Section 317
Original German
317 Die öffentliche Meynung enthält daher in sich die ewigen substantiellen Prinzipien der Gerechtigkeit, den wahrhaften Inhalt und das Resultat der ganzen Verfassung, Gesetzgebung und des allgemeinen Zustandes überhaupt, in Form des gesunden Menschenverstandes, als der durch alle in Gestalt von Vorurtheilen hindurch gehenden sittlichen Grundlage, so wie die wahrhaften Bedürfnisse und richtigen Tendenzen der Wirklichkeit. — Zugleich wie diß Innere ins Bewußtseyn tritt, und in allgemeinen Sätzen zur Vorstellung kommt, theils für sich, theils zum Behuf des concreten Raisonnirens über Begebenheiten, Anordnungen und Verhältnisse des Staats und gefühlte Bedürfnisse, so tritt die ganze Zufälligkeit des Meynens, seine Unwissenheit und Verkehrung, falsche Kenntniß und Beurtheilung ein. Indem es dabey um das Bewußtseyn der Eigenthümlichkeit der Ansicht und Kenntniß zu thun ist, so ist eine Meynung, je schlechter ihr Inhalt ist, desto eigenthümlicher; denn das Schlechte ist das in seinem Inhalte ganz Besondere und Eigenthümliche, das Vernünftige dagegen das an und für sich Allgemeine, und das Eigenthümliche ist das, worauf das Meynen sich etwas einbildet.
Es ist darum nicht für eine Verschiedenheit subjectiver Ansicht zu halten, wenn es das Einemal heißt;Vox populi, vox dei;und das andere Mal (bey Ariosto\*) z. B.);Che'l Volgare ignorante ogn' un riprendaE parli più di quel che meno intenda.
\*) Oder bey Göthe:Zuschlagen kann die Masse,Da ist sie respektabel;Urtheilen gelingt ihr miserabel.
Beydes liegt zumal in der öffentlichen Meynung. — Indem in ihr Wahrheit und endloser Irrthum so unmittelbar vereinigt ist, so ist es mit dem einen oder dem anderen nicht wahrhafter Ernst. Womit es Ernst ist, diß kann schwer zu unterscheiden scheinen; in der That wird es diß auch seyn, wenn man sich an die unmittelbare Aeußerung der öffentlichen Meynung hält. Indem aber das Substantielle ihr Inneres ist, so ist es nur mit diesem wahrhaft Ernst; diß kann aber nicht aus ihr, sondern eben darum, weil es das Substantielle ist, nur aus und für sich selbst erkannt werden. Welche Leidenschaft in das Gemeynte auch gelegt sey, und wie ernsthaft behauptet oder angegriffen und gestritten werde, so ist diß kein Kriterium über das, um was es in der That zu thun sey; aber diß Meynen würde am allerwenigsten sich darüber verständigen lassen, daß seine Ernsthaftigkeit nichts Ernstliches sey. — Ein großer Geist hat die Frage zur öffentlichen Beantwortung aufgestellt, ob es erlaubt sey, ein Volk zu täuschen? Man mußte antworten, daß ein Volk über seine substantielle Grundlage, das Wesen und bestimmten Character seines Geistes sich nicht täuschen lasse, aber über die Weise, wie es diesen weiß und nach dieser Weise seine Handlungen, Ereignisse u. s. f. beurtheilt, — von sich selbst getäuscht wird. —
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
317 Public opinion therefore contains within itself the eternal substantial principles of justice, the true content and the result of the whole constitution, legislation and universal condition in general, in the form of healthy common sense, as the ethical foundation that runs through everyone in the shape of prejudices, as well as the true needs and correct tendencies of actuality. — At the same time, as this inner content enters consciousness and comes to representation in universal propositions, partly for itself, partly for the purposes of concrete reasoning about the events, arrangements and relations of the state and felt needs, the whole contingency of opinion enters, with its ignorance and perversity, its false knowledge and judgment. Since what matters here is the consciousness of the peculiarity of a view and a knowledge, an opinion is the more peculiar the worse its content is; for the bad is what is wholly particular and peculiar in its content, while the rational is what is universal in and for itself, and the peculiar is that on which opinion prides itself.
It is therefore not to be taken for a difference of subjective view when at one time it is said,Vox populi, vox dei (the voice of the people is the voice of God);and at another (in Ariosto, for example):Che'l Volgare ignorante ogn' un riprendaE parli più di quel che meno intenda.(Let the ignorant mob censure everyone, and speak most of what it least understands.)
Or in Goethe:The mass can strike a blow,There it is respectable;Judging is something it does miserably.
Both lie together in public opinion. — Since truth and endless error are so immediately united in it, neither the one nor the other is truly in earnest. What is in earnest may seem hard to distinguish; and in fact it will be so, if one holds to the immediate utterance of public opinion. But since the substantial is its inner content, it is only with this that it is truly in earnest; yet this cannot be known from public opinion, but, precisely because it is the substantial, only from and for itself. Whatever passion may be put into what is opined, and however earnestly it may be asserted or attacked and fought over, this is no criterion of what in fact is at stake; but this opining would least of all let itself be persuaded that its earnestness is nothing earnest. — A great mind once put to public answer the question whether it is permitted to deceive a people. One had to answer that a people cannot be deceived about its substantial foundation, the essence and determinate character of its spirit, but that about the way in which it knows this, and judges its actions, events and so on according to this way, it is deceived by itself. —
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
317 Public opinion therefore contains within it the eternal, substantial principles of justice. It contains the true content and the result of the whole constitution, the legislation and the general condition of things as a whole, in the form of common sense, which is the ethical foundation running through everyone in the shape of prejudices. It also contains the true needs and the correct tendencies of actual reality. At the same time, when this inner content comes into consciousness and is put into general statements, it does so partly for its own sake and partly to support concrete argument about events, arrangements and relations in the state and about felt needs. Then all the chance and accident of opinion comes in as well, with its ignorance, its distortion, and its false knowledge and false judgment. Here what matters is the awareness of the peculiarity of a view and of what one knows. So the worse an opinion's content is, the more peculiar it is. For what is bad is whatever is wholly particular and peculiar in its content, while what is rational is what is universal in and for itself. And the peculiar is what opinion takes pride in.
So it should not be taken as a difference of subjective view when one time we are told,"The voice of the people is the voice of God";and another time (in Ariosto, for example):"That the ignorant crowd should blame everyone, and speak most of what it understands least."
Or in Goethe:"The mass can strike a blow;There it is respectable.Judging, it manages miserably."
Both belong together in public opinion. Since truth and endless error are united so immediately in it, one is not truly in earnest about either of the two. What one is in earnest about may seem hard to tell apart. In fact it will be hard, if one holds to the immediate expression of public opinion. But since what is substantial is its inner side, one is truly in earnest only about that. Yet this cannot be known from public opinion itself. Precisely because it is the substantial, it can only be known from and for itself. No matter what passion is put into what is opined, and no matter how earnestly it is asserted or attacked and fought over, none of this is a standard for what is really at stake. But this opining would least of all let itself be persuaded that its earnestness is nothing serious. A great mind once put a question to the public for an answer: whether it is permitted to deceive a people? One had to answer that a people cannot be deceived about its substantial foundation, the essence and definite character of its spirit. But about the way it knows this, and about how it judges its actions, events and so on by that way of knowing, it is deceived by itself.
About this section
Section 317 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 319 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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