Section 280
Original German
280 3) Dieses letzte Selbst des Staatswillens ist in dieser seiner Abstraction einfach und daher unmittelbare Einzelnheit; in seinem Begriffe selbst liegt hiermit die Bestimmung der Natürlichkeit; der Monarch ist daher wesentlich als dieses Individuum, abstrahirt von allem anderen Inhalte, und dieses Individuum auf unmittelbare natürliche Weise, durch die natürliche Geburt, zur Würde des Monarchen bestimmt.
Dieser Uebergang vom Begriff der reinen Selbstbestimmung in die Unmittelbarkeit des Seyns und damit in die Natürlichkeit ist rein speculativer Natur, seine Erkenntniß gehört daher der logischen Philosophie an. Es ist übrigens im Ganzen derselbe Uebergang, welcher als die Natur des Willens überhaupt bekannt und der Prozeß ist, einen Inhalt aus der Subjectivität (als vorgestellten Zweck), in das Daseyn zu übersetzen. (§. 8.) Aber die eigenthümliche Form der Idee und des Ueberganges, der hier betrachtet wird, ist das unmittelbare Umschlagen der reinen Selbstbestimmung des Willens (des einfachen Begriffes selbst) in ein Dieses und natürliches Daseyn, ohne die Vermittelung durch einen besondern Inhalt — (einen Zweck im Handeln). — Im sogenannten ontologischen Beweise vom Daseyn Gottes ist es dasselbe Umschlagen des absoluten Begriffes in das Seyn, was die Tiefe der Idee in der neuern Zeit ausgemacht hat, was aber in der neusten Zeit für das Unbegreifliche ausgegeben worden ist, — wodurch man denn, weil nur die Einheit des Begriffs und des Daseyns (§. 23.) die Wahrheit ist, auf das Erkennen der Wahrheit Verzicht geleistet hat. Indem das Bewußtseyn des Verstandes diese Einheit nicht in sich hat und bey der Trennung der beyden Momente der Wahrheit stehen bleibt, giebt es etwa bey diesem Gegenstande noch einen Glauben an jene Einheit zu. Aber indem die Vorstellung des Monarchen, als dem gewöhnlichen Bewußtseyn ganz anheimfallend angesehen wird, so bleibt hier um so mehr der Verstand bey seiner Trennung und den daraus fliessenden Ergebnissen seiner räsonnirenden Gescheutheit stehen, und leugnet dann, daß das Moment der letzten Entscheidung im Staate an und für sich (d. i. im Vernunftbegriff) mit der unmittelbaren Natürlichkeit verbunden sey; woraus zunächst die Zufälligkeit dieser Verbindung, und indem die absolute Verschiedenheit jener Momente als das Vernünftige behauptet wird, weiter die Unvernünftigkeit solcher Verbindung gefolgert wird, so daß hieran sich die anderen, die Idee des Staats zerrüttenden, Consequenzen knüpfen.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
280 3) This ultimate self of the state's will is, in this abstraction of itself, simple and therefore immediate individuality. Its very concept thus contains the determination of naturalness. The monarch is therefore essentially determined as this individual, abstracted from all other content; and this individual is determined to the dignity of monarch in an immediately natural way, through natural birth.
This transition from the concept of pure self-determination into the immediacy of being, and thus into naturalness, is purely speculative in character; knowledge of it therefore belongs to logical philosophy. Moreover, it is on the whole the same transition that is known as the nature of the will in general: the process of translating a content from subjectivity, as a represented purpose, into existence (§ 8). But the distinctive form of the Idea and of the transition considered here is the immediate reversal of the pure self-determination of the will—the simple concept itself—into a This and a natural existence, without mediation through a particular content, a purpose in action. In the so-called ontological proof of God's existence, it is this same reversal of the absolute concept into being that has constituted the depth of the Idea in the modern age, but which in the most recent age has been pronounced incomprehensible. In doing so, since only the unity of concept and existence is truth (§ 23), people have renounced knowledge of truth. Since the consciousness of the understanding does not contain this unity, and remains at the separation of the two moments of truth, it still perhaps allows a belief in that unity in the case of this object. But since the representation of the monarch is regarded as falling wholly within ordinary consciousness, the understanding here persists all the more firmly in its separation and in the conclusions of its argumentative cleverness that flow from it. It then denies that the moment of ultimate decision in the state is in and for itself—that is, in the rational concept—connected with immediate naturalness. From this it first infers that this connection is contingent; and, asserting the absolute difference of those moments as what is rational, it further infers that such a connection is irrational. From this follow the other consequences that shatter the Idea of the state.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
280 3) This final self of the state's will is simple in this abstraction of itself, and therefore immediate individuality. Its concept itself thus contains the determination of naturalness. The monarch is therefore essentially determined as this individual, apart from all other content, and this individual is determined for the dignity of the monarch in an immediately natural way: through natural birth.
This transition from the concept of pure self-determination into the immediacy of being, and thus into naturalness, is purely speculative in nature. Understanding it therefore belongs to logical philosophy. In general, moreover, it is the same transition that is known as the nature of the will in general: the process of transferring a content from subjectivity, as a represented purpose, into existence (§ 8). But the distinctive form of the Idea and of the transition considered here is the immediate turning of the will's pure self-determination—the simple concept itself—into a this and a natural existence, without mediation by a particular content, a purpose in action. In the so-called ontological proof of the existence of God, it is this same turning of the absolute concept into being that constituted the depth of the Idea in modern times. But in the most recent times this has been declared incomprehensible. Since only the unity of the concept and existence (§ 23) is truth, this amounts to giving up knowledge of truth. The consciousness of understanding does not contain this unity and stays with the separation of the two moments of truth. In the case of this subject it may still admit a belief in that unity. But the conception of the monarch is regarded as belonging wholly to ordinary consciousness. Here, therefore, understanding clings all the more to its separation and to the results of its clever argumentative reasoning. It then denies that the moment of final decision in the state is in and for itself—that is, in the concept of reason—connected with immediate naturalness. From this it first infers the contingency of this connection. Then, by asserting the absolute difference of those moments as what is rational, it further infers that such a connection is irrational. The other consequences that wreck the Idea of the state follow from this.
About this section
Section 280 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 282 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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