Section 33
Original German
Eintheilung.
33 Nach dem Stufengange der Entwicklung der Idee des an und für sich freyen Willens ist der Wille
A) unmittelbar; sein Begriff daher abstract, — die Persönlichkeit, und sein Daseyn eine unmittelbare äußerliche Sache; — die Sphäre des abstracten oder formellen Rechts.
B) der Wille aus dem äußern Daseyn in sich reflectirt, als subjective Einzelnheit bestimmt gegen das Allgemeine, — dasselbe theils als inneres, das Gute, theils als äußeres, eine vorhandene Welt und diese beyde Seiten der Idee als nur durch einander vermittelt; die Idee in ihrer Entzweyung oder besondern Existenz, das Recht des subjectiven Willens im Verhältniß zum Recht der Welt und zum Recht der, aber nur an sich seyenden, Idee; die Sphäre der Moralität.
C) die Einheit und Wahrheit dieser beyden abstracten Momente, — die gedachte Idee des Guten realisirt in dem in sich reflectirten Willen und in äußerlicher Welt; — so daß die Freyheit als die Substanz eben so sehr als Wirklichkeit und Nothwendigkeit existirt, wie als subjectiver Wille; — die Idee in ihrer an und für sich allgemeinen Existenz; die Sittlichkeit.
Die sittliche Substanz aber ist gleichfalls
a) natürlicher Geist; — die Familie,
b) in ihrer Entzweyung und Erscheinung; — die bürgerliche Gesellschaft,
c) der Staat, als die in der freyen Selbstständigkeit des besondern Willens eben so allgemeine und objective Freyheit; — welcher wirkliche und organische Geist α) eines Volks sich β) durch das Verhältniß der besondern Volksgeister hindurch, γ) in der Weltgeschichte zum allgemeinen Weltgeiste wirklich wird und offenbart, dessen Recht das Höchste ist.
Daß eine Sache oder Inhalt, der erst seinem Begriffe nach oder wie er an sich ist, gesetzt ist, die Gestalt der Unmittelbarkeit oder des Seyns hat, ist aus der speculativen Logik vorausgesetzt; ein anderes ist der Begriff, der in der Form des Begriffs für sich ist; dieser ist nicht mehr ein unmittelbares. — Gleicherweise ist das die Eintheilung bestimmende Princip vorausgesetzt. Die Eintheilung kann auch als eine historische Vorausangabe der Theile angesehen werden, denn die verschiedenen Stufen müssen als Entwicklungsmomente der Idee sich aus der Natur des Inhalts selbst hervorbringen. Eine philosophische Eintheilung ist überhaupt nicht eine äußerliche, nach irgend einem oder mehrern aufgenommenen Eintheilungsgründen gemachte äußere Classificirung eines vorhandenen Stoffes, sondern das immanente Unterscheiden des Begriffes selbst. — Moralität und Sittlichkeit, die gewöhnlich etwa als gleichbedeutend gelten, sind hier in wesentlich verschiedenem Sinne genommen. Inzwischen scheint auch die Vorstellung sie zu unterscheiden; der Kantische Sprachgebrauch bedient sich vorzugsweise des Ausdrucks Moralität, wie denn die praktischen Principien dieser Philosophie sich durchaus auf diesen Begriff beschränken, den Standpunkt der Sittlichkeit sogar unmöglich machen, ja selbst sie ausdrücklich zernichten und empören. Wenn aber Moralität und Sittlichkeit, ihrer Etymologie nach, auch gleichbedeutend wären, so hinderte dieß nicht diese einmal verschiedenen Worte für verschiedene Begriffe zu benutzen.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
Division
33 According to the stages in the development of the Idea of the will that is free in and for itself, the will is:
A) Immediate; its concept is therefore abstract—personality—and its existence an immediate external thing: the sphere of abstract or formal right.
