Section 302
Original German
302 Als vermittelndes Organ betrachtet stehen die Stände zwischen der Regierung überhaupt einerseits, und dem in die besondern Sphären und Individuen aufgelösten Volke andererseits. Ihre Bestimmung fordert an sie so sehr den Sinn und die Gesinnung des Staats und der Regierung, als der Interessen der besonderen Kreise und der Einzelnen. Zugleich hat diese Stellung die Bedeutung einer mit der organisirten Regierungsgewalt gemeinschaftlichen Vermittelung, daß weder die fürstliche Gewalt als Extrem isolirt, und dadurch als bloße Herrschergewalt und Willkühr erscheine, noch daß die besonderen Interessen der Gemeinden, Corporationen und der Individuen sich isoliren, oder noch mehr daß die Einzelnen nicht zur Darstellung einer Menge und eines Hauffens, zu einem somit unorganischen Meynen und Wollen, und zur bloß massenhaften Gewalt gegen den organischen Staat kommen.
Es gehört zu den wichtigsten logischen Einsichten, daß ein bestimmtes Moment, das als im Gegensatze stehend die Stellung eines Extrems hat, es dadurch zu seyn aufhört und organisches Moment ist, daß es zugleich Mitte ist. Bey dem hier betrachteten Gegenstand ist es um so wichtiger, diese Seite herauszuheben, weil es zu den häufigen aber höchst gefährlichen Vorurtheilen gehört, Stände hauptsächlich im Gesichtspunkte des Gegensatzes gegen die Regierung, als ob diß ihre wesentliche Stellung wäre, vorzustellen. Organisch, d. i. in die Totalität aufgenommen, beweist sich das ständische Element nur durch die Function der Vermittlung. Damit ist der Gegensatz selbst zu einem Schein herabgesetzt. Wenn er, insofern er seine Erscheinung hat, nicht bloß die Oberfläche beträfe, sondern wirklich ein substantieller Gegensatz würde, so wäre der Staat in seinem Untergange begriffen. — Das Zeichen, daß der Widerstreit nicht dieser Art ist, ergiebt sich der Natur der Sache nach dadurch, wenn die Gegenstände desselben nicht die wesentlichen Elemente des Staatsorganismus, sondern speziellere und gleichgültigere Dinge betreffen, und die Leidenschaft, die sich doch an diesen Inhalt knüpft, zur Partheisucht um ein bloß subjectives Interesse, etwa um die höheren Staatsstellen, wird.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
302 Considered as a mediating organ, the estates stand between the government in general on the one side and the people dissolved into particular spheres and individuals on the other. Their determination demands of them the sense and disposition of the state and government as much as of the interests of particular circles and individuals. At the same time, this position has the meaning of a mediation common to them and the organized executive power: the princely power must neither be isolated as an extreme, and thereby appear as mere domination and arbitrary choice; nor must the particular interests of communities, corporations, and individuals be isolated; still less must individuals come to present themselves as a multitude and a heap, with a correspondingly inorganic opinion and will, and as merely massive force against the organic state.
It belongs among the most important logical insights that a determinate moment which, as standing in opposition, occupies the position of an extreme, ceases to be such and is an organic moment through being at the same time a middle term. In the object considered here it is all the more important to emphasize this aspect, because it is a frequent but highly dangerous prejudice to represent the estates chiefly from the standpoint of opposition to the government, as if this were their essential position. The element of the estates proves itself organic, that is, taken up into the totality, only through the function of mediation. Opposition itself is thereby reduced to a semblance. If, insofar as it appears, it did not merely touch the surface but really became a substantial opposition, the state would be in the course of its downfall. By the nature of the matter, the sign that a conflict is not of this kind is that its objects concern not the essential elements of the state's organism but more specialized and indifferent things, and that the passion which nonetheless attaches to this content becomes partisanship for a merely subjective interest, perhaps the higher offices of state.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
302 Seen as a mediating organ, the estates stand between the government in general on one side and the people, broken up into particular spheres and individuals, on the other. Their task requires of them the sense and attitude of the state and the government as much as that of the interests of the particular circles and of individuals. At the same time, this position has the meaning of a mediation shared with the organized power of government. Its purpose is that the power of the prince does not appear isolated as an extreme, and thereby as mere power to rule and arbitrary choice. It is also that the particular interests of communities, corporations and individuals do not become isolated. And above all it is that individuals do not come to appear as a crowd and a heap, with an unorganized opinion and will, and as a merely massive force against the organic state.
It is among the most important logical insights that a determinate element which stands in opposition and so has the position of an extreme ceases to be one, and is an organic element, by being at the same time a middle. In the matter considered here it is all the more important to bring out this side. It is a common but highly dangerous prejudice to picture the estates mainly from the viewpoint of opposition to the government, as if that were their essential position. The estates element proves itself organic, that is, taken up into the totality, only through the function of mediation. With this the opposition itself is reduced to an appearance. If the opposition, insofar as it appears, did not merely affect the surface but became a truly substantial opposition, the state would be going under. — The sign that the conflict is not of this kind appears, by the nature of the matter, when its objects are not the essential elements of the state organism but more special and more indifferent things. It also appears when the passion that is attached to this content becomes factional strife over a merely subjective interest, such as the higher state posts.
About this section
Section 302 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 304 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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