Section 281
Original German
281 Beyde Momente in ihrer ungetrennten Einheit, das letzte grundlose Selbst des Willens und die damit eben so grundlose Existenz, als der Natur anheimgestellte Bestimmung, — diese Idee des von der Willkühr Unbewegten macht die Majestät des Monarchen aus. In dieser Einheit liegt die wirkliche Einheit des Staats, welche nur durch diese ihre innere und äußere Unmittelbarkeit, der Möglichkeit, in die Sphäre der Besonderheit, deren Willkühr, Zwecke und Ansichten herabgezogen zu werden, dem Kampf der Faktionen gegen Faktionen um den Thron, und der Schwächung und Zertrümmerung der Staatsgewalt, entnommen ist.
Geburts- und Erbrecht machen den Grund der Legitimität als Grund nicht eines bloß positiven Rechts, sondern zugleich in der Idee aus. — Daß durch die festbestimmte Thronfolge, d. i. die natürliche Succession, bey der Erledigung des Throns den Faktionen vorgebeugt ist, ist eine Seite, die mit Recht für die Erblichkeit desselben längst geltend gemacht worden ist. Diese Seite ist jedoch nur Folge, und zum Grunde gemacht zieht sie die Majestät in die Sphäre des Raisonnements herunter, und giebt ihr, deren Charakter diese grundlose Unmittelbarkeit und diß letzte Insichseyn ist, nicht die ihr immanente Idee des Staates, sondern etwas außer ihr, einen von ihr verschiedenen Gedanken, etwa das Wohl des Staates oder Volkes zu ihrer Begründung. Aus solcher Bestimmung kann wohl die Erblichkeit durch medios terminos gefolgert werden; sie läßt aber auch andere medios terminos und damit andere Consequenzen zu, — und es ist nur zu bekannt, welche Consequenzen aus diesem Wohl des Volkes (salut du peuple) gezogen worden sind. — Deswegen darf auch nur die Philosophie diese Majestät denkend betrachten, denn jede andere Weise der Untersuchung, als die speculative der unendlichen, in sich selbst begründeten Idee, hebt an und für sich die Natur der Majestät auf. — Das Wahlreich scheint leicht die natürlichste Vorstellung zu seyn, d. h. sie liegt der Seichtigkeit des Gedankens am nächsten; weil es die Angelegenheit und das Interesse des Volks sey, das der Monarch zu besorgen habe, so müsse es auch der Wahl des Volkes überlassen bleiben, wen es mit der Besorgung seines Wohls beauftragen wolle, und nur aus dieser Beauftragung entstehe das Recht zur Regierung. Diese Ansicht, wie die Vorstellungen vom Monarchen, als obersten Staatsbeamten, von einem Vertragsverhältnisse zwischen demselben und dem Volke u. s. f. geht von dem Willen, als Belieben, Meynung und Willkühr der Vielen aus, — einer Bestimmung, die, wie längst betrachtet worden, in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft als erste gilt, oder vielmehr sich nur geltend machen will, aber weder das Prinzip der Familie, noch weniger des Staats ist, überhaupt der Idee der Sittlichkeit entgegensteht. — Daß das Wahlreich vielmehr die schlechteste der Institutionen ist, ergiebt sich schon für das Raisonnement aus den Folgen, die für dasselbe übrigens nur als etwas Mögliches und Wahrscheinliches erscheinen, in der That aber wesentlich in dieser Institution liegen. Die Verfassung wird nämlich in einem Wahlreich durch die Natur des Verhältnisses, daß in ihm der particulaire Wille zum letzten Entscheidenden gemacht ist, zu einer Wahlkapitulation, d. h. zu einer Ergebung der Staatsgewalt auf die Discretion des particulairen Willens, woraus die Verwandlung der besonderen Staatsgewalten in Privateigenthum, die Schwächung und der Verlust der Souverainetät des Staats, und damit seine innere Auflösung und äußere Zertrümmerung, hervorgeht.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
281 Both moments in their undivided unity—the ultimate, groundless self of the will and the equally groundless existence therewith, as a determination left to nature—this Idea of what is unmoved by arbitrary choice constitutes the majesty of the monarch. In this unity lies the actual unity of the state, which only through this inward and outward immediacy is removed from the possibility of being drawn down into the sphere of particularity, its arbitrary choice, purposes, and views; from the struggle of factions against factions for the throne; and from the weakening and destruction of the power of the state.
