Section 301
Original German
301 Das ständische Element hat die Bestimmung, daß die allgemeine Angelegenheit nicht nur an sich, sondern auch für sich, d. i. daß das Moment der subjectiven formellen Freyheit, das öffentliche Bewußtseyn als empirische Allgemeinheit der Ansichten und Gedanken der Vielen, darin zur Existenz komme.
Der Ausdruck: die Vielen, (οἱ πολλοί) bezeichnet die empirische Allgemeinheit richtiger, als das gäng und gäbe: Alle. Denn wenn man sagen wird, daß es sich von selbst verstehe, daß unter diesen Allen zunächst wenigstens die Kinder, Weiber u. s. f. nicht gemeynt seyen, so versteht es sich hiemit noch mehr von selbst, daß man den ganz bestimmten Ausdruck: Alle nicht gebrauchen sollte, wo es sich um noch etwas ganz Unbestimmtes handelt. — Es sind überhaupt so unsäglich viele schiefe und falsche Vorstellungen und Redensarten über Volk, Verfassung und Stände in den Umlauf der Meynung gekommen, daß es eine vergebliche Mühe wäre, sie aufführen, erörtern und berichtigen zu wollen. Die Vorstellung, die das gewöhnliche Bewußtseyn über die Nothwendigkeit oder Nützlichkeit der Concurrenz von Ständen zunächst vor sich zu haben pflegt, ist vornemlich etwa, daß die Abgeordnete aus dem Volk oder gar das Volk es am besten verstehen müsse, was zu seinem Besten diene, und daß es den ungezweifelt besten Willen für dieses Beste habe. Was das erstere betrifft, so ist vielmehr der Fall, daß das Volk, insofern mit diesem Worte ein besonderer Theil der Mitglieder eines Staats bezeichnet ist, den Theil ausdrückt, der nicht weiß was er will. Zu wissen was man will, und noch mehr was der an und für sich seyende Wille, die Vernunft, will, ist die Frucht tiefer Erkenntniß und Einsicht, welche eben nicht die Sache des Volks ist. — Die Gewährleistung, die für das allgemeine Beste und die öffentliche Freyheit in den Ständen liegt, findet sich bey einigem Nachdenken nicht in der besonderen Einsicht derselben — denn die höchsten Staatsbeamten haben nothwendig tiefere und umfassendere Einsicht in die Natur der Einrichtungen und Bedürfnisse des Staats, so wie die größere Geschicklichkeit und Gewohnheit dieser Geschäfte und können ohne Stände das Beste thun, wie sie auch fortwährend bey den ständischen Versammlungen das Beste thun müssen, — sondern sie liegt theils wohl in einer Zuthat von Einsicht der Abgeordneten vornemlich in das Treiben der den Augen der höheren Stellen ferner stehenden Beamten, und insbesondere in dringendere und spezielle Bedürfnisse und Mängel, die sie in concreter Anschauung vor sich haben, theils aber in derjenigen Wirkung, welche die zu erwartende Censur Vieler und zwar eine öffentliche Censur mit sich führt, schon im Voraus die beste Einsicht auf die Geschäfte und vorzulegenden Entwürfe zu verwenden und sie nur den reinsten Motiven gemäß einzurichten — eine Nöthigung, die eben so für die Mitglieder der Stände selbst wirksam ist. Was aber den vorzüglich guten Willen der Stände für das allgemeine Beste betrifft, so ist schon oben (§. 272. Anm.) bemerkt worden, daß es zu der Ansicht des Pöbels, dem Standpunkte des Negativen überhaupt gehört, bey der Regierung einen bösen oder weniger guten Willen vorauszusetzen; — eine Voraussetzung, die zunächst, wenn in gleicher Form geantwortet werden sollte, die Recrimination zur Folge hätte, daß die Stände, da sie von der Einzelnheit, dem Privat-Standpunkt und den besonderen Interessen herkommen, für diese auf Kosten des allgemeinen Interesses ihre Wirksamkeit zu gebrauchen geneigt seyen, da hingegen die andern Momente der Staatsgewalt schon für sich auf den Standpunkt des Staates gestellt, und dem allgemeinen Zwecke gewidmet sind. Was hiermit die Garantie überhaupt betrifft, welche besonders in den Ständen liegen soll, so theilt auch jede andere der Staat-Institutionen diß mit ihnen, eine Garantie des öffentlichen Wohls und der vernünftigen Freyheit zu seyn, und es gibt darunter Institutionen, wie die Souverainetät des Monarchen, die Erblichkeit der Thronfolge, Gerichtsverfassung u. s. f. in welchen diese Garantie noch in viel stärkerem Grade liegt. Die eigenthümliche Begriffsbestimmung der Stände ist deshalb darin zu suchen, daß in ihnen das subjective Moment der allgemeinen Freyheit, die eigene Einsicht und der eigene Wille der Sphäre, die in dieser Darstellung bürgerliche Gesellschaft genannt worden ist, in Beziehung auf den Staat zur Existenz kommt. Daß diß Moment eine Bestimmung der zur Totalität entwickelten Idee ist, diese innere Nothwendigkeit, welche nicht mit äußeren Nothwendigkeiten und Nützlichkeiten zu verwechseln ist, folgt wie überall, aus dem philosophischen Gesichtspunkte.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
301 The determination of the element of the estates is that the universal concern should come to existence within it not only in itself but also for itself: that is, the moment of subjective formal freedom, public consciousness as the empirical universality of the views and thoughts of the Many.
