Section 218
Original German
218 Indem Eigenthum und Persönlichkeit in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft gesetzliche Anerkennung und Gültigkeit haben, so ist das Verbrechen nicht mehr nur Verletzung eines subjectiv-Unendlichen, sondern der allgemeinen Sache, die eine in sich feste und starke Existenz hat. Es tritt damit der Gesichtspunkt der Gefährlichkeit der Handlung für die Gesellschaft ein, wodurch einer Seits die Größe des Verbrechens verstärkt wird, anderer Seits aber setzt die ihrer selbst sicher gewordene Macht der Gesellschaft die äußerliche Wichtigkeit der Verletzung herunter, und führt daher eine größere Milde in der Ahndung desselben herbey.
Daß in Einem Mitgliede der Gesellschaft die andern Alle verletzt sind, verändert die Natur des Verbrechens nicht nach seinem Begriffe, sondern nach der Seite der äußern Existenz, der Verletzung, die nun die Vorstellung und das Bewußtseyn der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, nicht nur das Daseyn des unmittelbar Verletzten trifft. In den Heroen-Zeiten (siehe die Tragödien der Alten) sehen sich die Bürger durch die Verbrechen, welche die Glieder der Königshäuser gegen einander begehen, nicht als verletzt an. — Indem das Verbrechen, an sich eine unendliche Verletzung, als ein Daseyn nach qualitativen und quantitativen Unterschieden bemessen werden muß (§. 96.), welches nun wesentlich als Vorstellung und Bewußtseyn von dem Gelten der Gesetze bestimmt ist, so ist die Gefährlichkeit für die bürgerliche Gesellschaft eine Bestimmung seiner Größe, oder auch eine seiner qualitativen Bestimmungen. — Diese Qualität nun oder Größe ist aber nach dem Zustande der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft veränderlich, und in ihm liegt die Berechtigung, sowohl einen Diebstahl von etlichen Sous oder einer Rübe mit dem Tode, als einen Diebstahl, der das hundert- und mehrfache von dergleichen Werthen beträgt, mit einer gelinden Strafe zu belegen. Der Gesichtspunkt der Gefährlichkeit für die bürgerliche Gesellschaft, indem er die Verbrechen zu aggraviren scheint, ist es vielmehr vornämlich, der ihre Ahndung vermindert hat. Ein Strafcodex gehört darum vornämlich seiner Zeit und dem Zustand der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft in ihr an.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
218 Since property and personality have legal recognition and validity in civil society, crime is no longer merely the violation of something subjectively infinite, but of the universal cause, which has an existence firm and strong in itself. With this the standpoint of the dangerousness of the action to society enters, whereby on the one hand the magnitude of the crime is increased; but on the other hand the power of society, having become sure of itself, lowers the external importance of the violation, and therefore brings about greater mildness in punishing it.
That in one member of society all the others are injured does not change the nature of the crime according to its concept, but according to the side of external existence, of the injury, which now strikes the representation and consciousness of civil society, not merely the existence of the one immediately injured. In the heroic ages (see the tragedies of the ancients) the citizens do not regard themselves as injured by the crimes that the members of royal houses commit against one another. — Since crime, which is in itself an infinite injury, must be measured as an existence according to qualitative and quantitative differences (§ 96), an existence that is now essentially determined as representation and consciousness of the validity of the laws, the dangerousness to civil society is a determination of its magnitude, or also one of its qualitative determinations. — This quality or magnitude, however, varies with the condition of civil society, and in this lies the warrant for punishing a theft of a few sous or of a turnip with death, and a theft amounting to a hundred times such values or more with a mild penalty. The standpoint of dangerousness to civil society, though it seems to aggravate crimes, is rather what has chiefly lessened their punishment. A penal code therefore belongs chiefly to its time and to the condition of the civil society within it.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
218 Property and personality now have legal recognition and validity in civil society. So crime is no longer only the violation of something subjectively infinite. It is the violation of the universal matter, which has a firm and strong existence in itself. This brings in the point of view of how dangerous the act is for society. On one side, this increases the magnitude of the crime. On the other side, the power of society, now sure of itself, reduces the outward importance of the violation, and so leads to greater mildness in punishing it.
That in one member of society all the others are injured does not change the nature of the crime in terms of its concept. It changes it in terms of outward existence, of the injury, which now strikes the ideas and consciousness of civil society, and not only the existence of the person directly injured. In the heroic ages (see the tragedies of the ancients) the citizens do not regard themselves as injured by the crimes that members of the royal houses commit against one another. — A crime is in itself an infinite violation. But it must be measured as an existing thing by qualitative and quantitative differences (§ 96). That existence is essentially defined as an idea and consciousness of the validity of the laws. So the danger to civil society is a determination of the crime's magnitude, or one of its qualitative determinations. — This quality or magnitude, however, varies with the condition of civil society. In that condition lies the justification for punishing with death a theft of a few sous or of a turnip, and for punishing with a mild penalty a theft a hundred times that value or more. The point of view of danger to civil society seems to make crimes worse. In fact it is chiefly this point of view that has reduced their punishment. A penal code therefore belongs mainly to its own time and to the condition of civil society in that time.
About this section
Section 218 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 220 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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