Section 228
Original German
228 Das Recht des Selbstbewußtseyns der Parthie ist im Richterspruch, nach der Seite daß er die Subsumtion des qualificirten Falles unter das Gesetz ist, in Ansehung des Gesetzes dadurch bewahrt, daß das Gesetz bekannt und damit das Gesetz der Parthei selbst, und in Ansehung der Sumsumtion, daß der Rechtsgang öffentlich ist. Aber in Ansehung der Entscheidung über den besondern, subjectiven und äußerlichen Inhalt der Sache, dessen Erkenntniß in die ersten der §. 225. angegebenen Seiten fällt, findet jenes Recht in dem Zutrauen zu der Subjectivität der Entscheidenden seine Befriedigung. Diß Zutrauen gründet sich vornemlich auf die Gleichheit der Parthie mit denselben nach ihrer Besonderheit, dem Stande, und dergleichen.
Das Recht des Selbstbewußtseyns, das Moment der subjectiven Freyheit, kann als der substantielle Gesichtspunkt in der Frage über Nothwendigkeit der öffentlichen Rechtspflege und der sogenannten Geschwornengerichte angesehen werden. Auf ihn reducirt sich das Wesentliche, was in der Form der Nützlichkeit für diese Institutionen vorgebracht werden kann. Nach anderen Rücksichten und Gründen von diesen oder jenen Vortheilen oder Nachtheilen, kann herüber und hinüber gestritten werden, sie sind wie alle Gründe des Raisonnements secondär und nicht entscheidend, oder aber aus andern vielleicht höhern Sphären genommen. Daß die Rechtspflege an sich von rein juristischen Gerichten gut, vielleicht besser als mit andern Institutionen, ausgeübt werden könne, um diese Möglichkeit handelt es sich insofern nicht, als wenn sich auch diese Möglichkeit zur Wahrscheinlichkeit, ja selbst zur Nothwendigkeit steigern ließe, es von der andern Seite immer das Recht des Selbstbewußtseyns ist, welches dabey seine Ansprüche behält und sie nicht befriedigt findet. — Wenn die Kenntniß des Rechtes durch die Beschaffenheit dessen, was die Gesetze in ihrem Umfange ausmacht, ferner des Ganges der gerichtlichen Verhandlungen, und die Möglichkeit das Recht zu verfolgen, Eigenthum eines auch durch Terminologie, die für die, um deren Recht es geht, eine fremde Sprache ist, sich ausschließend machenden Standes ist, so sind die Mitglieder der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, die für die Subsistenz auf ihre Thätigkeit, ihr eigenes Wissen und Wollen angewiesen sind, gegen das nicht nur persönlichste und eigenste, sondern auch das substantielle und vernünftige darin, das Recht, fremde gehalten und unter Vormundschaft, selbst in eine Art von Leibeigenschaft gegen solchen Stand, gesetzt. Wenn sie wohl das Recht haben, im Gerichte leiblich, mit den Füßen, zugegen zu seyn, (in judicio stare) so ist diß wenig, wenn sie nicht geistig, mit ihrem eigenen Wissen gegenwärtig seyn sollen, und das Recht, das sie erlangen, bleibt ein äußerliches Schicksal für sie.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
228 The right of the party's self-consciousness is preserved in the judicial verdict, on the side where the verdict is the subsumption of the qualified case under the law, with respect to the law by the fact that the law is known and thereby is the party's own law, and with respect to the subsumption by the fact that the legal proceeding is public. But with respect to the decision on the particular, subjective, and external content of the matter, the cognition of which falls under the first of the sides indicated in § 225, that right finds its satisfaction in trust in the subjectivity of those who decide. This trust is founded chiefly on the equality of the party with them in their particularity, in station, and the like.
The right of self-consciousness, the moment of subjective freedom, can be regarded as the substantial point of view in the question of the necessity of public administration of justice and of the so-called trial by jury. To it is reduced what is essential in whatever can be advanced for these institutions in the form of utility. On other considerations and grounds, concerning this or that advantage or disadvantage, one can argue back and forth; like all grounds of ratiocination they are secondary and not decisive, or else are drawn from other, perhaps higher, spheres. That the administration of justice could be exercised well, perhaps better than under other institutions, by purely juridical courts is not the question here, insofar as, even if this possibility could be raised to probability, indeed to necessity, it is always, on the other side, the right of self-consciousness that retains its claims in the matter and does not find them satisfied. — If the knowledge of right, by the constitution of what the laws comprise in their compass, and further of the course of judicial proceedings and the possibility of pursuing right, is the property of an estate that also makes itself exclusive by a terminology which is a foreign language to those whose right is at stake, then the members of civil society, who for their subsistence are dependent on their own activity and their own knowing and willing, are kept strangers to what is not only most personal and their own but also what is substantial and rational in it, right, and are placed under tutelage, even into a kind of serfdom toward such an estate. If they do indeed have the right to be bodily present in court, with their feet (in judicio stare, to stand in court), this is little if they are not to be present spiritually, with their own knowing, and the right they obtain remains for them an external fate.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
228 The right of self-consciousness of the party is preserved in the judge's verdict, so far as the verdict is the subsumption of the qualified case under the law. With regard to the law, it is preserved because the law is known and so is the party's own law. With regard to the subsumption, it is preserved because the legal procedure is public. But the decision on the particular, subjective and external content of the matter falls under the first of the sides named in § 225. With regard to that, this right finds its satisfaction in trust in the subjectivity of those who decide. This trust rests chiefly on the party's equality with them in their particularity, in rank and the like.
The right of self-consciousness, the moment of subjective freedom, can be seen as the substantial point of view in the question of whether public administration of justice and so-called juries are necessary. What is essential in what can be offered for these institutions in the form of usefulness comes down to it. On other considerations and grounds, about this or that advantage or disadvantage, people can argue back and forth. Like all grounds of reasoning, these are secondary and not decisive, or else they are taken from other, perhaps higher, spheres. That the administration of justice could be carried out well by purely legal courts, perhaps better than by other institutions, is not the issue here. Even if this possibility could be raised to probability, or even to necessity, on the other side it is always the right of self-consciousness that keeps its claims in the matter and does not find them satisfied. — Suppose knowledge of right is the property of an estate that shuts itself off, through the nature of what the laws amount to in their whole extent, and further through the course of court proceedings and the possibility of pursuing one's right, and also through a terminology that is a foreign language to those whose right is at stake. Then the members of civil society, who depend for their subsistence on their own activity and their own knowing and willing, are held as strangers to right. That is not only what is most personal and their own, but also what is substantial and rational in it. They are placed under guardianship, even into a kind of serfdom toward that estate. They may well have the right to be bodily present in court, on their feet (in judicio stare, "to stand in court"). But that is little, if they are not to be present in spirit, with their own knowledge. The right they obtain remains for them an external fate.
About this section
Section 228 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 230 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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