Section 279
Original German
279 2) Die Souverainetät, zunächst nur der allgemeine Gedanke dieser Idealität, existirt nur als die ihrer selbst gewisse Subjectivität und als die abstracte, insofern grundlose Selbstbestimmung des Willens, in welcher das Letzte der Entscheidung liegt. Es ist diß das Individuelle des Staats als solches, der selbst nur darin Einer ist. Die Subjectivität aber ist in ihrer Wahrheit nur als Subject, die Persönlichkeit nur als Person, und in der zur reellen Vernünftigkeit gediehenen Verfassung, hat jedes der drey Momente des Begriffes seine für sich wirkliche ausgesonderte Gestaltung. Diß absolut entscheidende Moment des Ganzen ist daher nicht die Individualität überhaupt, sondern Ein Individuum, der Monarch.
Die immanente Entwickelung einer Wissenschaft, die Ableitung ihres ganzen Inhalts aus dem einfachen Begriffe, (— sonst verdient eine Wissenschaft wenigstens nicht den Namen einer philosophischen Wissenschaft) zeigt das Eigenthümliche, daß der eine und derselbe Begriff, hier der Wille, der Anfangs, weil es der Anfang ist, abstract ist, sich erhält, aber seine Bestimmungen und zwar eben so nur durch sich selbst verdichtet und auf diese Weise einen concreten Inhalt gewinnt. So ist es das Grundmoment der zuerst im unmittelbaren Rechte abstracten Persönlichkeit, welches sich durch seine verschiedenen Formen von Subjectivität fortgebildet hat, und hier im absoluten Rechte, dem Staate, der vollkommen concreten Objectivität des Willens, die Persönlichkeit des Staats ist, seine Gewißheit seiner selbst — dieses letzte, was alle Besonderheiten in dem einfachen Selbst aufhebt, das Abwägen der Gründe und Gegengründe, zwischen denen sich immer herüber und hinüber schwanken läßt, abbricht, und sie durch das: Ich will, beschließt, und alle Handlung und Wirklichkeit anfängt. — Die Persönlichkeit, und die Subjectivität überhaupt hat aber ferner, als unendliches sich auf sich beziehendes, schlechthin nur Wahrheit und zwar seine nächste unmittelbare Wahrheit als Person, für sich seyendes Subject, und das für sich seyende ist eben so schlechthin Eines. Die Persönlichkeit des Staates ist nur als eine Person, der Monarch, wirklich. — Persönlichkeit drückt den Begriff als solchen aus, die Person enthält zugleich die Wirklichkeit desselben, und der Begriff ist nur mit dieser Bestimmung, Idee, Wahrheit. — Eine sogenannte moralische Person, Gesellschaft, Gemeinde, Familie, so concret sie in sich ist, hat die Persönlichkeit nur als Moment, abstract in ihr; sie ist darin nicht zur Wahrheit ihrer Existenz gekommen, der Staat aber ist eben diese Totalität, in welcher die Momente des Begriffs zur Wirklichkeit nach ihrer eigenthümlichen Wahrheit gelangen. — Alle diese Bestimmungen sind schon für sich und in ihren Gestaltungen im ganzen Vorlauf dieser Abhandlung erörtert, aber hier darum wiederholt worden, weil man sie zwar in ihren besondern Gestaltungen leicht zugibt, aber da sie gerade nicht wieder erkennt und auffaßt, wo sie in ihrer wahrhaften Stellung, nicht vereinzelt, sondern nach ihrer Wahrheit als Momente der Idee vorkommen. — Der Begriff des Monarchen ist deßwegen der schwerste Begriff für das Räsonnement, d. h. für die reflektirende Verstandesbetrachtung, weil es in den vereinzelten Bestimmungen stehen bleibt, und darum dann auch nur Gründe, endliche Gesichtspunkte und das Ableiten aus Gründen kennt. So stellt es dann die Würde des Monarchen als etwas nicht nur der Form, sondern ihrer Bestimmung nach Abgeleitetes dar; vielmehr ist sein Begriff, nicht ein abgeleitetes, sondern das schlechthin aus sich anfangende zu seyn. Am nächsten trifft daher hiemit die Vorstellung zu, das Recht des Monarchen als auf göttliche Autorität gegründet zu betrachten, denn darin ist das Unbedingte desselben enthalten. Aber es ist bekannt, welche Mißverständnisse sich hieran geknüpft haben, und die Aufgabe der philosophischen Betrachtung ist, eben diß Göttliche zu begreifen.
