Section 319
Original German
319 Die Freyheit der öffentlichen Mittheilung — (deren eines Mittel, die Presse, was es an weitreichender Berührung vor dem andern, der mündlichen Rede, voraus hat, ihm dagegen an der Lebendigkeit zurück steht) — die Befriedigung jenes prickelnden Triebes, seine Meynung zu sagen und gesagt zu haben, hat ihre directe Sicherung in den ihre Ausschweifungen theils verhindernden, theils bestrafenden polizeylichen und Rechtsgesetzen und Anordnungen; die indirecte Sicherung aber in der Unschädlichkeit, welche vornemlich in der Vernünftigkeit der Verfassung, der Festigkeit der Regierung, dann auch in der Oeffentlichkeit der Stände-Versammlungen begründet ist, — in letzterem, insofern sich in diesen Versammlungen die gediegene und gebildete Einsicht über die Interessen des Staats ausspricht, und Anderen wenig Bedeutendes zu sagen übrig läßt, hauptsächlich die Meynung ihnen benommen wird, als ob solches Sagen von eigenthümlicher Wichtigkeit und Wirkung sey; — ferner aber in der Gleichgültigkeit und Verachtung gegen seichtes und gehässiges Reden, zu der es sich nothwendig bald herunter gebracht hat.
Preßfreyheit definiren als die Freyheit, zu reden und zu schreiben, was man will, stehet dem parallel, wenn man die Freyheit überhaupt als die Freyheit angibt, zu thun, was man will. — Solches Reden gehört der noch ganz ungebildeten Rohheit und Oberflächlichkeit des Vorstellens an. Es ist übrigens der Natur der Sache nach nirgends, daß der Formalismus so hartnäckig festhält und so wenig sich verständigen läßt, als in dieser Materie. Denn der Gegenstand ist das Flüchtigste, Zufälligste, Besonderste, Zufälligste des Meynens in unendlicher Mannigfaltigkeit des Inhalts und der Wendungen; über die directe Aufforderung zum Diebstahl, Mord, Aufruhr u. s. f. hinaus liegt die Kunst und Bildung der Aeußerung, die für sich als ganz allgemein und unbestimmt erscheint, aber theils zugleich auch eine ganz bestimmte Bedeutung versteckt, theils mit Consequenzen zusammenhängt, die nicht wirklich ausgedrückt sind und von denen es unbestimmbar ist, sowohl ob sie richtig folgen, als auch ob sie in jener Aeußerung enthalten seyn sollen. Diese Unbestimmbarkeit des Stoffes und der Form läßt die Gesetze darüber diejenige Bestimmtheit nicht erreichen, welche vom Gesetz gefordert wird, und macht das Urtheil, indem Vergehen, Unrecht, Verletzung hier die besonderste subjectiveste Gestalt haben, gleichfalls zu einer ganz subjectiven Entscheidung. Außerdem ist die Verletzung an die Gedanken, die Meynung und den Willen der Anderen gerichtet, diese sind das Element, in welchem sie eine Wirklichkeit erlangt; dieses Element gehört aber der Freyheit der Anderen an, und es hängt daher von diesen ab, ob jene verletzende Handlung eine wirkliche That ist. — Gegen die Gesetze kann daher sowohl ihre Unbestimmtheit aufgezeigt werden, als sich für die Aeußerung Wendungen und Formirungen des Ausdrucks erfinden lassen, wodurch man die Gesetze umgeht oder die richterliche Entscheidung als ein subjectives Urtheil behauptet wird. Ferner kann dagegen, wenn die Aeußerung als eine verletzende That behandelt wird, behauptet werden, daß es keine That, sondern sowohl nur ein Meynen und Denken als nur ein Sagen sey; so wird in einem Athem aus der bloßen Subjectivität des Inhalts und der Form, aus der Unbedeutenheit und Unwichtigkeit eines bloßen Meynens und Sagens die Straflosigkeit desselben, und für eben dieses Meynen als für mein und zwar geistigstes Eigenthum und für das Sagen als für die Aeußerung und Gebrauch dieses meines Eigenthums, der hohe Respekt und Achtung gefordert. — Das Substantielle aber ist und bleibt, daß Verletzung der Ehre von Individuen überhaupt, Verläumdung, Schmähung, Verächtlichmachung der Regierung, ihrer Behörden und Beamten, der Person des Fürsten insbesondere, Verhöhnung der Gesetze, Aufforderung zum Aufruhr u. s. f. Verbrechen, Vergehen mit den mannichfaltigsten Abstuffungen sind. Die größere Unbestimmbarkeit, welche solche Handlungen