Section 26
Original German
26 Der Wille α) insofern er sich selbst zu seiner Bestimmung hat und so seinem Begriffe gemäß und wahrhaftig ist, ist der schlechthin objective Wille, β) der objective Wille aber, als ohne die unendliche Form des Selbstbewußtseyns ist der in sein Object oder Zustand, wie er seinem Inhalte nach beschaffen sey, versenkte Wille — der kindliche, sittliche, wie der sclavische, abergläubische u. s. f. — γ) Die Objectivität ist endlich die einseitige Form im Gegensatze der subjectiven Willensbestimmung, hiemit die Unmittelbarkeit des Daseyns, als äußerliche Existenz; der Wille wird sich in diesem Sinne erst durch die Ausführung seiner Zwecke objectiv.
Diese logischen Bestimmungen von Subjectivität und Objectivität sind hier in der Absicht besonders aufgeführt worden, um in Ansehung ihrer, da sie in der Folge oft gebraucht werden, ausdrücklich zu bemerken, daß es ihnen wie andern Unterschieden und entgegengesetzten Reflexionsbestimmungen geht, um ihrer Endlichkeit und daher ihrer dialektischen Natur willen in ihr Entgegengesetztes überzugehen. Andern solchen Bestimmungen des Gegensatzes bleibt jedoch ihre Bedeutung fest für Vorstellung und Verstand, indem ihre Identität noch als ein innerliches ist. Im Willen hingegen führen solche Gegensätze, welche abstracte und zugleich Bestimmungen von ihm, der nur als das Concrete gewußt werden kann, seyn sollen, von selbst auf diese ihre Identität und auf die Verwechslung ihrer Bedeutungen; — eine Verwechslung, die dem Verstande bewußtlos nur begegnet. — So ist der Wille, als die in sich seyende Freyheit, die Subjectivität selbst, diese ist damit sein Begriff und so seine Objectivität; Endlichkeit aber ist seine Subjectivität, im Gegensatze gegen die Objectivität; aber eben in diesem Gegensatze ist der Wille nicht bey sich, mit dem Objecte verwickelt und seine Endlichkeit besteht eben sowohl darinn, nicht subjectiv zu seyn u. s. f. — Was daher im Folgenden das Subjective oder Objective des Willens für eine Bedeutung haben soll, hat jedesmal aus dem Zusammenhang zu erhellen, der ihre Stellung in Beziehung auf die Totalität enthält.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
26 The will, α) insofar as it has itself as its determination and is thus in accordance with its concept and true, is the unconditionally objective will. β) The objective will, however, as without the infinite form of self-consciousness, is the will immersed in its object or condition, whatever the character of its content—the childlike and ethical will, as well as the slavish, superstitious will, and so on. γ) Objectivity, finally, is the one-sided form opposed to the subjective determination of the will, and hence the immediacy of existence as external existence; in this sense, the will becomes objective to itself only by carrying out its ends.
These logical determinations of subjectivity and objectivity have been set out here in particular so that, since they will often be used in what follows, it may be expressly noted that they, like other distinctions and opposed determinations of reflection, pass over into their opposites because of their finitude and consequently their dialectical nature. Yet other such determinations of opposition retain a fixed meaning for ordinary conception and the understanding, since their identity is still an inward one. In the will, by contrast, such oppositions—which are supposed to be abstract and at the same time determinations of the will, which can be known only as the concrete—lead of themselves to this identity of theirs and to the interchange of their meanings. This is an interchange that merely happens to the understanding without its knowing it. Thus the will, as freedom within itself, is subjectivity itself; subjectivity is therefore its concept and hence its objectivity. Finitude, however, is its subjectivity in opposition to objectivity; but precisely in this opposition the will is not at home with itself, is entangled with the object, and its finitude consists just as much in its not being subjective, and so on. Thus the meaning that the subjective or objective aspect of the will is to have in what follows must in each case become clear from the context, which contains its position in relation to the totality.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
26 The will is: α) completely objective insofar as it has itself as its determination and is thus in keeping with its concept and true; β) objective, but without the infinite form of self-consciousness, when it is absorbed in its object or condition, whatever that may be in content—the will of a child, a will living ethically, as well as a slavish or superstitious will, and so on; γ) finally, objectivity is the one-sided form opposed to the subjective determination of the will, and thus the immediacy of existence as external existence. In this sense the will becomes objective to itself only by carrying out its purposes.
These logical determinations of subjectivity and objectivity have been specifically listed here because they will often be used below. The point is to make clear that, like other distinctions and opposed determinations of reflection, their finitude, and therefore their dialectical nature, leads them to pass into their opposites. In other such determinations of opposition, however, their meaning remains fixed for representation and understanding, since their identity is still something inner. In the will, by contrast, these opposites are supposed to be abstract and at the same time determinations of the will, which can be known only as the concrete. They therefore lead of themselves to this identity and to their meanings interchanging—an interchange that merely happens to the understanding without its awareness. Thus the will, as freedom existing within itself, is subjectivity itself. Subjectivity is therefore its concept and so its objectivity. But its subjectivity, in opposition to objectivity, is finitude. Yet precisely in this opposition, the will is not at home with itself but entangled with the object, and its finitude consists just as much in its not being subjective, and so on. What the subjective or objective side of the will is to mean in what follows must therefore always become clear from the context, which contains their position in relation to the whole.
About this section
Section 26 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 28 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the European tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.