Volkssouverainetät kann in dem Sinn gesagt werden, daß ein Volk überhaupt nach Außen ein selbstständiges sey und einen eigenen Staat ausmache, wie das Volk von Großbrittanien, aber das Volk von England, oder Schottland, Irland, oder von Venedig, Genua, Ceylon u. s. f. kein souveraines Volk mehr sey, seitdem sie aufgehört haben, eigene Fürsten oder oberste Regierungen für sich zu haben. — Man kann so auch von der Souverainetät nach Innen sagen, daß sie im Volke residire, wenn man nur überhaupt vom Ganzen spricht, ganz so wie vorhin (§. 277. 278.) gezeigt ist, daß dem Staate Souverainetät zukomme. Aber Volkssouverainetät als im Gegensatze gegen die im Monarchen existirende Souverainetät genommen, ist der gewöhnliche Sinn, in welchem man in neuern Zeiten von Volkssouverainetät zu sprechen angefangen hat, — in diesem Gegensatze gehört die Volkssouverainetät zu den verworrenen Gedanken, denen die wüste Vorstellung des Volkes zu Grunde liegt. Das Volk, ohne seinen Monarchen und die eben damit nothwendig und unmittelbar zusammenhängende Gliederung des Ganzen genommen, ist die formlose Masse, die kein Staat mehr ist und der keine der Bestimmungen, die nur in dem in sich geformten Ganzen vorhanden sind, — Souverainetät, Regierung, Gerichte, Obrigkeit, Stände und was es seyn, mehr zukommt. Damit daß solche auf eine Organisation, das Staatsleben, sich beziehende Momente in einem Volke hervortreten, hört es auf, diß unbestimmte Abstractum zu seyn, das in der bloß allgemeinen Vorstellung Volk heißt. — Wird unter der Volkssouverainetät die Form der Republik und zwar bestimmter der Demokratie verstanden (denn unter Republik begreift man sonstige mannichfache empirische Vermischungen, die in eine philosophische Betrachtung ohnehin nicht gehören), so ist theils oben (bey §. 273. in der Anmerkung) das Nöthige gesagt, theils kann gegen die entwickelte Idee nicht mehr von solcher Vorstellung die Rede seyn. — In einem Volke, das weder als ein patriarchalischer Stamm, noch in dem unentwickelten Zustande, in welchem die Formen der Demokratie oder Aristokratie möglich sind, (s. Anm. ebend.) noch sonst in einem willkührlichen und unorganischen Zustande vorgestellt, sondern als eine in sich entwickelte, wahrhaft organische Totalität gedacht wird, ist die Souverainetät als die Persönlichkeit des Ganzen, und diese in der ihrem Begriffe gemäßen Realität, als die Person des Monarchen.
Auf der vorhin bemerkten Stufe, auf welcher die Eintheilung der Verfassungen in Demokratie, Aristokratie und Monarchie gemacht worden ist, dem Standpunkte der noch in sich bleibenden substantiellen Einheit, die noch nicht zu ihrer unendlichen Unterscheidung und Vertiefung in sich gekommen ist, tritt das Moment der letzten sich selbst bestimmenden Willensentscheidung nicht als immanentes organisches Moment des Staates für sich in eigenthümliche Wirklichkeit heraus. Immer muß zwar auch in jenen unausgebildeteren Gestaltungen des Staats eine individuelle Spitze, entweder wie in den dahin gehörenden Monarchien, für sich vorhanden seyn, oder wie in den Aristokratien, vornemlich aber in den Demokratien, sich in den Staatsmännern, Feldherren, nach Zufälligkeit und dem besonderen Bedürfniß der Umstände erheben; denn alle Handlung und Wirklichkeit hat ihren Anfang und ihre Vollführung in der entschiedenen Einheit eines Anführers. Aber eingeschlossen in die gediegen bleibende Vereinung der Gewalten, muß solche Subjectivität des Entscheidens theils ihrem Entstehen und Hervortreten nach zufällig, theils überhaupt untergeordnet seyn; nicht anderswo daher als jenseits solcher bedingten Spitzen konnte das unvermischte, reine Entscheiden, ein von außen her bestimmendes Fatum, liegen. Als Moment der Idee mußte es in die Existenz treten, aber außerhalb der menschlichen Freyheit und ihres Kreises, den der Staat befaßt, wurzelnd. — Hier liegt der Ursprung des Bedürfnisses, von Orakeln, dem Dämon (beym Sokrates), aus Eingeweiden der Thiere, dem Fressen und Fluge der Vögel u. s. f. die letzte Entscheidung über die großen Angelegenheiten und für die wichtigen Momente des Staats zu holen — eine Entscheidung, welche die Menschen, noch nicht die Tiefe des Selbstbewußtseyns erfassend, und aus der Gediegenheit der substantiellen Einheit zu diesem Fürsichseyn gekommen, noch nicht innerhalb des menschlichen Seyns zu sehen die Stärke hatten. — Im Dämon des Sokrates (vergl. oben §. 