Section 24
Original German
24 Er ist allgemein, weil in ihm alle Beschränkung und besondere Einzelnheit aufgehoben ist, als welche allein in der Verschiedenheit des Begriffes und seines Gegenstandes oder Inhalts, oder nach anderer Form, in der Verschiedenheit seines subjectiven Fürsichseyns — und seines Ansichseyns, seiner ausschließenden und beschließenden Einzelnheit — und seiner Allgemeinheit selbst, liegt.
Die verschiedenen Bestimmungen der Allgemeinheit ergeben sich in der Logik. (s. Encyklop. der philos. Wissenschaften §. 118 — 126.) Bey diesem Ausdruck fällt dem Vorstellen zunächst die abstracte und äußerliche ein; aber bey der an und für sich seyenden Allgemeinheit, wie sie sich hier bestimmt hat, ist weder an die Allgemeinheit der Reflexion, die Gemeinschaftlichkeit oder die Allheit zu denken, noch an die abstracte Allgemeinheit, welche außer dem Einzelnen auf der andern Seite steht, die abstracte Verstandes-Identität (§. 6. Anm.). Es ist die in sich concrete und so für sich seyende Allgemeinheit, welche die Substanz, die immanente Gattung oder immanente Idee des Selbstbewußtseyns ist; — der Begriff des freyen Willens, als das über seinen Gegenstand übergreifende, durch seine Bestimmung hindurchgehende Allgemeine, das in ihr mit sich identisch ist. — Das an und für sich seyende Allgemeine ist überhaupt das, was man das Vernünftige nennt und was nur auf diese speculative Weise gefaßt werden kann.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
24 The will is universal, because within it all limitation and particular individuality are sublated. These lie solely in the difference between the concept and its object or content—or, in another form, in the difference between its subjective being-for-itself and its being-in-itself, between its exclusive and resolving individuality and its universality itself.
The various determinations of universality are set out in logic. (See Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, §§ 118–126.) At this expression, ordinary conception first thinks of abstract and external universality. But in the case of universality that is in and for itself, as it has been determined here, we must think neither of the universality of reflection—commonality or allness—nor of abstract universality, which stands outside the individual, on the other side: the abstract identity of the understanding (§ 6, Remark). It is universality that is concrete within itself and thus is for itself, the substance, the immanent genus or immanent Idea of self-consciousness—the concept of the free will as the universal that encompasses its object and passes through its determination, remaining identical with itself in that determination. What is universal in and for itself is, in general, what is called rational, and can be grasped only in this speculative way.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
24 The will is universal, because all limitation and particular individuality are overcome in it. These lie only in the difference between the concept and its object or content. Put another way, they lie in the difference between its subjective being-for-itself and its being-in-itself, between its excluding, deciding individuality and its universality itself.
The different determinations of universality are developed in logic. (See Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, §§ 118–126.) When we hear this expression, ordinary representation first thinks of abstract, external universality. But the universality that is in and for itself, as it has been determined here, means neither the universality of reflection—what things have in common, or all of them taken together—nor abstract universality, which stands apart from the individual on the other side: the understanding's abstract identity (§ 6, Remark). It is universality that is concrete within itself and so is for itself. It is the substance, the inherent genus or inherent Idea of self-consciousness: the concept of the free will as the universal that encompasses its object and passes through its determination, remaining identical with itself within it. What is universal in and for itself is, in general, what we call the rational, which can be grasped only in this speculative way.
About this section
Section 24 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 26 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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