Section 25
Original German
25 Das Subjective heißt in Ansehung des Willens überhaupt die Seite seines Selbstbewußtseyns, der Einzelnheit (§. 7.) im Unterschiede von seinem an sich seyenden Begriffe, daher heißt seine Subjectivität α) die reine Form, die absolute Einheit des Selbstbewußtseyns mit sich, in der es als Ich=Ich schlechthin innerlich und abstractes Beruhen auf sich ist — die reine Gewißheit seiner selbst, unterschieden von der Wahrheit; β) die Besonderheit des Willens als die Willkühr und der zufällige Inhalt beliebiger Zwecke; γ) überhaupt die einseitige Form (§. 8.), insofern das Gewollte wie es seinem Inhalte nach sey, nur erst ein dem Selbstbewußtseyn angehöriger Inhalt und unausgeführter Zweck ist.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
25 With regard to the will in general, the subjective means the side of its self-consciousness, of individuality (§ 7), as distinct from its concept as it is in itself. Its subjectivity therefore means: α) the pure form, the absolute unity of self-consciousness with itself, in which, as I=I, it is utterly inward and an abstract resting upon itself—pure certainty of itself, distinguished from truth; β) the particularity of the will as arbitrary choice and the contingent content of whatever ends it pleases; γ) in general, the one-sided form (§ 8), insofar as what is willed, whatever its content may be, is as yet only a content belonging to self-consciousness and an end not carried out.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
25 For the will in general, the subjective means the side of its self-consciousness, its individuality (§ 7), as distinct from its concept as it is in itself. So its subjectivity means: α) pure form, the absolute unity of self-consciousness with itself, in which, as I=I, it is entirely inward and abstractly rests on itself—the pure certainty of itself, distinct from truth; β) the particularity of the will as arbitrary choice and the contingent content of any chosen purposes; γ) the one-sided form in general (§ 8), insofar as what is willed, whatever its content may be, is still only a content belonging to self-consciousness and a purpose not yet carried out.
About this section
Section 25 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 27 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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