138.) können wir den Anfang sehen, daß der sich vorher nur jenseits seiner selbst versetzende Wille sich in sich verlegte und sich innerhalb seiner erkannte, — der Anfang der sich wissenden und damit wahrhaften Freyheit. Diese reelle Freyheit der Idee, da sie eben diß ist, jedem der Momente der Vernünftigkeit seine eigene, gegenwärtige, selbstbewußte Wirklichkeit zu geben, ist es, welche somit die letzte sich selbst bestimmende Gewißheit, die die Spitze im Begriffe des Willens ausmacht, der Funktion eines Bewußtseyns zutheilt. Diese letzte Selbstbestimmung kann aber nur insofern in die Sphäre der menschlichen Freyheit fallen, als sie die Stellung der für sich abgesonderten, über alle Besonderung und Bedingung erhabenen Spitze hat; denn nur so ist sie nach ihrem Begriffe wirklich.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
279 2) Sovereignty, initially only the universal thought of this ideality, exists only as subjectivity certain of itself, and as the abstract, and to that extent groundless, self-determination of the will in which the ultimate decision lies. This is the individual character of the state as such, which itself is One only in this. But subjectivity is in its truth only as a subject, personality only as a person; and in the constitution that has developed into real rationality, each of the three moments of the concept has its distinct shape, actual in its own right. This absolutely decisive moment of the whole is therefore not individuality in general, but one individual, the monarch.
The immanent development of a science, the derivation of its entire content from the simple concept—otherwise a science at least does not deserve the name of a philosophical science—has this distinctive character: the one and the same concept, here the will, which is abstract at the beginning because it is the beginning, maintains itself, but condenses its determinations, again only through itself, and in this way acquires a concrete content. Thus it is the fundamental moment of personality, at first abstract in immediate right, that has developed through its different forms of subjectivity and here, in absolute right, the state, the completely concrete objectivity of the will, is the personality of the state, its certainty of itself. This ultimate point sublates all particularities in the simple self, cuts short the weighing of grounds and countergrounds, between which one may always sway back and forth, resolves them through the “I will,” and begins all action and actuality. But personality, and subjectivity in general, as the infinite that relates to itself, further has truth, and indeed its nearest immediate truth, only as a person, a subject existing for itself; and what exists for itself is likewise absolutely One. The personality of the state is actual only as one person, the monarch. Personality expresses the concept as such; the person also contains its actuality, and only with this determination is the concept Idea, truth. A so-called moral person—a society, community, or family—however concrete it may be within itself, has personality only as a moment, abstractly within it; in it, personality has not attained the truth of its existence. The state, however, is precisely this totality in which the moments of the concept attain actuality according to their distinctive truth. All these determinations have already been discussed, in themselves and in their shapes, throughout the course of this treatise. They have been repeated here because, although one readily grants them in their particular shapes, one fails to recognize and grasp them again precisely where they occur in their true position, not in isolation but in their truth as moments of the Idea. The concept of the monarch is therefore the most difficult concept for mere reasoning, that is, for the reflective consideration of the understanding, because this remains caught in isolated determinations and hence knows only grounds, finite points of view, and deduction from grounds. It therefore presents the monarch's dignity as something derived, not only in its form but in its determination. Rather, its concept is to be not something derived, but that which begins absolutely from itself. The conception that regards the monarch's right as founded on divine authority thus comes nearest to it, for this contains its unconditional character. But the misunderstandings that have attached themselves to this are well known, and the task of philosophical consideration is precisely to comprehend this divine character.
