Section 217
Original German
217 Wie in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft das Recht an sich zum Gesetze wird, so geht auch das vorhin unmittelbare und abstracte Daseyn meines einzelnen Rechts in die Bedeutung des Anerkanntseyns als eines Daseyns in dem existirenden allgemeinen Willen und Wissen über. Die Erwerbungen und Handlungen über Eigenthum müssen daher mit der Form, welche ihnen jenes Daseyn giebt, vorgenommen und ausgestattet werden. Das Eigenthum beruht nun auf Vertrag und auf den dasselbe des Beweises und rechtskräftig machenden Förmlichkeiten.
Die ursprünglichen d. i. unmittelbaren Erwerbungsarten und Titel (§. 54 ff.) fallen in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft eigentlich hinweg und kommen nur als einzelne Zufälligkeiten oder beschränkte Momente vor. — Es ist theils das im Subjectiven stehende bleibende Gefühl, theils die Reflexion die am Abstractum ihrer Wesentlichkeiten hält, welche die Förmlichkeiten verwirft, die seinerseits wieder der todte Verstand gegen die Sache festhalten und ins Unendliche vermehren kann. — Uebrigens liegt es im Gange der Bildung, von der sinnlichen und unmittelbaren Form eines Inhaltes, mit langer und harter Arbeit zur Form seines Gedankens und damit einem ihm gemäßen einfachen Ausdruck zu gelangen, daß im Zustande einer nur erst beginnenden Rechtsbildung die Solennitäten und Formalitäten von großer Umständlichkeit und mehr als Sache selbst, denn als das Zeichen gelten; woher denn auch im römischen Rechte eine Menge von Bestimmungen und besonders von Ausdrücken aus den Solennitäten beybehalten worden sind, statt durch Gedanken-Bestimmungen und deren adäquaten Ausdruck ersetzt worden zu seyn.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
217 As right in itself becomes law in civil society, so too the previously immediate and abstract existence of my individual right passes over into the significance of being recognized, as an existence within the existing universal will and knowledge. Acquisitions and transactions concerning property must therefore be undertaken and furnished with the form that this existence gives them. Property now rests on contract and on the formalities that make it provable and legally effective.
The original, that is, immediate, modes of acquisition and titles (§ 54 ff.) properly drop away in civil society and appear only as individual accidents or limited moments. — It is partly the abiding feeling that dwells in the subjective, partly the reflection that clings to the abstraction of its essentialities, which rejects the formalities; the dead understanding, for its part, can in turn hold on to them against the matter itself and multiply them into the infinite. — Moreover, it lies in the course of cultural formation that, through long and hard labor, a content passes from its sensuous and immediate form to the form of its thought, and thereby to a simple expression adequate to it; hence, in a condition where the formation of right has only just begun, solemnities and formalities of great elaborateness count as the thing itself rather than as its sign. For this reason, too, a multitude of provisions in Roman law, and especially of expressions, have been retained from the solemnities, instead of having been replaced by determinations of thought and their adequate expression.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
217 Just as right in itself becomes law in civil society, so too the previously immediate and abstract existence of my individual right takes on the meaning of being recognized, that is, of existing in the existing universal will and knowledge. Acquisitions and actions concerning property must therefore be carried out and equipped with the form that gives them this existence. Property now rests on contract and on the formalities that make it provable and legally binding.
The original, that is, immediate, ways of acquiring things and the titles to them (§ 54 ff.) really drop away in civil society and appear only as individual accidents or limited moments. — On one side there is a lasting feeling in the subject, and on the other a reflection that holds to the abstraction of its essentials. Both reject the formalities. The dead understanding, for its part, can in turn hold on to the formalities against the matter itself and multiply them without end. — Besides, it belongs to the course of education that a content moves, through long and hard work, from its sensuous and immediate form to the form of its thought, and so to a simple expression that fits it. So in a state where legal culture is only just beginning, solemnities and formalities are extremely elaborate, and are valued more as the thing itself than as its sign. For this reason Roman law also kept a great number of provisions, and especially of expressions, from the solemnities, instead of replacing them with determinations of thought and their fitting expression.
About this section
Section 217 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 219 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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