B) The will reflected into itself from external existence, determined as subjective individuality in contrast to the universal—the latter being in part inward, the good, and in part outward, a world already present, and these two sides of the Idea being only mediated through one another. This is the Idea in its division or particular existence, the right of the subjective will in relation to the right of the world and to the right of the Idea, which, however, is only in itself: the sphere of morality.
C) The unity and truth of these two abstract moments—the Idea of the good as thought, realized in the will reflected into itself and in the external world; so that freedom, as substance, exists as actuality and necessity just as much as it does as subjective will: the Idea in its existence that is universal in and for itself; ethical life.
Ethical substance, in turn, is likewise:
a) Natural spirit—the family;
b) In its division and appearance—civil society;
c) The state, as freedom that, in the free independence of the particular will, is equally universal and objective. This actual and organic spirit, α) of a people, β) through the relationship of the particular national spirits, γ) in world history becomes actual and reveals itself as the universal world-spirit, whose right is supreme.
It is presupposed from speculative logic that a matter or content, posited only according to its concept, or as it is in itself, has the shape of immediacy or being. The concept that is for itself in the form of the concept is something different; it is no longer something immediate. The principle determining the division is likewise presupposed. The division can also be regarded as a historical anticipation of the parts, for the various stages must produce themselves from the nature of the content itself as moments in the development of the Idea. A philosophical division is not, in general, an external classification of given material, made from outside according to one or more adopted grounds of division, but the immanent differentiation of the concept itself. Morality and ethical life, which are commonly treated as more or less synonymous, are used here in essentially different senses. Yet ordinary conception too seems to distinguish them: Kantian usage favors the expression morality, just as the practical principles of that philosophy confine themselves entirely to this concept, even make the standpoint of ethical life impossible, indeed expressly destroy and outrage it. But even if morality and ethical life were synonymous according to their etymology, that would not prevent the use of these words, different as they are, for different concepts.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
Division
33 Following the stages in the development of the Idea of the will that is free in and for itself, the will is:
A) Immediate. Its concept is therefore abstract—personality—and its existence is an immediately external thing. This is the sphere of abstract or formal right.
B) Reflected back into itself from external existence, and determined as subjective individuality in contrast to the universal. The universal is partly inward, as the good, and partly outward, as an existing world. These two sides of the Idea are mediated only through each other. This is the Idea in its division, or particular existence: the right of the subjective will in relation to the right of the world and the right of the Idea, which, however, exists only in itself. This is the sphere of morality.
C) The unity and truth of these two abstract moments. The Idea of the good, grasped in thought, is realized both in the will reflected into itself and in the external world. Freedom as substance thus exists as actual reality and necessity just as much as it exists as subjective will. This is the Idea in its existence as universal in and for itself: ethical life.
The ethical substance is likewise:
a) Natural spirit—the family;
b) In its division and appearance—civil society;
c) The state: freedom that is universal and objective even within the free independence of the particular will. This actual, organic spirit of a people (α) becomes actual and reveals itself (β) through the relation among the particular spirits of peoples and (γ) in world history as the universal world spirit, whose right is the highest.
We presuppose from speculative logic that a thing or content, when posited only according to its concept, or as it is in itself, has the form of immediacy or being. A concept that exists for itself in the form of the concept is something different: it is no longer immediate. The principle that determines the division is likewise presupposed. The division can also be regarded as a historical preview of the parts, since the different stages must produce themselves from the nature of the content itself as moments in the Idea’s development. A philosophical division is not an external classification of given material, made according to one or more criteria taken from elsewhere. It is the concept’s own internal differentiation. Morality and ethical life, which are commonly treated as roughly equivalent, are used here in essentially different senses. Ordinary thinking, too, seems to distinguish them. Kantian usage prefers the expression morality, just as the practical principles of that philosophy are entirely restricted to this concept. They even make the standpoint of ethical life impossible, indeed expressly destroy it and outrage it. But even if morality and ethical life were equivalent in their etymology, that would not prevent us from using these two different words for different concepts.
About this section
Section 33 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 35 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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