeordnet ist; nur das Recht des Weltgeistes ist das uneingeschränkt absolute.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
30 Right is sacred as such, solely because it is the existence of the absolute concept, of self-conscious freedom. But the formalism of right—and, later, of duty—arises from differences in the development of the concept of freedom. In contrast to a more formal—that is, more abstract, and therefore more limited—right, the sphere and stage of spirit in which spirit has brought the further moments contained in its Idea to determination and actuality within itself is more concrete, richer within itself, and more truly universal; precisely for this reason, it also has a higher right.
Every stage in the development of the Idea of freedom has its own distinctive right, because it is the existence of freedom in one of freedom’s own determinations. When one speaks of the opposition of morality or ethical life to right, right means only the first, formal right of abstract personality. Morality, ethical life, and the interest of the state are each a distinctive right, because each of these shapes is a determination and existence of freedom. They can come into collision only insofar as they stand on the same footing as rights. If spirit’s moral standpoint were not also a right—freedom in one of its forms—it could not come into collision at all with the right of personality or any other right, because such a right contains the concept of freedom, spirit’s highest determination, in contrast to which anything else is without substance. But collision also contains this further moment: that these rights are limited, and hence one is also subordinate to another. Only the right of the world-spirit is the unrestricted absolute right.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
30 Right is something sacred in general, solely because it is the existence of the absolute concept, of self-conscious freedom. But the formalism of right—and later, of duty—comes from differences in the development of the concept of freedom. Compared with a more formal, that is, more abstract and therefore more limited right, a sphere and stage of spirit has a higher right when it has brought the further elements contained in its Idea to determination and actual reality within itself. It has this higher right precisely as the more concrete sphere, richer within itself and more truly universal.
Each stage in the development of the Idea of freedom has its own distinctive right, because it is the existence of freedom in one of freedom's own determinations. When morality and ethical life are spoken of as opposed to right, right means only the first, formal right of abstract personality. Morality, ethical life, and the interest of the state are each a distinctive right, because each of these forms is a determination and existence of freedom. They can come into conflict only insofar as they stand on the same level as rights. If spirit's moral standpoint were not also a right, freedom in one of its forms, it could not come into conflict with the right of personality or any other right. Such a right contains the concept of freedom, spirit's highest determination, against which anything else lacks substance. But conflict also contains this other element: these rights are limited, and therefore one is also subordinate to the other. Only the right of world spirit is absolute without restriction.
About this section
Section 30 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 32 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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