Section 316
Original German
316 Die formelle subjective Freyheit, daß die Einzelnen als solche ihr eigenes Urtheilen, Meynen und Rathen über die allgemeinen Angelegenheiten haben und äußern, hat in dem Zusammen, welches öffentliche Meynung heißt, ihre Erscheinung. Das an und für sich Allgemeine, das Substantielle und Wahre, ist darin mit seinem Gegentheile, dem für sich Eigenthümlichen und Besonderen des Meynens der Vielen verknüpft; diese Existenz ist daher der vorhandene Widerspruch ihrer selbst, — das Erkennen als Erscheinung; die Wesentlichkeit eben so unmittelbar als die Unwesentlichkeit.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
316 The formal subjective freedom that individuals as such have and express their own judgment, opinion and counsel on universal affairs has its appearance in that togetherness which is called public opinion. What is universal in and for itself, the substantial and the true, is here bound up with its opposite, the peculiar and particular for itself in the opinion of the many; this existence is therefore the present contradiction of itself—knowing as appearance; essentiality just as immediately as inessentiality.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
316 Formal subjective freedom means that individuals, as individuals, have and voice their own judgments, opinions and advice about public affairs. This freedom shows itself in what is called public opinion. What is universal in and for itself, the substantial and true, is tied here to its opposite, to what is peculiar to itself and particular in the opinions of the many. So this way of existing is the contradiction of itself, present before us. It is knowing as appearance: what is essential is just as immediately what is inessential.
About this section
Section 316 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 318 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the European tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.