Section 273
Original German
273 Der politische Staat dirimirt sich somit in die substantiellen Unterschiede,
a) die Gewalt, das Allgemeine zu bestimmen und festzusetzen, die gesetzgebende Gewalt,
b) der Subsumtion der besondern Sphären und einzelnen Fälle unter das Allgemeine; — die Regierungswalt,
c) der Subjectivität als der letzten Willensentscheidung, die fürstliche Gewalt, — in der die unterschiedenen Gewalten zur individuellen Einheit zusammengefaßt sind, die also die Spitze und der Anfang des Ganzen — der constitutionellen Monarchie, ist.
Die Ausbildung des Staats zur constitutionellen Monarchie ist das Werk der neuern Welt, in welcher die substantielle Idee die unendliche Form gewonnen hat. Die Geschichte dieser Vertiefung des Geistes der Welt in sich, oder was dasselbe ist, diese freye Ausbildung, in der die Idee ihre Momente — und nur ihre Momente sind es — als Totalitäten aus sich entläßt, und sie eben damit in der idealen Einheit des Begriffs enthält, als worin die reelle Vernünftigkeit besteht, — die Geschichte dieser wahrhaften Gestaltung des sittlichen Lebens ist die Sache der allgemeinen Weltgeschichte.
Die alte Eintheilung der Verfassungen in Monarchie, Aristokratie und Demokratie, hat die noch ungetrennte substantielle Einheit zu ihrer Grundlage, welche zu ihrer innern Unterscheidung (einer entwickelten Organisation in sich) und damit zur Tiefe und concreten Vernünftigkeit noch nicht gekommen ist. Für jenen Standpunkt der alten Welt ist daher diese Eintheilung die wahre und richtige; denn der Unterschied als an jener noch substantiellen nicht zur absoluten Entfaltung in sich gediehenen Einheit ist wesentlich ein äußerlicher und erscheint zunächst als Unterschied der Anzahl (Encyklop. der Phil. §. 82.) derjenigen, in welchen jene substantielle Einheit immanent seyn soll. Diese Formen, welche auf solche Weise verschiedenen Ganzen angehören, sind in der constitutionellen Monarchie zu Momenten herabgesetzt; der Monarch ist Einer; mit der Regierungs-Gewalt treten Einige und mit der gesetzgebenden Gewalt tritt die Vielheit überhaupt ein. Aber solche bloß quantitative Unterschiede sind, wie gesagt, nur oberflächlich und geben nicht den Begriff der Sache an. Es ist gleichfalls nicht passend, wenn in neuerer Zeit soviel vom demokratischen, aristokratischen Elemente in der Monarchie gesprochen worden ist; denn diese dabey gemeynten Bestimmungen, eben insofern sie in der Monarchie Statt finden, sind nicht mehr Demokratisches und Aristokratisches. — Es gibt Vorstellungen von Verfassungen, wo nur das Abstractum von Staat oben hin gestellt ist, welches regiere und befehle, und es unentschieden gelassen und als gleichgültig angesehen wird, ob an der Spitze dieses Staates, Einer oder Mehrere oder Alle stehen. — „Alle diese Formen, sagt so Fichte in s. Naturrecht, 1. Th. S. 196 sind, wenn nur ein Ephorat, (ein von ihm erfundenes, seyn sollendes Gegengewicht gegen die oberste Gewalt) vorhanden, rechtsgemäß und können allgemeines Recht im Staate hervorbringen und erhalten.“ — Eine solche Ansicht (wie auch jene Erfindung eines Ephorats) stammt aus der vorhin bemerkten Seichtigkeit des Begriffes vom Staate. Bey einem ganz einfachen Zustande der Gesellschaft haben diese Unterschiede freylich wenig oder keine Bedeutung, wie denn Moses in seiner Gesetzgebung für den Fall, daß das Volk einen König verlange, weiter keine Abänderung der Institutionen, sondern nur für den König das Gebot hinzufügt, daß seine Cavallerie, seine Frauen und sein Gold und Silber nicht zahlreich seyn solle (5. B. Mose 17, 16 ff.). — Man kann übrigens in einem Sinne allerdings sagen, daß auch für die Idee jene drey Formen (die monarchische mit eingeschlossen in der beschränkten Bedeutung nämlich, in der sie neben die aristokratische und demokratische gestellt wird) gleichgültig sind, aber in dem entgegengesetzten Sinne, weil sie insgesammt der Idee in ihrer vernünftigen Entwickelung (§. 