Section 227
Original German
227 Die erstere Seite, die Erkenntniß des Falles in seiner unmittelbaren Einzelnheit und seine Qualificirung enthält für sich kein Rechtsprechen. Sie ist eine Erkenntniß, wie sie jedem gebildeten Menschen zusteht. Insofern für die Qualification der Handlung das subjective Moment der Einsicht und Absicht des Handelnden (s. II. Th.) wesentlich ist, und der Beweis ohnehin nicht Vernunft- oder abstracte Verstandes-Gegenstände, sondern nur Einzelheiten, Umstände und Gegenstände sinnlicher Anschauung und subjectiver Gewißheit betrifft, daher keine absolut objective Bestimmung in sich enthält, so ist das Letzte in der Entscheidung die subjective Ueberzeugung und das Gewissen, (animi sententia), wie in Ansehung des Beweises, der auf Aussagen und Versicherungen anderer beruht, der Eyd die zwar subjective, aber letzte Bewährung ist.
Bey dem in Rede stehenden Gegenstand ist es eine Hauptsache die Natur des Beweisens, auf welches es hier ankommt, ins Auge zu fassen und es von dem Erkennen und Beweisen anderer Art zu unterscheiden. Eine Vernunftbestimmung, wie der Begriff des Rechts selbst ist, zu beweisen, d. i. ihre Nothwendigkeit zu erkennen, erfordert eine andere Methode, als der Beweis eines geometrischen Lehrsatzes. Ferner bey Letzterem ist die Figur vom Verstande bestimmt und einem Gesetze gemäß bereits abstract gemacht; aber bey einem empirischen Inhalt, wie eine Thatsache ist, ist der Stoff des Erkennens die gegebene sinnliche Anschauung und die sinnliche subjective Gewißheit und das Aussprechen und Versichern von solcher, — woran nun das Schließen und Combiniren aus solchen Aussagen, Zeugnissen, Umständen u. dergl. thätig ist. Die objective Wahrheit, welche aus solchem Stoffe und der ihm gemäßen Methode, bey dem Versuche sie für sich objectiv zu bestimmen, auf halbe Beweise und in weiterer wahrhafter Consequenz, die zugleich eine formelle Inconsequenz in sich enthält, auf außerordentliche Strafen führt, hervorgehet, hat einen ganz andern Sinn, als die Wahrheit einer Vernunftbestimmung oder eines Satzes, dessen Stoff sich der Verstand bereits abstract bestimmt hat. Daß nun solche empirische Wahrheit einer Begebenheit zu erkennen, in der eigentlich juristischen Bestimmung eines Gerichts, daß in dieser eine eigenthümliche Qualität hiefür und damit ein ausschließendes Recht an sich und Nothwendigkeit liege, diß aufzuzeigen machte einen Hauptgesichtspunkt bey der Frage aus, inwiefern den förmlichen juristischen Gerichtshöfen das Urtheil über das Factum wie über die Rechtsfrage zuzuschreiben sey.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
227 The first side, the cognition of the case in its immediate individuality and its qualification, involves in itself no administration of justice. It is a cognition such as belongs to every educated person. Insofar as the subjective moment of the agent's insight and intention (see Part II) is essential for the qualification of the action, and proof in any case concerns not objects of reason or of the abstract understanding but only singulars, circumstances, and objects of sensuous intuition and subjective certainty, and therefore contains no absolutely objective determination, the last word in the decision is subjective conviction and conscience (animi sententia, the verdict of the mind), just as, with respect to proof that rests on the statements and assurances of others, the oath is the confirmation that is indeed subjective but final.
In the matter under discussion it is of chief importance to keep in view the nature of the proving that is at issue here, and to distinguish it from cognizing and proving of other kinds. To prove a determination of reason, as the concept of right itself is, that is, to cognize its necessity, requires a different method from the proof of a geometrical theorem. Furthermore, in the latter the figure is determined by the understanding and already made abstract in accordance with a law; but with an empirical content, such as a fact is, the material of cognition is given sensuous intuition and sensuous subjective certainty, and the declaring and affirming of it, — in which inference and combination from such statements, testimonies, circumstances, and the like are then at work. The objective truth that proceeds from such material and the method fitted to it, in the attempt to determine it objectively for itself — an attempt that leads to half-proofs and, in further true consistency, which at the same time contains a formal inconsistency, to extraordinary punishments — has a quite different sense from the truth of a determination of reason or of a proposition whose material the understanding has already determined abstractly. That the cognition of such empirical truth of an event lies in the properly juridical function of a court, that there is in this function a peculiar qualification for it and thereby an exclusive right in itself and a necessity, to show this was a chief point of view in the question to what extent the judgment upon the fact, as upon the question of right, is to be ascribed to the formal juridical courts.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
227 The first side, knowing the case in its immediate individuality and describing it, does not by itself involve pronouncing a legal judgment. It is a kind of knowing that belongs to every educated person. In describing an act, the subjective moment of the agent's insight and intention (see Part II) is essential. Besides, proof concerns no objects of reason or of abstract understanding. It concerns only individual things, circumstances, and objects of sense perception and subjective certainty, and so contains no absolutely objective determination. Therefore the last word in the decision is subjective conviction and conscience (animi sententia, "the judgment of the mind"). In the same way, where proof rests on the statements and assurances of others, the oath is the final confirmation, subjective though it is.
On the subject at hand, it is a main point to keep in view the nature of the proving that matters here, and to tell it apart from knowing and proving of another kind. To prove a determination of reason, such as the concept of right itself, that is, to know its necessity, requires a different method from the proof of a geometrical theorem. Further, in geometry the figure is determined by the understanding and has already been made abstract in accordance with a law. But with an empirical content, such as a fact, the material of knowing is the given sense perception and sensuous, subjective certainty, and the speaking and asserting of it. Inference and combination from such statements, testimonies, circumstances and the like are then at work on this material. Objective truth comes out of such material and the method that fits it, when we try to determine it objectively on its own. This truth leads to half proofs, and, by a further truly consistent step that also contains a formal inconsistency, to extraordinary punishments. It has a quite different sense from the truth of a determination of reason, or of a proposition whose material the understanding has already determined abstractly. That knowing such empirical truth of an event belongs to the proper legal function of a court, that there lies in it a distinctive quality for this, and with that an exclusive right and necessity in itself: to show this was a main point of view in the question of how far the formal legal courts should be given the judgment on the fact as well as on the question of law.
About this section
Section 227 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 229 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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