Section 318
Original German
318 Die öffentliche Meynung verdient daher eben so geachtet, als verachtet zu werden, dieses nach ihrem concreten Bewußtseyn und Aeußerung, jenes nach ihrer wesentlichen Grundlage, die, mehr oder weniger getrübt, in jenes Concrete nur scheint. Da sie in ihr nicht den Maaßstab der Unterscheidung noch die Fähigkeit hat, die substantielle Seite zum bestimmten Wissen in sich herauf zu heben, so ist die Unabhängigkeit von ihr, die erste formelle Bedingung zu etwas Großem und Vernünftigem (in der Wirklichkeit wie in der Wissenschaft). Dieses kann seinerseits sicher seyn, daß sie es sich in der Folge gefallen lassen, anerkennen und es zu einem ihrer Vorurtheile machen werde.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
318 Public opinion therefore deserves to be respected just as much as to be despised: the latter in respect of its concrete consciousness and expression, the former in respect of its essential foundation, which, more or less clouded, only shines through in that concrete. Since it has within itself neither the standard of distinction nor the capacity to raise the substantial side into determinate knowledge, independence of it is the first formal condition of anything great and rational (in actuality as in science). The great and rational, for its part, may be certain that public opinion will afterward put up with it, acknowledge it, and make it one of its prejudices.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
318 Public opinion therefore deserves to be respected as much as to be despised. It deserves contempt for its concrete awareness and expression. It deserves respect for its essential foundation, which shows through, more or less clouded, only as a glimmer in that concrete form. Public opinion has in itself neither a standard for telling the two apart nor the ability to raise the substantial side into definite knowledge. So independence from it is the first formal condition for anything great and rational, whether in actual life or in science. In its turn, the great and rational can be sure that public opinion will later accept it, acknowledge it, and make it one of its own prejudices.
About this section
Section 318 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 320 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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