Popular sovereignty may be spoken of in the sense that a people is independent outwardly and constitutes a state of its own, as does the people of Great Britain, whereas the people of England, Scotland, Ireland, or Venice, Genoa, Ceylon, and so forth is no longer a sovereign people since it has ceased to have princes or supreme governments of its own. One may likewise say that inward sovereignty resides in the people, provided one speaks only of the whole in general, just as it has been shown above (§§ 277–278) that sovereignty belongs to the state. But popular sovereignty, taken in opposition to the sovereignty existing in the monarch, is the usual sense in which people have begun to speak of popular sovereignty in recent times. In this opposition it belongs among the confused thoughts founded upon the chaotic conception of the people. The people, taken without its monarch and the articulation of the whole necessarily and immediately connected with him, is a formless mass, no longer a state, and possessing none of the determinations that belong only to a whole formed within itself: sovereignty, government, courts, authorities, estates, or whatever else. Once moments related to an organization, to the life of the state, emerge in a people, it ceases to be that indeterminate abstraction which in the merely general conception is called the people. If popular sovereignty means the republican form, and specifically democracy—for under the name republic one also comprehends various other empirical mixtures that in any case do not belong to philosophical consideration—then what is necessary has partly been said above, in the remark to § 273; and partly, in the face of the developed Idea, such a conception can no longer be discussed. In a people conceived neither as a patriarchal tribe nor in the undeveloped condition in which the forms of democracy or aristocracy are possible—see the same remark—nor otherwise in an arbitrary and inorganic condition, but as a totality developed within itself and truly organic, sovereignty exists as the personality of the whole, and this, in the reality appropriate to its concept, as the person of the monarch.
At the stage mentioned above, on which constitutions were divided into democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy—the standpoint of substantial unity still remaining within itself, which has not yet attained its infinite differentiation and deepening within itself—the moment of the ultimate, self-determining decision of the will does not emerge as an immanent organic moment of the state with a distinctive actuality of its own. Even in those less developed shapes of the state, an individual apex must always either be present in its own right, as in the monarchies belonging to this stage, or arise in statesmen and military commanders, as in aristocracies and above all democracies, contingently and according to the particular need of circumstances. For every action and actuality has its beginning and execution in the decided unity of a leader. But, enclosed within the still compact union of the powers, such subjectivity of decision must be partly contingent in its origin and emergence, and partly subordinate altogether. Hence unmixed, pure decision, a fate determining from outside, could lie nowhere but beyond such conditioned apices. As a moment of the Idea it had to come into existence, but rooted outside human freedom and its sphere, which the state embraces. Here lies the origin of the need to obtain from oracles, from the daemon—in Socrates—from animals' entrails, from the feeding and flight of birds, and so forth, the ultimate decision on great affairs and the important moments of the state: a decision that human beings, not yet grasping the depth of self-consciousness, and having passed from the compactness of substantial unity to this division, did not yet have the strength to see within human being itself. In the daemon of Socrates—compare § 138 above—we may see the beginning of the will, which had previously placed itself only beyond itself, transferring itself into itself and recognizing itself within itself: the beginning of self-knowing and therefore genuine freedom. This real freedom of the Idea, since it consists precisely in giving each moment of rationality its own present, self-conscious actuality, thus assigns the ultimate self-determining certainty, which constitutes the apex in the concept of the will, to the function of one consciousness. But this ultimate self-determination can fall within the sphere of human freedom only insofar as it occupies the position of an apex set apart in its own right and raised above all particularization and condition; for only thus is it actual according to its concept.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
279 2) Sovereignty, at first only the universal thought of this ideality, exists only as subjectivity certain of itself, and as the abstract and, to that extent, groundless self-determination of the will in which the final decision lies. This is the individual element of the state as such, and only in it is the state itself one. But subjectivity has its truth only as a subject, and personality only as a person. In a constitution that has developed into real rationality, each of the three moments of the concept has its own distinct shape, actual in its own right. This absolutely decisive moment of the whole is therefore not individuality in general but one individual: the monarch.
The immanent development of a science, the derivation of its entire content from the simple concept—without this, a science at least does not deserve the name of philosophical science—has this distinctive feature: one and the same concept, here the will, which is abstract at first precisely because it is the beginning, preserves itself but also condenses its determinations, again only through itself, and in this way acquires concrete content. Thus the fundamental moment of personality, initially abstract in immediate right, has developed through its different forms of subjectivity. Here, in absolute right, the state, the fully concrete objectivity of the will, it is the personality of the state, its certainty of itself. It is the final element that supersedes all particularities in the simple self, breaks off the weighing of reasons and counterreasons between which one can always keep wavering, and concludes them with "I will," beginning all action and actual reality. Further, personality and subjectivity in general, as the infinite relating to itself, have truth only—and their nearest, immediate truth—as a person, a subject that is for itself. What is for itself is likewise unconditionally one. The personality of the state is actual only as one person, the monarch. Personality expresses the concept as such; the person also contains its actual reality. Only with this determination is the concept Idea and truth. A so-called moral person—a society, community, or family—however concrete it is within itself, has personality only as a moment, abstractly within it. In this respect it has not reached the truth of its existence. The state, however, is precisely this totality in which the moments of the concept attain actual reality in accordance with their own distinctive truth. All these determinations have already been discussed, both in themselves and in their various forms, throughout the preceding course of this work. They are repeated here because people readily admit them in their particular forms, but fail to recognize and grasp them precisely where they occur in their true position: not in isolation, but in their truth as moments of the Idea. For this reason the concept of the monarch is the hardest concept for argumentative reasoning—that is, for reflective understanding—because it remains stuck in isolated determinations and consequently knows only reasons, finite points of view, and derivation from reasons. It therefore presents the dignity of the monarch as something derived, not only in form but in its determination. On the contrary, the monarch's concept is to be not something derived, but what begins unconditionally from itself. The conception that comes closest to it is therefore to regard the monarch's right as founded on divine authority, since this contains its unconditional character. But the misunderstandings attached to this are well known, and the task of philosophical consideration is precisely to comprehend this divine element.
