Section 303
Original German
303 Der allgemeine, näher dem Dienst der Regierung sich widmende Stand, hat unmittelbar in seiner Bestimmung, das Allgemeine zum Zwecke seiner wesentlichen Thätigkeit zu haben; in dem ständischen Elemente der gesetzgebenden Gewalt kommt der Privatstand zu einer politischen Bedeutung und Wirksamkeit. Derselbe kann nun dabey weder als bloße ungeschiedene Masse, noch als eine in ihre Atome aufgelöste Menge erscheinen, sondern als das was er bereits ist, nämlich unterschieden in den auf das substantielle Verhältniß, und in den auf die besondern Bedürfnisse und die sie vermittelnde Arbeit sich gründenden Stand. (§. 201. ff.) Nur so knüpft sich in dieser Rücksicht wahrhaft das im Staate wirkliche, Besondere an das Allgemeine an.
Diß gehet gegen eine andere gangbare Vorstellung, daß, indem der Privatstand zur Theilnahme an der allgemeinen Sache in der gesetzgebenden Gewalt erhoben wird, er dabey in Form der Einzelnen erscheinen müsse, sey es daß sie Stellvertreter für diese Funktion wählen, oder daß gar selbst jeder eine Stimme dabey exerciren solle. Diese atomistische, abstracte Ansicht verschwindet schon in der Familie wie in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, wo der Einzelne, nur als Mitglied eines Allgemeinen zur Erscheinung kommt. Der Staat aber ist wesentlich eine Organisation von solchen Gliedern, die für sich Kreise sind, und in ihm soll sich kein Moment als eine unorganische Menge zeigen. Die Vielen als Einzelne, was man gerne unter Volk versteht, sind wohl ein Zusammen, aber nur als die Menge, — eine formlose Masse, deren Bewegung und Thun eben damit nur elementarisch, vernunftlos, wild und fürchterlich wäre. Wie man in Beziehung auf Verfassung noch vom Volke, dieser unorganischen Gesammtheit, sprechen hört, so kann man schon zum Voraus wissen, daß man nur Allgemeinheiten und schiefe Deklamationen zu erwarten hat. — Die Vorstellung, welche die in jenen Kreisen schon vorhandenen Gemeinwesen, wo sie ins Politische, d. i. in den Standpunkt der höchsten concreten Allgemeinheit eintreten, wieder in eine Menge von Individuen auflößt, hält eben damit das bürgerliche und das politische Leben von einander getrennt, und stellt dieses, so zu sagen, in die Luft, da seine Basis nur die abstracte Einzelnheit der Willkühr und Meynung, somit das Zufällige, nicht eine an und für sich feste und berechtigte Grundlage seyn würde. — Obgleich in den Vorstellungen sogenannter Theorien die Stände der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft überhaupt, und die Stände in politischer Bedeutung weit auseinander liegen, so hat doch die Sprache noch diese Vereinigung erhalten, die früher ohnehin vorhanden war.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
303 The universal estate, more particularly devoted to the service of government, has immediately in its determination the universal as the purpose of its essential activity. In the element of the estates within the legislative power, the private estate acquires political significance and efficacy. It can appear here neither as a mere undifferentiated mass nor as a multitude dissolved into its atoms, but only as what it already is: distinguished into the estate founded upon the substantial relation and the estate founded upon particular needs and the labor mediating them (§ 201 ff.). Only thus, in this respect, is the particular actually present in the state truly connected with the universal.
This runs counter to another current conception: that when the private estate is raised to participation in the universal concern within the legislative power, it must appear in the form of individuals, whether they elect representatives for this function or even each exercise a vote himself. This atomistic, abstract view already disappears in the family as in civil society, where the individual appears only as a member of a universal. But the state is essentially an organization of members that are themselves circles, and no moment within it should appear as an inorganic multitude. The Many as individuals, which people like to understand by the people, are indeed a togetherness, but only as a multitude—a formless mass whose movement and activity would thereby be merely elemental, irrational, wild, and terrible. Whenever one still hears talk of the people, this inorganic entirety, in relation to the constitution, one may know in advance that only generalities and crooked declamations are to be expected. The conception that dissolves the communities already present in those circles back into a multitude of individuals when they enter the political sphere, that is, the standpoint of the highest concrete universality, thereby keeps civil and political life separate and leaves the latter, so to speak, hanging in the air, since its basis would be only the abstract individuality of arbitrary choice and opinion, hence the contingent, not a foundation firm and authorized in and for itself. Although in the conceptions of so-called theories the estates of civil society in general and the estates in the political sense lie far apart, language has nonetheless preserved this union, which was in any case present formerly.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
303 The universal class, which devotes itself more closely to the service of the government, has it directly in its calling to take the universal as the aim of its essential activity. In the estates element of the legislative power, the private class comes to a political significance and effectiveness. In this role it can appear neither as a mere undivided mass nor as a crowd dissolved into its atoms. It must appear as what it already is, namely divided into the class that rests on the substantial relationship and the class that rests on particular needs and the work that mediates them (§ 201 ff.). Only in this way, in this respect, is what is truly real in the state, the particular, tied to the universal.
This goes against another common idea. When the private class is raised to a share in the universal cause in the legislative power, it supposedly has to appear in the form of individuals, either by choosing representatives for this function or even by each person casting a vote. This atomistic, abstract view disappears already in the family and in civil society, where the individual appears only as a member of a universal. The state, however, is essentially an organization of members that are circles in themselves, and in it no element should show itself as an unorganized crowd. The many as individuals, which people like to understand by "the people," are indeed a together, but only as the crowd. That is a formless mass whose movement and action would therefore be only elemental, without reason, wild and terrible. When one still hears talk about the people, this unorganized whole, in connection with a constitution, one can know in advance that only generalities and crooked declamation are to be expected. — The idea that dissolves the communities already present in those circles back into a crowd of individuals, just when they enter the political sphere, that is, the standpoint of the highest concrete universality, keeps civil life and political life apart. It leaves political life, so to speak, hanging in the air. Its base would then be only the abstract individuality of arbitrary choice and opinion, and so the accidental, not a foundation that is firm in and for itself and entitled. — In the ideas of so-called theories, the classes of civil society and the estates in a political sense lie far apart. Yet language has kept the union of the two, which in any case existed earlier.
About this section
Section 303 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 305 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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