Section 278

278 These two determinations—that the particular functions and powers of the state are neither independent and fixed in themselves nor in the particular will of individuals, but have their ultimate root in the unity of the state as their simple self—constitute the sovereignty of the state.

This is sovereignty inwardly; it has another side, sovereignty outwardly: see below. In the former feudal monarchy the state was indeed sovereign outwardly, but inwardly neither the monarch nor the state itself was sovereign. On the one hand (compare § 273, remark), the particular functions and powers of the state and of civil society were established in independent corporations and communities, so that the whole was more an aggregate than an organism; on the other hand, they were the private property of individuals, and thus what was to be done with them in relation to the whole was left to those individuals' opinion and pleasure. The idealism that constitutes sovereignty is the same determination through which, in the animal organism, its so-called parts are not parts but members, organic moments, whose isolation and independent existence are disease (see Encyklop. der phil. Wissensch. § 293). It is the same principle that appeared in the abstract concept of the will (see the following section, remark) as negativity relating to itself, and thus as universality determining itself to individuality (§ 7), in which all particularity and determinacy are sublated: the absolute, self-determining ground. To grasp this, one must in general have mastered the concept of what the substance and true subjectivity of the concept are. Because sovereignty is the ideality of all particular authorization, the misunderstanding readily arises—and is very common—that it is mere might and empty arbitrary choice, and that sovereignty is synonymous with despotism. But despotism designates in general the condition of lawlessness in which the particular will as such, whether that of a monarch or of a people—ochlocracy—counts as law, or rather in place of law. Sovereignty, by contrast, constitutes precisely in the lawful, constitutional condition the moment of the ideality of the particular spheres and functions: such a sphere is not something independent, self-subsisting in its purposes and modes of operation and absorbed only in itself, but is determined in those purposes and modes of operation by the purpose of the whole—what has in general been called, in a less definite expression, the welfare of the state—and dependent upon it. This ideality appears in two ways. In a peaceful condition the particular spheres and functions proceed along the path of satisfying their particular functions and purposes. Here it is partly only the unconscious necessity of the matter that turns their self-seeking into a contribution to mutual preservation and the preservation of the whole (see § 183); partly it is direct intervention from above that continually brings them back to the purpose of the whole and restricts them accordingly (see executive power, § 289), while also requiring them to make direct contributions toward this preservation. But in a condition of emergency, whether internal or external, it is sovereignty into whose simple concept the organism, subsisting there in its particularities, draws together, and to which the state's salvation is entrusted through the sacrifice of what is otherwise authorized. Here that idealism attains its distinctive actuality (see § 321 below).

278 These two determinations constitute the sovereignty of the state: its particular functions and powers are neither independent and fixed in themselves nor grounded in the particular will of individuals. Rather, they have their ultimate root in the unity of the state as their simple self.

This is sovereignty internally. It also has another side, directed outward; see below. In the former feudal monarchy, the state was indeed sovereign externally, but internally it was not just the monarch who lacked sovereignty: the state itself lacked it. On the one hand (compare § 273, Remark), the particular functions and powers of the state and civil society were constituted as independent corporations and communities, so that the whole was more an aggregate than an organism. On the other hand, they were individuals' private property, and what these individuals should therefore do for the whole was left to their opinion and discretion. The idealism that constitutes sovereignty is the same determination according to which, in an animal organism, its so-called parts are not parts but members, organic moments, and their isolation and existence for themselves is disease (see Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, § 293). It is the same principle that appeared in the abstract concept of the will (see the next section's Remark) as negativity relating to itself, and thus as universality determining itself into individuality (§ 7). In this universality, all particularity and determinacy are superseded; it is the absolute ground that determines itself. To grasp it, one must in general understand the concept of what substance and the true subjectivity of the concept are. Because sovereignty is the ideality of every particular entitlement, the misunderstanding readily arises, and is very common, that it is mere power and empty arbitrary choice, and that sovereignty means the same thing as despotism. But despotism means, in general, a condition of lawlessness, where a particular will as such—whether that of a monarch or of a people (mob rule)—counts as law, or rather takes the place of law. Sovereignty, by contrast, constitutes precisely in a lawful, constitutional condition the moment of the ideality of particular spheres and functions. That is, such a sphere is not independent and self-sufficient in its purposes and ways of working, absorbed only in itself. In these purposes and ways of working it is determined by and dependent on the purpose of the whole, which has generally been called the welfare of the state, a less definite expression. This ideality appears in two ways. In peace, the particular spheres and functions continue along their course of satisfying their particular functions and purposes. In part, only the unconscious necessity of the matter turns their self-interest into a contribution to their mutual preservation and the preservation of the whole (see § 183). In part, however, direct intervention from above continually brings them back to the purpose of the whole and limits them accordingly (see governmental power, § 289), while also requiring them to make direct contributions to preserving it. But in an emergency, internal or external, the organism that otherwise exists in its particular spheres comes together in the simple concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty is entrusted with saving the state by sacrificing what is otherwise entitled to exist. Here that idealism comes into its own actual reality (see below, § 321).