272.) nicht gemäß sind und diese in keiner derselben ihr Recht und Wirklichkeit erlangen könnte. Deßwegen ist es auch zur ganz müssigen Frage geworden, welche die vorzüglichste unter ihnen wäre; — von solchen Formen kann nur historischer Weise die Rede seyn. — Sonst aber muß man auch in diesem Stücke, wie in so vielen anderen, den tiefen Blick Montesquieu's in seiner berühmt gewordenen Angabe der Principien dieser Regierungsformen anerkennen, aber diese Angabe, um ihre Richtigkeit anzuerkennen, nicht mißverstehen. Bekanntlich gab er als Prinzip der Demokratie die Tugend an; denn in der That beruht solche Verfassung auf der Gesinnung, als der nur substantiellen Form, in welcher die Vernünftigkeit des an und für sich seyenden Willens in ihr noch existirt. Wenn Montesquieu aber hinzufügt, daß England im siebzehnten Jahrhundert das schöne Schauspiel gegeben habe, die Anstrengungen, eine Demokratie zu errichten, als unmächtig zu zeigen, da die Tugend in den Führern gemangelt habe, — und wenn er ferner hinzusetzt, daß wenn die Tugend in der Republik verschwindet, der Ehrgeiz sich derer, deren Gemüth desselben fähig ist, und die Habsucht sich Aller bemächtigt, und der Staat alsdann, eine allgemeine Beute, seine Stärke nur in der Macht einiger Individuen und in der Ausgelassenheit Aller habe, — so ist darüber zu bemerken, daß bey einem ausgebildeteren Zustande der Gesellschaft und bey der Entwickelung und dem Freywerden der Mächte der Besonderheit, die Tugend der Häupter des Staats unzureichend und eine andere Form des vernünftigen Gesetzes, als nur die der Gesinnung erforderlich wird, damit das Ganze die Kraft, sich zusammenzuhalten und den Kräften der entwickelten Besonderheit ihr positives wie ihr negatives Recht angedeihen zu lassen, besitze. Gleicherweise ist das Mißverständniß zu entfernen, als ob damit, daß in der demokratischen Republik die Gesinnung der Tugend die substantielle Form ist, in der Monarchie diese Gesinnung für entbehrlich oder gar für abwesend erklärt, und vollends als ob Tugend und die in einer gegliederten Organisation gesetzlich bestimmte Wirksamkeit einander gegengesetzt und unverträglich wäre. — Daß in der Aristokratie die Mäßigung das Prinzip sey, bringt die hier beginnende Abscheidung der öffentlichen Macht und des Privat-Interesses mit sich, welche zugleich sich so unmittelbar berühren, daß diese Verfassung in sich auf dem Sprunge steht, unmittelbar zum härtesten Zustande der Tyranney oder Anarchie (man sehe die römische Geschichte) zu werden und sich zu vernichten. — Daß Montesquieu die Ehre als das Prinzip der Monarchie erkennt, daraus ergiebt sich für sich schon, daß er nicht die patriarchalische oder antike überhaupt, noch die zu objectiver Verfassung gebildete, sondern die Feudal-Monarchie und zwar insofern die Verhältnisse ihres innern Staatsrechts zu rechtlichem Privat-Eigenthume und Privilegien von Individuen und Corporationen befestigt sind, verstehet. Indem in dieser Verfassung das Staatsleben auf privilegirter Persönlichkeit beruhet, in deren Belieben ein großer Theil dessen gelegt ist, was für das Bestehen des Staats gethan werden muß, so ist das objective dieser Leistungen nicht auf Pflichten, sondern auf Vorstellung und Meynung gestellt, somit statt der Pflicht nur die Ehre das, was den Staat zusammenhält.