Popular sovereignty can be spoken of in the sense that a people is independent externally and forms a state of its own. This is true of the people of Great Britain. But the peoples of England, Scotland, Ireland, or Venice, Genoa, Ceylon, and so on are no longer sovereign peoples, since they have ceased to have their own princes or supreme governments. One can likewise say of internal sovereignty that it resides in the people, provided one is speaking only of the whole. This is just as it was shown above (§§ 277, 278) that sovereignty belongs to the state. But popular sovereignty understood as opposed to the sovereignty existing in the monarch is the usual sense in which people have recently begun speaking of popular sovereignty. In this opposition, popular sovereignty is one of those confused thoughts founded on a crude conception of the people. The people, taken without their monarch and without the articulation of the whole necessarily and immediately connected with him, are a formless mass. They are no longer a state, and none of the determinations found only in a whole formed within itself—sovereignty, government, courts, authorities, estates, or anything else—belongs to them any longer. As soon as such moments relating to an organization, to political life, appear in a people, it ceases to be this indeterminate abstraction called people in a merely general conception. If popular sovereignty means the form of a republic, and more specifically democracy—for "republic" also includes various empirical mixtures that in any case do not belong in a philosophical treatment—then what is necessary has already been said above, in the Remark to § 273. Besides, in the face of the developed Idea there can no longer be any question of such a conception. If a people is conceived neither as a patriarchal tribe, nor in the undeveloped condition in which democracy or aristocracy is possible (see the same Remark), nor in some other arbitrary, inorganic condition, but as an internally developed, truly organic totality, then sovereignty is the personality of the whole, and this personality, in a reality corresponding to its concept, is the person of the monarch.
At the stage noted earlier, where constitutions were classified as democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, the standpoint is that of substantial unity still remaining within itself, not yet having reached its infinite differentiation and inward deepening. At this stage the moment of the final, self-determining decision of the will does not emerge independently into its own actual reality as an immanent organic moment of the state. Even in those less developed forms of the state, there must always be an individual at the top. This individual may exist independently, as in the monarchies belonging to this category, or may emerge in statesmen and generals, as in aristocracies and especially democracies, through chance and the particular need of the circumstances. For all action and actual reality have their beginning and completion in the decisive unity of a leader. But enclosed within the powers' still undifferentiated union, this subjectivity of decision must be partly accidental in its origin and emergence, and partly subordinate in general. Pure, unmixed decision could therefore lie only beyond such conditioned leaders, as a fate determining things from outside. As a moment of the Idea it had to come into existence, but rooted outside human freedom and the sphere of freedom encompassed by the state. Here lies the origin of the need to obtain the final decision on the great affairs and important moments of the state from oracles, the daemon in the case of Socrates, the entrails of animals, the feeding and flight of birds, and so on. People did not yet have the strength to see such a decision within human existence. They had not yet grasped the depth of self-consciousness and emerged from the compactness of substantial unity into this being-for-self. In the daemon of Socrates (compare above, § 138), we can see the beginning of the will's moving into itself and recognizing itself within itself, whereas previously it had placed itself only beyond itself. This is the beginning of freedom that knows itself and is therefore true freedom. This real freedom of the Idea consists precisely in giving each moment of rationality its own present, self-conscious actual reality. It therefore assigns to the function of a consciousness the final, self-determining certainty that constitutes the summit of the concept of the will. But this final self-determination can fall within the sphere of human freedom only insofar as it occupies the position of a summit set apart in its own right, raised above all particularization and conditioning. For only in this way is it actual in accordance with its concept.
About this section
Section 279 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 281 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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