Section 29
Original German
29 Dieß, daß ein Daseyn überhaupt, Daseyn des freyen Willens ist, ist das Recht. — Es ist somit überhaupt die Freyheit, als Idee.
Die Kantische (Kants Rechtslehre Einl.) und auch allgemeiner angenommene Bestimmung, worinn „die Beschränkung meiner Freyheit oder Willkühr, daß sie mit jedermanns Willkühr nach einem allgemeinen Gesetze zusammen bestehen könne, das Hauptmoment ist“ — enthält theils nur eine negative Bestimmung, die der Beschränkung, theils läuft das Positive, das allgemeine oder sogenannte Vernunftgesetz, die Uebereinstimmung der Willkühr des einen mit der Willkühr des andern, auf die bekannte formelle Identität und den Satz des Widerspruchs hinaus. Die angeführte Definition des Rechts enthält die seit Rousseau vornehmlich verbreitete Ansicht, nach welcher der Wille, nicht als an und für sich seyender, vernünftiger, der Geist nicht als wahrer Geist, sondern als besonderes Individuum, als Wille des Einzelnen in seiner eigenthümlichen Willkühr, die substantielle Grundlage und das Erste seyn soll. Nach diesem einmal angenommenen Princip kann das Vernünftige freylich nur als beschränkend für diese Freyheit, so wie auch nicht als immanent Vernünftiges, sondern nur als ein äußeres, formelles Allgemeines herauskommen. Jene Ansicht ist eben so ohne allen speculativen Gedanken und von dem philosophischen Begriffe verworfen, als sie in den Köpfen und in der Wirklichkeit Erscheinungen hervorgebracht hat, deren Fürchterlichkeit nur an der Seichtigkeit der Gedanken, auf die sie sich gründeten, eine Parallele hat.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
29 That an existence is the existence of the free will is what constitutes right. Right, therefore, is in general freedom as Idea.
The Kantian definition (Kant’s Doctrine of Right, Introduction), which is also more generally accepted, in which “the limitation of my freedom or arbitrary choice, so that it can coexist with everyone’s arbitrary choice under a universal law, is the chief moment,” contains, on the one hand, only a negative determination, that of limitation. On the other, its positive element—the universal or so-called rational law, the agreement of one person’s arbitrary choice with another’s—amounts to the familiar formal identity and the principle of contradiction. The definition of right just cited contains the view, especially widespread since Rousseau, that the will—not as a will that is in and for itself and rational, and spirit not as true spirit, but as a particular individual, as the individual’s will in its own distinctive arbitrary choice—is to be the substantial foundation and primary element. Once this principle is accepted, the rational can of course emerge only as a limitation upon this freedom, and not as immanently rational, but only as an external, formal universal. This view is utterly devoid of speculative thought and rejected by the philosophical concept; and the phenomena it has produced in people’s minds and in actuality have a horror matched only by the shallowness of the thoughts on which they were founded.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
29 That an existence is, in general, the existence of the free will is what makes it right. Right is therefore freedom as Idea.
Kant's definition (Kant, Doctrine of Right, Introduction), which is also more widely accepted, is one in which “the restriction of my freedom or arbitrary choice, so that it can coexist with everyone's arbitrary choice under a universal law, is the central element.” This contains, first, only a negative determination, that of restriction. Second, the positive element—the universal or so-called law of reason, the agreement of one person's arbitrary choice with another's—amounts to the familiar formal identity and the law of contradiction. This definition of right contains the view spread chiefly since Rousseau that the will, not as a rational will existing in and for itself, and spirit, not as true spirit, but as a particular individual, as the individual's will in its distinctive arbitrary choice, should be the substantial foundation and the starting point. Once this principle is accepted, the rational can of course emerge only as restricting this freedom. Nor can it emerge as inherently rational, but only as an external, formal universal. This view has no speculative thought at all and is rejected by the philosophical concept. Correspondingly, it has produced phenomena in people's minds and in actual reality whose horror is matched only by the shallowness of the thoughts on which they were based.
About this section
Section 29 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 31 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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