Eine andere Frage bietet sich leicht dar: wer die Verfassung machen soll? Diese Frage scheint deutlich, zeigt sich aber bey näherer Betrachtung sogleich sinnlos. Denn sie setzt voraus, daß keine Verfassung vorhanden, somit ein bloßer atomistischer Haufen von Individuen beysammen sey. Wie ein Haufen, ob durch sich oder andere, durch Güte, Gedanken oder Gewalt, zu einer Verfassung kommen würde, müßte ihm überlassen bleiben, denn mit einem Haufen hat es der Begriff nicht zu thun. — Setzt aber jene Frage schon eine vorhandene Verfassung voraus, so bedeutet das Machen nur eine Veränderung, und die Voraussetzung einer Verfassung enthält es unmittelbar selbst, daß die Veränderung nur auf verfassungsmäßigem Wege geschehen könne. — Ueberhaupt aber ist es schlechthin wesentlich, daß die Verfassung, obgleich in der Zeit hervorgegangen, nicht als ein gemachtes angesehen werde; denn sie ist vielmehr das schlechthin an und für sich seyende, das darum als das Göttliche und Beharrende, und als über der Sphäre dessen, was gemacht wird, zu betrachten ist.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
273 The political state thus divides itself into the substantial distinctions:
a) the power to determine and establish the universal: the legislative power;
b) the subsumption of the particular spheres and individual cases under the universal: the executive power;
c) subjectivity as the ultimate decision of the will: the princely power, in which the distinct powers are gathered into an individual unity, and which is therefore the apex and beginning of the whole—the constitutional monarchy.
The development of the state into constitutional monarchy is the work of the modern world, in which the substantial Idea has attained infinite form. The history of this deepening of the world's spirit within itself—or, what is the same, of this free development in which the Idea releases its moments, and only its moments, from itself as totalities, and precisely thereby contains them within the ideal unity of the concept, in which real rationality consists—the history of this true formation of ethical life belongs to universal world history.
The old division of constitutions into monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy rests upon substantial unity still undivided, which has not yet attained its internal differentiation—an organization developed within itself—and thus depth and concrete rationality. For that standpoint of the ancient world, therefore, this division is true and correct. For difference, in that substantial unity which has not yet unfolded itself absolutely within itself, is essentially external, and appears at first as a difference in the number (Encyclop. der Phil. § 82) of those in whom that substantial unity is supposed to be immanent. These forms, which in this way belong to distinct wholes, are reduced to moments within constitutional monarchy: the monarch is One; with the executive power a Few enter, and with the legislative power the Many in general. But such merely quantitative differences are, as has been said, only superficial and do not yield the concept of the matter. It is likewise inappropriate that in recent times so much has been said of the democratic and aristocratic element in monarchy; for these determinations, insofar as they find a place within monarchy, are no longer democratic or aristocratic. There are conceptions of constitutions in which nothing but the abstraction of a state is set on high, to govern and command, and it is left undecided, and regarded as immaterial, whether One or Several or All stand at the head of this state. “All these forms,” Fichte says in his Naturrecht, Part 1, p. 196, “are consistent with right, provided only that an ephorate”—a counterweight, supposedly, to the supreme power, invented by him—“is present, and can produce and maintain universal right in the state.” Such a view, like that invention of an ephorate itself, arises from the superficiality in the concept of the state noted above. In a wholly simple condition of society these distinctions admittedly have little or no significance. Thus Moses, in his legislation for the case in which the people should demand a king, makes no further alteration in the institutions, but merely adds for the king the command that his cavalry, his wives, and his gold and silver should not be numerous (5. B. Mose 17, 16 ff.). In one sense it may indeed be said that for the Idea, too, these three forms—including the monarchical in the restricted sense in which it is placed beside the aristocratic and democratic—are immaterial; but this is in the opposite sense, because all of them fail to accord with the Idea in its rational development (§ 272), and in none of them could the Idea attain its right and actuality. Hence the question of which is the most excellent among them has become wholly idle; such forms can be