Section 328
Original German
328 Der Gehalt der Tapferkeit als Gesinnung liegt in dem wahrhaften absoluten Endzweck, der Souverainetät des Staates; — die Wirklichkeit dieses Endzwecks als Werk der Tapferkeit hat das Hingeben der persönlichen Wirklichkeit zu ihrer Vermittlung. Diese Gestalt enthält daher die Härte der höchsten Gegensätze, die Entäußerung selbst aber als Existenz der Freyheit; — die höchste Selbstständigkeit des Fürsichseyns, deren Existenz zugleich in dem Mechanischen einer äußern Ordnung und des Dienstes ist, — gänzlichen Gehorsam und Abthun des eigenen Meynens und Raisonnirens, so Abwesenheit des eigenen Geistes, und intensivste und umfassende augenblickliche Gegenwart des Geistes und Entschlossenheit, — das feindseligste und dabey persönlichste Handeln gegen Individuen, bey vollkommen gleichgültiger, ja guter Gesinnung gegen sie als Individuen.
Das Leben daran setzen, ist freylich mehr als den Tod nur fürchten, aber ist sonach das bloß Negative, und hat darum keine Bestimmung und Werth für sich; — das Positive, der Zweck und Inhalt giebt diesem Muthe erst die Bedeutung; Räuber, Mörder, mit einem Zwecke, welcher Verbrechen ist, Abentheurer mit einem sich in seiner Meynung gemachten Zwecke u. s. f. haben auch jenen Muth, das Leben daran zu setzen. — Das Princip der modernen Welt, der Gedanke und das Allgemeine, hat der Tapferkeit die höhere Gestalt gegeben, daß ihre Aeußerung mechanischer zu seyn scheint und nicht als Thun dieser besondern Person, sondern nur als Gliedes eines Ganzen, — eben so daß sie als nicht gegen einzelne Personen, sondern gegen ein feindseliges Ganze überhaupt gekehrt, somit der persönliche Muth als ein nicht persönlicher erscheint. Jenes Princip hat darum das Feuergewehr erfunden, und nicht eine zufällige Erfindung dieser Waffe hat die bloß persönliche Gestalt der Tapferkeit in die abstractere verwandelt.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
328 The substance of bravery as a disposition lies in the true absolute final end, the sovereignty of the state; — the actuality of this final end, as the work of bravery, has the surrender of personal actuality as its mediation. This shape therefore contains the harshness of the highest oppositions, but the relinquishment itself as the existence of freedom; — the highest independence of being-for-itself, whose existence is at the same time in the mechanism of an external order and of service, — complete obedience and putting aside of one's own opining and reasoning, thus the absence of one's own spirit, and the most intense and comprehensive momentary presence of spirit and resolution; — the most hostile and at the same time most personal action against individuals, with a perfectly indifferent, even kind, disposition toward them as individuals.
To risk one's life is indeed more than merely to fear death, but is thus the merely negative, and therefore has no determination and worth for itself; — the positive, the purpose and content, first gives this courage its meaning; robbers, murderers with a purpose that is a crime, adventurers with a purpose made up in their own opinion, and so on, also have that courage to risk their lives. — The principle of the modern world, thought and the universal, has given bravery the higher shape in which its expression seems more mechanical and not the doing of this particular person but only of a member of a whole, — likewise in which it is turned not against single persons but against a hostile whole in general, so that personal courage appears as impersonal. That principle has therefore invented the firearm, and it is not a contingent invention of this weapon that has transformed the merely personal shape of bravery into the more abstract.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
328 The content of bravery as an attitude lies in the true, absolute final purpose, the sovereignty of the state. The actuality of this final purpose, as the work of bravery, has the giving up of personal actuality as its means. This form therefore contains the harshness of the highest opposites. The giving up itself is the existence of freedom. It is the highest independence of being-for-itself, whose existence is at the same time in the mechanical side of an external order and service. It is complete obedience and the laying aside of one's own opining and arguing, and so an absence of one's own spirit. And yet it is the most intense and all-embracing presence of spirit in the moment, and resolve. It is the most hostile action against individuals, and at the same time the most personal, with a wholly indifferent, even good attitude toward them as individuals.
To stake one's life is certainly more than merely fearing death. But it is therefore merely the negative, and so has no determination and no worth for itself. The positive, the purpose and content, first gives this courage its meaning. Robbers and murderers, whose purpose is a crime, and adventurers, whose purpose is one they have made up in their own opinion, and so on, also have that courage to stake their life. The principle of the modern world, thought and the universal, has given bravery a higher form. Its expression seems more mechanical, and appears not as the doing of this particular person, but only as that of a member of a whole. It also appears as turned not against single persons but against a hostile whole in general. So personal courage appears as not personal. That principle therefore invented the firearm. It was not a chance invention of this weapon that changed the merely personal form of bravery into the more abstract one.
About this section
Section 328 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 330 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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