The expression “the Many” (οἱ πολλοί) designates empirical universality more correctly than the current expression “All.” For if it is said that it is self-evident that among these All at least children, women, and so forth are not initially meant, then it is still more self-evident that one should not use the wholly determinate expression “All” where something still quite indeterminate is in question. So indescribably many crooked and false conceptions and expressions about the people, constitution, and estates have entered the circulation of opinion that it would be a futile labor to try to list, discuss, and correct them. The conception ordinary consciousness tends first to have before it concerning the necessity or usefulness of the participation of estates is chiefly that the deputies from the people, or even the people itself, must best understand what serves its welfare, and that it has the undoubtedly best will for this welfare. As for the former, the opposite is rather the case: the people, insofar as this word designates a particular part of the members of a state, expresses the part that does not know what it wills. To know what one wills, and still more what the will that is in and for itself—reason—wills, is the fruit of profound knowledge and insight, which is precisely not the people's affair. On some reflection, the guarantee for the universal welfare and public freedom that lies in the estates is not found in their particular insight: the highest state officials necessarily have deeper and more comprehensive insight into the nature of the arrangements and needs of the state, as well as greater skill and familiarity with these affairs, and can do what is best without estates, just as they must continually do what is best at the assemblies of estates. Rather, it lies partly in an additional insight provided by the deputies, chiefly into the activities of officials more remote from the eyes of higher authorities, and in particular into more urgent and specific needs and deficiencies, which they have before them in concrete intuition. Partly, however, it lies in the effect of the expected censure of the Many, a public censure: this induces those concerned to apply their best insight in advance to the business and proposed drafts, and to arrange them only in accordance with the purest motives—a pressure that operates just as much upon the members of the estates themselves. But as for the especially good will of the estates toward the universal welfare, it has already been remarked above (§ 272, remark) that to presuppose an evil or less good will in government belongs to the outlook of the rabble, to the standpoint of the negative in general. If answered in the same form, this presupposition would produce the countercharge that the estates, since they come from individuality, the private standpoint, and particular interests, might be inclined to use their activity on behalf of these at the expense of the universal interest, whereas the other moments of state power are already placed, in their own right, at the standpoint of the state and devoted to the universal purpose. As for the guarantee in general that is supposed to lie particularly in the estates, every other institution of the state shares with them in being a guarantee of public welfare and rational freedom. Among them are institutions, such as the monarch's sovereignty, the hereditary succession to the throne, the constitution of the courts, and so forth, in which this guarantee lies to a much stronger degree. The distinctive conceptual determination of the estates must therefore be sought in this: within them the subjective moment of universal freedom—the individual insight and will of the sphere called civil society in this exposition—comes into existence in relation to the state. That this moment is a determination of the Idea developed into a totality—this inward necessity, which must not be confused with external necessities and utilities—follows, here as everywhere, from the philosophical point of view.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
301 The estates element has the purpose that the universal concern should exist not only in itself but also for itself. That is, it should bring into existence the element of subjective formal freedom, namely public consciousness as the empirical universality of the views and thoughts of the many.
The expression "the many" (οἱ πολλοί) names empirical universality more correctly than the common expression "all." If it is said that it goes without saying that among these all, at least children, women and so on are not meant, then it goes without saying even more that one should not use the quite definite word "all" where something quite indefinite is in question. — So many crooked and false ideas and phrases about people, constitution and estates have come into circulation that it would be wasted effort to try to list them, discuss them and correct them. The idea that ordinary consciousness usually first has before it about why the estates are necessary or useful is mainly this: that the deputies of the people, or even the people themselves, must understand best what serves their own good, and that they undoubtedly have the best will for that good. As for the first point, the fact is rather that the people, taken as a particular part of the members of a state, is the part that does not know what it wants. To know what one wants, and still more to know what the will that is in and for itself, reason, wants, is the fruit of deep knowledge and insight, and that is not the business of the people. — On some reflection, the guarantee that the estates give for the general good and public freedom is not found in their particular insight. The highest state officials necessarily have deeper and wider insight into the nature of the state's institutions and needs, and more skill and practice in these affairs. They can do the best without estates, just as they must continue to do the best at the assemblies of the estates. The guarantee lies partly in an added measure of insight on the part of the deputies. This is mainly insight into the doings of the officials who stand farther from the eyes of the higher posts, and in particular into more urgent and special needs and defects that the deputies see before them in concrete observation. It lies partly in the effect that the expected criticism of many people, and public criticism at that, has. It makes people put their best insight in advance into the business and the plans to be put forward, and shape them only by the purest motives. This pressure works equally on the members of the estates themselves. As for the especially good will of the estates toward the general good, it was already remarked above (§ 272, note) that it belongs to the outlook of the rabble, the standpoint of the negative in general, to assume an evil or less good will on the part of the government. If one answered in the same form, this assumption would first lead to the counter-charge that the estates, since they come from individuality, from the private standpoint and from particular interests, are inclined to use their influence for these at the expense of the universal interest. The other elements of the power of the state, on the other hand, are already placed by themselves on the standpoint of the state and are devoted to the universal aim. As for the guarantee in general that is supposed to lie especially in the estates, every other institution of the state shares this with them, namely that it is a guarantee of public welfare and rational freedom. Some of these institutions, such as the sovereignty of the monarch, the hereditary succession to the throne, and the court system, carry this guarantee to a much stronger degree. The proper determination of the estates by the concept must therefore be sought in this: in them the subjective element of universal freedom, the own insight and own will of the sphere that has been called civil society in this account, comes into existence in relation to the state. That this element is a determination of the Idea developed into a totality, this inner necessity, which is not to be confused with external necessities and usefulnesses, follows, as everywhere, from the philosophical point of view.
About this section
Section 301 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 303 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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