durch das Element erhalten, worin sie ihre Aeußerung haben, hebt jenen ihren substantiellen Charakter nicht auf, und hat deswegen nur die Folge, daß der subjective Boden, auf welchem sie begangen werden, auch die Natur und Gestalt der Reaction bestimmt; dieser Boden des Vergehens selbst ist es, welcher in der Reaction, sey sie nun als polizeyliche Verhinderung der Verbrechen, oder als eigentliche Strafe bestimmt, die Subjectivität der Ansicht, Zufälligkeit u. dergl. zur Nothwendigkeit macht. Der Formalismus legt sich hier, wie immer darauf, aus einzelnen Seiten, die der äußerlichen Erscheinung angehören, und aus Abstractionen, die er daraus schöpft, die substantielle und concrete Natur der Sache weg zu raisonniren. — Die Wissenschaften aber, da sie, wenn sie nemlich anders Wissenschaften sind, sowohl sich überhaupt nicht auf dem Boden des Meynens und subjectiver Ansichten befinden, als auch ihre Darstellung nicht in der Kunst der Wendungen, des Anspielens, halben Aussprechens und Versteckens, sondern in dem unzweydeutigen, bestimmten und offenen Aussprechen der Bedeutung und des Sinnes besteht, fallen nicht unter die Categorie dessen, was die öffentliche Meynung ausmacht (§. 316.). — Uebrigens, indem, wie vorhin bemerkt, das Element, in welchem die Ansichten und deren Aeußerungen, als solche zu einer ausgeführten Handlung werden, und ihre wirkliche Existenz erreichen, die Intelligenz, Grundsätze, Meynungen Anderer sind, so hängt diese Seite der Handlungen, ihre eigentliche Wirkung und die Gefährlichkeit für die Individuen, die Gesellschaft und den Staat, (vergl. §. 218.) auch von der Beschaffenheit dieses Bodens ab, wie ein Funke auf einen Pulverhaufen geworfen eine ganz andere Gefährlichkeit hat, als auf feste Erde, wo er spurlos vergeht. — Wie daher die wissenschaftliche Aeußerung ihr Recht, und ihre Sicherung in ihrem Stoffe und Inhalt hat, so kann das Unrecht der Aeußerung auch eine Sicherung, oder wenigstens eine Duldung in der Verachtung erhalten, in welche sie sich versetzt hat. Ein Theil solcher für sich auch gesetzlich strafbaren Vergehen kann auf die Rechnung derjenigen Art von Nemesis kommen, welche die innere Ohnmacht, die sich durch die überwiegenden Talente und Tugenden gedrückt fühlt, auszuüben gedrungen ist, um gegen solche Uebermacht zu sich selbst zu kommen, und der eigenen Nichtigkeit ein Selbstbewußtseyn wiederzugeben, wie die römischen Soldaten an ihren Imperatoren im Triumphzug, für den harten Dienst und Gehorsam, vornämlich dafür daß ihr Name in jener Ehre nicht zum Zählen kam, durch Spottlieder eine harmlosere Nemesis ausübten, und sich in eine Art von Gleichgewicht mit ihnen setzten. Jene schlechte und gehässige Nemesis wird durch die Verachtung um ihren Effect gebracht, und dadurch, wie das Publikum, das etwa einen Kreis um solche Geschäftigkeit bildet, auf die bedeutungslose Schadenfreude und die eigene Verdammniß, die sie in sich hat, beschränkt.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
319 The freedom of public communication—(one means of which, the press, has over the other, the spoken word, the advantage of far-reaching contact, but falls short of it in liveliness)—the satisfaction of that tingling urge to say one's opinion and to have said it, has its direct safeguard in the police and legal statutes and ordinances which partly prevent and partly punish its excesses; its indirect safeguard, however, lies in its harmlessness, which is grounded chiefly in the rationality of the constitution and the stability of the government, then also in the publicity of the assemblies of estates—in the latter, in so far as in these assemblies solid and cultivated insight into the interests of the state is expressed and leaves little of any importance for others to say, and above all the opinion is taken from them that such saying is of peculiar importance and effect—and further in the indifference and contempt toward shallow and spiteful talk, to which it has necessarily soon brought itself down.
