Section 272
Original German
272 Innere Verfassung für sich.
Die Verfassung ist vernünftig, insofern der Staat seine Wirksamkeit nach der Natur des Begriffs in sich unterscheidet und bestimmt, und zwar so, daß jede dieser Gewalten selbst in sich die Totalität dadurch ist, daß sie die andern Momente in sich wirksam hat und enthält, und daß sie, weil sie den Unterschied des Begriffs ausdrücken, schlechthin in seiner Idealität bleiben und nur Ein individuelles Ganzes ausmachen.
Es ist über Verfassung, wie über die Vernunft selbst, in neuern Zeiten unendlich viel Geschwätze, und zwar in Deutschland das schaalste durch diejenigen in die Welt gekommen, welche sich überredeten, es am besten und selbst mit Ausschluß aller Andern und am ersten der Regierungen zu verstehen, was Verfassung sey, und die unabweisliche Berechtigung darin zu haben meynten, daß die Religion und die Frömmigkeit die Grundlage aller dieser ihrer Seichtigkeiten seyn sollte. Es ist kein Wunder, wenn dieses Geschwätze die Folge gehabt hat, daß vernünftigen Männern die Worte Vernunft, Aufklärung, Recht u. s. f. wie Verfassung und Freyheit ekelhaft geworden sind, und man sich schämen möchte, noch über politische Verfassung auch mitzusprechen. Wenigstens aber mag man von diesem Ueberdrusse die Wirkung hoffen, daß die Ueberzeugung allgemeiner werde, daß eine philosophische Erkenntniß solcher Gegenstände nicht aus dem Räsonnement, aus Zwecken, Gründen und Nützlichkeiten, noch viel weniger aus dem Gemüth, der Liebe und der Begeisterung, sondern allein aus dem Begriffe hervorgehen könne, und daß diejenigen, welche das Göttliche für unbegreiflich und die Erkenntniß des Wahren für ein nichtiges Unternehmen halten, sich enthalten müssen, mitzusprechen. Was sie aus ihrem Gemüthe und ihrer Begeisterung an unverdautem Gerede oder an Erbaulichkeit hervorbringen, beydes kann wenigstens nicht die Prätension auf philosophische Beachtung machen.
Von den cursirenden Vorstellungen ist in Beziehung auf den §. 269. die von der nothwendigen Theilung der Gewalten des Staats zu erwähnen, — einer höchst wichtigen Bestimmung, welche mit Recht, wenn sie nämlich in ihrem wahren Sinne genommen worden wäre, als die Garantie der öffentlichen Freyheit betrachtet werden könnte, — einer Vorstellung, von welcher aber gerade die, welche aus Begeisterung und Liebe zu sprechen meynen, nichts wissen und nichts wissen wollen; — denn in ihr ist es eben, wo das Moment der vernünftigen Bestimmtheit liegt. Das Prinzip der Theilung der Gewalten enthält nämlich das wesentliche Moment des Unterschiedes, der realen Vernünftigkeit; aber wie es der abstracte Verstand faßt, liegt darin theils die falsche Bestimmung der absoluten Selbstständigkeit der Gewalten gegeneinander, theils die Einseitigkeit, ihr Verhältniß zu einander als ein Negatives, als gegenseitige Beschränkung aufzufassen. In dieser Ansicht wird es eine Feindseligkeit, eine Angst vor jeder, was jede gegen die Andere als gegen ein Uebel hervorbringt, mit der Bestimmung sich ihr entgegenzusetzen und durch diese Gegengewichte ein allgemeines Gleichgewicht, aber nicht eine lebendige Einheit zu bewirken. Nur die Selbstbestimmung des Begriffs in sich, nicht irgend andere Zwecke und Nützlichkeiten, ist es, welche den absoluten Ursprung der unterschiedenen Gewalten enthält, und um derentwillen allein die Staatsorganisation als das in sich Vernünftige und das Abbild der ewigen Vernunft ist. — Wie der Begriff, und dann in concreter Weise die Idee sich an ihnen selbst bestimmen und damit ihre Momente abstract der Allgemeinheit, Besonderheit und Einzelnheit setzen, ist aus der Logik, — freylich nicht der sonst gäng und gäben — zu erkennen.) Ueberhaupt das Negative zum Ausgangspunkt zu nehmen, und das Wollen des Bösen und das Mißtrauen dagegen zum Ersten zu machen, und von dieser Voraussetzung aus nun pfiffigerweise Dämme auszuklügeln, die als eine Wirksamkeit nur gegenseitiger Dämme bedürfen, charakterisirt dem Gedanken nach den negativen Verstand und der Gesinnung nach die Ansicht des Pöbels. (S. oben §. 244.) — Mit der Selbstständigkeit der Gewalten, z. B. der, wie sie genannt worden sind, executiven und der gesetzgebenden Gewalt, ist, wie man diß auch im Großen gesehen hat, die Zertrümmerung des Staats unmittelbar gesetzt, oder, insofern der Staat sich wesentlich erhält, der Kampf, daß die eine Gewalt die andere unter sich bringt, dadurch zunächst die Einheit, wie sie sonst beschaffen sey, bewirkt und so allein das Wesentliche, das Bestehen des Staats rettet.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
Internal Constitution in Its Own Right
272 The constitution is rational insofar as the state differentiates and determines its activity within itself according to the nature of the concept, in such a way that each of these powers is itself the totality, because it has the other moments active within itself and contains them; and because they express the difference of the concept, they remain wholly within its ideality and constitute only one individual whole.