discussed only historically. In this respect, as in so many others, one must acknowledge Montesquieu's profound insight in his celebrated account of the principles of these forms of government, but must not misunderstand that account if one is to acknowledge its correctness. As is well known, he assigned virtue as the principle of democracy; for such a constitution does indeed rest upon disposition, the merely substantial form in which the rationality of the will that is in and for itself still exists within it. But when Montesquieu adds that England in the seventeenth century offered the beautiful spectacle of efforts to establish a democracy proving powerless, because virtue was lacking in the leaders; and when he further adds that, if virtue disappears from the republic, ambition seizes those whose minds are capable of it, and greed seizes everyone, so that the state, a universal prey, then has its strength only in the power of a few individuals and the license of all—one must observe that, in a more developed condition of society, and with the development and liberation of the powers of particularity, the virtue of the heads of the state is insufficient. Another form of rational law than merely that of disposition becomes necessary, so that the whole may possess the strength to hold itself together and to allow the powers of developed particularity their positive as well as their negative right. Likewise, one must remove the misunderstanding that, because the disposition of virtue is the substantial form in the democratic republic, this disposition is declared dispensable, or even absent, in monarchy; or, conversely, that virtue and activity determined by law within an articulated organization are opposed and incompatible. That moderation is the principle in aristocracy follows from the division, beginning here, between public power and private interest; yet these also touch one another so directly that this constitution stands poised to become immediately the harshest condition of tyranny or anarchy—see Roman history—and to destroy itself. That Montesquieu recognizes honor as the principle of monarchy already makes it clear that he understands neither the patriarchal or ancient monarchy in general, nor the monarchy developed into an objective constitution, but feudal monarchy, insofar as the relations of its internal constitutional law have been fixed as legal private property and privileges of individuals and corporations. Since in this constitution the life of the state rests upon privileged personality, and much of what must be done for the state's subsistence is left to its pleasure, the objective character of these services rests not upon duties but upon representation and opinion; thus, instead of duty, honor alone holds the state together.
Another question readily presents itself here: who is to make the constitution? This question seems clear, but on closer examination immediately proves meaningless. For it presupposes that no constitution exists, and that therefore a mere atomistic heap of individuals is assembled. How a heap should arrive at a constitution, whether by itself or through others, by kindness, thought, or force, would have to be left to it; for the concept has nothing to do with a heap. But if the question already presupposes an existing constitution, making it means only altering it; and the presupposition of a constitution immediately entails that alteration can take place only by constitutional means. In general, however, it is absolutely essential that the constitution, though it has arisen in time, should not be regarded as something made. Rather, it is what is absolutely in and for itself, and must therefore be regarded as divine and enduring, and as standing above the sphere of what is made.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
273 The political state thus divides into these substantial distinctions:
a) The power to determine and establish the universal: legislative power.
b) The power to bring the particular spheres and individual cases under the universal: the governmental power.
c) The power of subjectivity as the final decision of the will: the power of the prince. In it the distinct powers are brought together into an individual unity. It is therefore the summit and the beginning of the whole—of constitutional monarchy.
The development of the state into constitutional monarchy is the achievement of the modern world, in which the substantial Idea has acquired infinite form. The history of the world's spirit deepening into itself—or, what is the same thing, this free development in which the Idea releases its moments, and only its moments, from itself as totalities, and thereby contains them in the ideal unity of the concept, in which real rationality consists—the history of this true formation of ethical life belongs to universal world history.