To define freedom of the press as the freedom to speak and write what one wants is parallel to giving freedom in general as the freedom to do what one wants. — Such talk belongs to the wholly uncultivated crudeness and superficiality of representation. Moreover, by the nature of the matter, there is nowhere that formalism holds on so stubbornly and lets itself be persuaded so little as in this subject. For the object is the most fleeting, the most contingent, the most particular, the most contingent of opinions, in infinite variety of content and turns of phrase; beyond direct incitement to theft, murder, rebellion and so on lies the art and cultivation of expression, which for itself appears wholly universal and indeterminate, but partly at the same time conceals a quite determinate meaning, partly is connected with consequences that are not actually expressed and of which it is indeterminable both whether they follow correctly and whether they are meant to be contained in that expression. This indeterminability of matter and form prevents the laws on the subject from attaining the determinateness that is demanded of law, and, since offense, wrong and injury here have the most particular, most subjective shape, makes the judgment likewise a wholly subjective decision. Besides, the injury is directed at the thoughts, the opinion and the will of others; these are the element in which it obtains an actuality; but this element belongs to the freedom of others, and it therefore depends on them whether that injurious action is an actual deed. — Against the laws, therefore, their indeterminacy can be pointed out, and turns and shapings of expression can be invented for the utterance by which the laws are evaded or the judicial decision is made out to be a subjective judgment. Further, if the utterance is treated as an injurious deed, it can be asserted against this that it is no deed, but only an opining and thinking, and only a saying; so in one breath, from the mere subjectivity of content and form, from the insignificance and unimportance of a mere opining and saying, impunity for it is claimed, and for this very opining, as being my own and indeed most spiritual property, and for the saying, as the expression and use of this my property, high respect and regard is demanded. — But the substantial point is and remains that violation of the honor of individuals in general, slander, abuse, the bringing of the government, its authorities and officials, of the person of the prince in particular, into contempt, derision of the laws, incitement to rebellion and so on are crimes and offenses of the most manifold gradations. The greater indeterminability which such actions receive from the element in which they find their expression does not cancel that substantial character of theirs, and has therefore only the consequence that the subjective ground on which they are committed also determines the nature and shape of the reaction; it is this ground of the offense itself which, in the reaction, whether this be determined as police prevention of crimes or as actual punishment, makes subjectivity of view, contingency and the like into necessity. Formalism here, as always, sets about reasoning away the substantial and concrete nature of the matter by means of single aspects belonging to external appearance, and of abstractions which it draws from them. — The sciences, however, since, if they are indeed sciences, they are not on the ground of opining and subjective views at all, and since their exposition consists not in the art of turns of phrase, of allusion, of half-saying and concealing, but in the unequivocal, determinate and open stating of meaning and sense, do not fall under the category of what constitutes public opinion (§ 316). — Moreover, since, as remarked above, the element in which views and their utterances become, as such, an executed action and attain their actual existence is the intelligence, the principles, the opinions of others, this side of the actions, their proper effect and the dangerousness for individuals, society and the state (compare § 218), also depends on the constitution of this ground, as a spark thrown on a heap of powder has a wholly different dangerousness than on solid earth, where it vanishes without a trace. — Just as scientific utterance, therefore, has its right and its safeguard in its subject matter and content, so the wrong of an utterance can also find a safeguard, or at least toleration, in the contempt into which it has put itself. A part of such offenses, though punishable by law in themselves, can be set down to the account of that kind of Nemesis which inner impotence, feeling itself oppressed by superior talents and virtues, is driven to exert, in order to come to itself against such superiority and to give back to its own nothingness a self-consciousness; as the Roman soldiers, in the triumphal procession, exercised a more harmless Nemesis on their imperators with mocking songs, for the hard service and obedience, above all because their name did not count in that honor, and so set themselves in a kind of equilibrium with them. That bad and spiteful Nemesis is robbed of its effect by contempt, and thereby, like the public that may form a circle about such busyness, is confined to meaningless malicious joy and to the perdition which it bears within itself.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
319 Freedom of public communication (one means of which, the press, has a far wider reach than the other, spoken words, but falls behind it in liveliness) is the satisfaction of that itching urge to say one's opinion and to have said it. This freedom has its direct protection in police and legal laws and regulations, which partly prevent its excesses and partly punish them. It has its indirect protection in its harmlessness. That harmlessness rests chiefly on the rationality of the constitution and the firmness of the government. It also rests on the openness of the assemblies of the estates. This openness helps insofar as these assemblies give voice to solid, educated insight into the interests of the state. That leaves others little of any importance to say, and above all it takes away the notion that such saying has special importance and effect. Finally it rests on the indifference and contempt toward shallow and spiteful talk, to which that talk has soon necessarily brought itself down.