The right of birth and inheritance constitutes the ground of legitimacy, a ground not merely in positive right but also in the Idea. That a firmly determined succession to the throne, that is, natural succession, prevents factions when the throne becomes vacant is an aspect that has long and rightly been advanced in favor of its hereditary character. Yet this aspect is only a consequence. Made into the ground, it drags majesty down into the sphere of mere reasoning and gives it, whose character is this groundless immediacy and ultimate being-within-itself, not the Idea of the state immanent in it, but something outside it, a thought distinct from it, perhaps the welfare of the state or the people, as its foundation. From such a determination its hereditary character can indeed be inferred through middle terms; but it also admits other middle terms, and thus other consequences—and it is only too well known what consequences have been drawn from this welfare of the people (salut du peuple). Hence philosophy alone may consider this majesty in thought; for every method of inquiry other than the speculative method of the infinite Idea, grounded within itself, in and for itself sublates the nature of majesty. An elective monarchy readily seems the most natural conception, that is, the one nearest to superficial thought. Since it is the people's affairs and interest that the monarch is to attend to, it would also have to be left to the people's choice whom to entrust with attending to its welfare; only from this commission would the right to govern arise. This view, like the conceptions of the monarch as supreme state official, of a contractual relation between him and the people, and so forth, proceeds from the will as the pleasure, opinion, and arbitrary choice of the Many. As has long since been considered, this determination counts as primary in civil society, or rather only seeks to assert itself there; but it is neither the principle of the family, still less of the state, and is altogether opposed to the Idea of ethical life. That elective monarchy is, on the contrary, the worst of institutions follows even for mere reasoning from its consequences, which to such reasoning appear only as something possible and probable, but which in fact lie essentially within this institution. For in an elective monarchy the constitution becomes, through the nature of the relation in which the particular will is made the ultimate decider, an electoral capitulation, that is, a surrender of state power to the discretion of the particular will. From this follow the transformation of the particular powers of the state into private property, the weakening and loss of the sovereignty of the state, and thus its inward dissolution and outward destruction.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
281 The two moments in their undivided unity—the ultimate, groundless self of the will and its equally groundless existence, as a determination left to nature—this Idea of what is unmoved by arbitrary choice constitutes the monarch's majesty. In this unity lies the actual unity of the state. Only through this inner and outer immediacy is it removed from the possibility of being dragged down into the sphere of particularity, with its arbitrary choices, purposes, and views; from the struggle of factions against factions for the throne; and from the weakening and destruction of state power.
The rights of birth and inheritance constitute the ground of legitimacy, as a ground not merely in positive law but also in the Idea. Fixed succession to the throne—that is, natural succession—prevents factions when the throne falls vacant. This is an aspect that has long and rightly been put forward in favor of its hereditary character. But this aspect is only a consequence. If made the ground, it drags majesty down into the sphere of argumentative reasoning. Majesty's character is this groundless immediacy and this ultimate being-within-itself. Yet this argument bases it not on the Idea of the state immanent in it, but on something outside it, a thought different from it, such as the welfare of the state or people. Heredity can indeed be inferred from such a determination through intermediate terms. But it also allows other intermediate terms, and therefore other consequences. It is all too well known what consequences have been drawn from this welfare of the people ("the people's safety"). For this reason only philosophy may consider this majesty in thought. Any mode of investigation other than the speculative investigation of the infinite Idea, grounded in itself, inherently cancels the nature of majesty. An elective monarchy readily seems the most natural conception. That is, it lies closest to shallow thinking: since it is the people's concerns and interests that the monarch must look after, the people should also be left to choose whom they wish to entrust with looking after their welfare, and only this commission gives rise to the right to govern. This view, like the ideas of the monarch as the highest state official, of a contractual relationship between him and the people, and so on, starts from the will as the preference, opinion, and arbitrary choice of the many. As discussed long ago, this is a determination that counts as primary in civil society—or rather, merely tries to assert itself there. It is not the principle of the family, still less of the state, and is opposed to the Idea of ethical life in general. That elective monarchy is instead the worst of institutions is already clear, even to argumentative reasoning, from its consequences. To that reasoning they admittedly appear only as something possible and probable, but in fact they are essential to this institution. For in an elective monarchy the nature of the relationship makes the particular will the final deciding factor. The constitution therefore becomes an electoral capitulation: a surrender of state power to the discretion of the particular will. This produces the transformation of the state's particular powers into private property, the weakening and loss of the state's sovereignty, and therefore its internal dissolution and external destruction.
About this section
Section 281 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 283 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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