Section 225
Original German
225 In dem Geschäfte des Rechtsprechens als der Anwendung des Gesetzes auf den einzelnen Fall unterscheiden sich die zwey Seiten, erstens die Erkenntniß der Beschaffenheit des Falls nach seiner unmittelbaren Einzelnheit, ob ein Vertrag u. s. f. vorhanden, eine verletzende Handlung begangen, und wer deren Thäter sey, und im peinlichen Rechte die Reflexion als Bestimmung der Handlung nach ihrem substantiellen, verbrecherischen Charakter (§. 119. Anm.) — zweytens die Subsumtion des Falles unter das Gesetz der Wiederherstellung des Rechts, worunter im Peinlichen die Strafe begriffen ist. Die Entscheidungen über diese beyde verschiedenen Seiten sind verschiedene Funktionen.
In der römischen Gerichtsverfassung kam die Unterscheidung dieser Functionen darin vor, daß der Prätor seine Entscheidung gab, im Fall sich die Sache so oder so verhalte, und daß er zur Untersuchung dieses Verhaltens einen besondern Judex bestellte. — Die Charakterisirung einer Handlung nach ihrer bestimmten verbrecherischen Qualität (ob z. B. ein Mord oder Tödtung) ist im englischen Rechtsverfahren, der Einsicht oder Willkühr des Anklägers überlassen und das Gericht kann keine andere Bestimmung fassen, wenn es jene unrichtig findet.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
225 In the business of administering justice, as the application of the law to the individual case, two sides are distinguished: first, the cognition of the character of the case in its immediate individuality, whether a contract and so on exists, whether an injurious action has been committed, and who its perpetrator is, and in criminal law the reflection that determines the action according to its substantial, criminal character (§ 119, Remark); second, the subsumption of the case under the law of the restoration of right, within which, in criminal law, punishment is comprised. The decisions on these two different sides are different functions.
In the Roman constitution of the courts, the distinction of these functions appeared in the fact that the praetor gave his decision in case the matter stood thus or thus, and appointed a special judex to investigate how it stood. — The characterization of an action according to its determinate criminal quality (whether, for example, murder or manslaughter) is, in English legal procedure, left to the discernment or arbitrary choice of the accuser, and the court cannot adopt any other determination if it finds that one incorrect.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
225 In the business of pronouncing judgment, which is the application of the law to the individual case, two sides are distinguished. First, there is knowing what the case is like in its immediate individuality: whether a contract and so on exists, whether a harmful act was committed, and who did it. In criminal law there is also the reflection that determines the act in its substantial, criminal character (§ 119, Remark). Second, there is the subsumption of the case under the law that restores right, and in criminal law punishment is included in this. The decisions on these two different sides are different functions.
In the Roman court system the distinction between these functions appeared in this way: the praetor gave his decision in case the matter stood one way or another, and appointed a special judex to investigate how it stood. — In English legal procedure, the description of an act by its specific criminal quality (for example, whether it is murder or manslaughter) is left to the insight or choice of the accuser. If the court finds that description incorrect, it cannot make any other determination.
About this section
Section 225 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 227 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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