In recent times there has been an infinite amount of chatter about the constitution, as about reason itself; in Germany, indeed, the shallowest talk has been brought into the world by those who persuaded themselves that they understood best—and even to the exclusion of everyone else, and first of all the governments—what a constitution is, and who thought they had an indisputable warrant for doing so in the claim that religion and piety ought to be the foundation of all these shallownesses of theirs. It is no wonder that this chatter has made reasonable men sick of the words reason, enlightenment, right, and so forth, as well as constitution and freedom, and that one might feel ashamed even to join in a discussion of the political constitution. Yet one may at least hope that this weariness will spread the conviction that philosophical knowledge of such objects cannot arise from reasoning about purposes, grounds, and utilities, still less from feeling, love, and enthusiasm, but only from the concept; and that those who regard the divine as incomprehensible and knowledge of the true as a vain undertaking must refrain from joining in. Whatever undigested talk or edifying sentiment they produce out of their feelings and enthusiasm, neither can at least lay claim to philosophical consideration.
Among current conceptions, the necessary division of the powers of the state should be mentioned in connection with § 269—a determination of the highest importance, which could rightly be regarded as the guarantee of public freedom if it were understood in its true sense. Yet precisely those who suppose themselves to speak from enthusiasm and love know nothing, and wish to know nothing, of this conception; for it is here that the moment of rational determinacy lies. The principle of the division of powers contains the essential moment of difference, of real rationality. But as abstract understanding apprehends it, it contains, on the one hand, the false determination that the powers are absolutely independent of one another, and on the other the one-sided view of their relation as something negative, as mutual restriction. On this view it becomes a hostility, a fear of what each may do against the other as against an evil, with the purpose of confronting it and, through these counterweights, producing a general equilibrium, but not a living unity. Only the concept's self-determination within itself, not any other purposes and utilities, contains the absolute origin of the distinct powers; and only through it is the organization of the state what is rational in itself and the image of eternal reason. How the concept, and then, concretely, the Idea, determine themselves within themselves and thereby posit their moments—abstractly, universality, particularity, and individuality—is to be known from logic, though certainly not from the logic otherwise current. To take the negative as one's starting point at all, to make the will to evil and distrust of it the primary thing, and on that presupposition cunningly to devise dams that themselves require opposing dams in order to work, characterizes in thought the negative understanding and in disposition the outlook of the rabble. See § 244 above. With the independence of the powers—for example, of what have been called the executive and legislative powers—the destruction of the state is immediately posited, as has also been seen on a grand scale; or, insofar as the state essentially maintains itself, a struggle is posited in which one power subordinates the other, thereby first bringing about unity, whatever its character may otherwise be, and thus alone saving what is essential: the state's subsistence.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
272 The internal constitution in its own right.
The constitution is rational insofar as the state differentiates and defines its activity within itself according to the nature of the concept, and does so in such a way that each of these powers is itself the whole within itself, because it contains the other moments and has them active within it. And because these powers express the differentiation of the concept, they remain entirely within its ideality and make up only one individual whole.
In recent times there has been endless chatter about constitutions, as about reason itself. The shallowest of it has appeared in Germany, from people who persuaded themselves that they understood what a constitution is better than anyone else—indeed, to the exclusion of everyone else, above all governments. They thought they had an unanswerable right to speak because religion and piety were supposed to underlie all these superficialities of theirs. It is no wonder that this chatter has made rational people sick of the words reason, enlightenment, right, and so on, as well as constitution and freedom, and that one might feel ashamed even to join in a discussion of political constitutions. Still, we may at least hope that this disgust will spread the conviction that philosophical knowledge of such matters cannot come from argumentative reasoning, from purposes, grounds, and advantages, still less from feeling, love, and enthusiasm, but only from the concept. Those who hold the divine to be beyond comprehension and knowledge of truth to be a pointless undertaking must refrain from joining the discussion. Whatever undigested talk or uplifting sentiment they produce from their feelings and enthusiasm, neither can claim philosophical attention, at any rate.
Among current ideas, the necessary division of the powers of the state should be mentioned in connection with § 269. This is an extremely important determination. If it had been taken in its true sense, it could rightly have been regarded as the guarantee of public freedom. Yet precisely those who think they speak from enthusiasm and love know nothing of this idea and want to know nothing of it. For it is here that the moment of rational definiteness lies. The principle of the division of powers contains the essential moment of difference, of real rationality. But as abstract understanding grasps it, it contains both the false determination that the powers are absolutely independent of one another and the one-sided view that their relationship is negative, one of mutual limitation. On this view the relationship becomes hostility, a fear of each power. Each produces this fear of the other as of an evil, intending to oppose it and, through these counterweights, to produce a general balance, but not a living unity. Only the concept's self-determination within itself, not any other purposes or advantages, contains the absolute origin of the distinct powers. This alone makes the organization of the state inherently rational and an image of eternal reason. How the concept, and then, in concrete form, the Idea, determine themselves in themselves and thereby posit their moments—abstractly, universality, particularity, and individuality—is to be learned from logic, though certainly not the logic ordinarily current. In general, to start from the negative, to make the will to do evil and distrust of it the primary things, and then, on this assumption, cleverly devise barriers which, as an effective force, need only barriers set against one another: in thought this characterizes negative understanding, and in disposition it characterizes the view of the rabble. (See above, § 244.) When the powers are independent—for example, the powers that have been called executive and legislative—the destruction of the state is immediately implied, as has also been seen on a large scale. Or, insofar as the state essentially maintains itself, there is a struggle in which one power subordinates the other. This first brings about unity, whatever its other characteristics may be, and only in this way saves what is essential: the continued existence of the state.
About this section
Section 272 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 274 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the European tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.