The old classification of constitutions into monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy rests on the still undivided substantial unity. This unity has not yet reached its internal differentiation—an organization developed within itself—and therefore has not yet reached depth and concrete rationality. For that standpoint of the ancient world, this classification is therefore true and correct. For difference within that still substantial unity, which has not yet unfolded itself absolutely, is essentially external. It appears first as a difference in the number (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, § 82) of those in whom that substantial unity is supposed to be present. These forms, which in this way belong to different wholes, are reduced to moments in constitutional monarchy. The monarch is one; a few enter with the governmental power, and the many as such enter with legislative power. But as already said, such merely quantitative differences are superficial and do not express the concept of the matter. It is equally inappropriate that so much has recently been said about democratic and aristocratic elements in monarchy. The determinations meant by this, precisely insofar as they occur in monarchy, are no longer democratic or aristocratic. There are conceptions of constitutions in which only the abstraction of a state is placed at the top, to rule and command. Whether one, several, or all stand at the head of this state is left undecided and regarded as immaterial. "All these forms," says Fichte in his Naturrecht, Part 1, p. 196, "are lawful, provided only that an ephorate"—a counterweight to the highest power that he invented and supposed should exist—"is present, and can produce and maintain universal right in the state." Such a view, like that invention of an ephorate, comes from the shallowness in the concept of the state noted earlier. In a very simple condition of society these distinctions admittedly have little or no significance. Thus Moses, in his legislation for the case that the people should demand a king, makes no other change in the institutions. He merely adds the command that the king's cavalry, wives, and gold and silver should not be numerous (Deuteronomy 17:16 and following). In one sense, incidentally, it can indeed be said that those three forms are also immaterial to the Idea. This includes the monarchical form in the limited meaning in which it is placed alongside the aristocratic and democratic forms. But this is true in the opposite sense: none of them conforms to the Idea in its rational development (§ 272), and in none could the Idea attain its right and actual reality. For this reason, too, asking which of them is best has become an entirely idle question. Such forms can only be discussed historically. Still, in this matter, as in so many others, we must recognize Montesquieu's deep insight in his famous account of the principles of these forms of government. But to recognize its correctness, we must not misunderstand it. As is well known, he named virtue as the principle of democracy. Such a constitution does in fact rest on disposition, as the merely substantial form in which the rationality of the will that is in and for itself still exists within it. But Montesquieu adds that in the seventeenth century England presented the fine spectacle of showing the efforts to establish a democracy to be powerless, because its leaders lacked virtue. He adds further that when virtue disappears in a republic, ambition takes hold of those whose minds are capable of it, and greed takes hold of everyone; the state then becomes everyone's prey, with its strength lying only in the power of a few individuals and the excesses of everyone. On this we should observe that in a more developed condition of society, with the development and liberation of the powers of particularity, the virtue of the state's leaders is insufficient. Rational law needs a form other than disposition alone, so that the whole has the strength to hold itself together and allow the powers of developed particularity their positive as well as their negative right. Equally, we must remove the misunderstanding that because a virtuous disposition is the substantial form in a democratic republic, this disposition is declared unnecessary or even absent in a monarchy; and still more the misunderstanding that virtue and the legally defined activity of an articulated organization are opposed and incompatible. That moderation is the principle of aristocracy follows from the separation, beginning here, of public power and private interest. At the same time they touch so directly that this constitution is poised to turn immediately into the harshest condition of tyranny or anarchy (see Roman history) and destroy itself. That Montesquieu recognizes honor as the principle of monarchy itself already shows that he does not mean patriarchal or ancient monarchy in general, nor monarchy developed into an objective constitution. He means feudal monarchy, specifically insofar as the relationships of its internal constitutional law have been fixed as the legal private property and privileges of individuals and corporations. In this constitution political life rests on privileged persons. Much of what must be done for the state to continue existing is left to their discretion. The objective element in these services therefore rests not on duties but on notion and opinion. Thus honor alone, instead of duty, is what holds the state together.
Another question readily arises: who should make the constitution? This question seems clear, but on closer inspection immediately proves meaningless. It assumes that no constitution exists, and therefore that there is only an atomistic heap of individuals assembled together. How a heap would acquire a constitution—whether by itself or through others, through kindness, thought, or force—would have to be left to it. For the concept has nothing to do with a heap. But if that question already assumes an existing constitution, making it means only changing it. The assumption of a constitution itself immediately entails that the change can happen only constitutionally. In general, however, it is absolutely essential that the constitution, although it has arisen in time, should not be regarded as something made. Rather, it is what is unconditionally in and for itself. It must therefore be regarded as divine and enduring, and as above the sphere of things that are made.
About this section
Section 273 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 275 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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