To define freedom of the press as the freedom to say and write whatever one wants is parallel to defining freedom in general as the freedom to do whatever one wants. Such talk belongs to a wholly uneducated crudeness and superficiality of thinking. Besides, by the nature of the matter, there is nowhere that formalism holds on so stubbornly and lets itself be persuaded so little as on this topic. For the subject is the most fleeting, most accidental, most particular, most accidental side of opining, with endless variety in content and in turns of phrase. Beyond direct incitement to theft, murder, rebellion and so on lies the art and cultivation of expression. In itself it looks wholly general and indefinite. But partly it also hides a quite definite meaning at the same time, and partly it is tied to consequences that are not actually spoken. It cannot be determined whether those consequences follow correctly, or whether they are meant to be contained in that expression. This indeterminacy of material and form means that laws on the subject cannot reach the definiteness that is demanded of a law. It also makes the judgment a wholly subjective decision, since offenses, wrongs and injuries here have the most particular, most subjective shape. Besides, the injury is aimed at the thoughts, opinion and will of others. These are the element in which it gains actuality. But this element belongs to the freedom of those others, and so it depends on them whether that injuring act is a real deed. So against the laws one can point out their indefiniteness. One can also invent turns of phrase and forms of expression that get around the laws, or that make the judge's decision look like a merely subjective judgment. Further, when an utterance is treated as an injurious deed, one can claim that it is no deed at all, but only an opinion and a thought, or only a saying. In one breath, then, the mere subjectivity of the content and form, the insignificance and unimportance of a mere opinion and saying, is used to claim that it should go unpunished. And in the same breath high respect and regard is demanded for this very opinion, as my own and indeed my most spiritual property, and for the saying, as the expression and use of this my property. But what is substantial is and remains this: injury to the honor of individuals in general, slander, abuse, bringing the government, its authorities and officials, and the person of the prince in particular, into contempt, mocking the laws, incitement to rebellion and so on, are crimes and offenses of the most varied degrees. The greater indeterminacy that such acts get from the element in which they are expressed does not remove their substantial character. It has only the result that the subjective ground on which they are committed also decides the nature and shape of the response. This ground of the offense itself is what, in the response, makes the subjectivity of the view, chance and the like into a necessity. This holds whether the response is set as police prevention of crimes or as actual punishment. Here, as always, formalism sets out to argue away the substantial and concrete nature of the matter, using single aspects that belong to the outward appearance and the abstractions it draws from them. The sciences, however, are another matter, provided that they really are sciences. They are not on the ground of opining and subjective views. Their presentation does not consist in the art of turns of phrase, hints, half-saying and hiding, but in the clear, definite and open statement of meaning and sense. So they do not fall under the category of what makes up public opinion (§ 316). Moreover, as noted above, the element in which views and their expressions become a carried-out action and gain real existence is the intelligence, principles and opinions of others. So this side of the actions, their real effect and their danger to individuals, society and the state (compare § 218), also depends on the condition of this ground. A spark thrown on a heap of gunpowder is dangerous in quite a different way than one thrown on solid earth, where it dies away without a trace. So just as scientific expression has its right and its protection in its subject matter and content, the wrong of an utterance can also find protection, or at least toleration, in the contempt into which it has put itself. Some of such offenses, which are also punishable by law in themselves, can be put down to a kind of nemesis. Inner powerlessness feels itself weighed down by superior talents and virtues, and is driven to practice this nemesis. In this way it comes back to itself against such superiority, and gives its own nothingness a self-awareness again. In the same way the Roman soldiers, in the triumphal procession, exercised a more harmless nemesis on their imperators through mocking songs. This was for their hard service and obedience, and above all because their names did not count in that honor. They put themselves into a kind of balance with them. That bad and spiteful nemesis loses its effect through contempt. Through this it is confined, like the public that perhaps forms a circle around such busy activity, to meaningless malicious glee and to the damnation it carries in itself.
About this section
Section 319 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 321 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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