Section 216
Original German
216 Für das öffentliche Gesetzbuch sind einer Seits einfache allgemeine Bestimmungen zu fordern, anderer Seits führt die Natur des endlichen Stoffs auf endlose Fortbestimmung. Der Umfang der Gesetze soll einer Seits ein fertiges geschlossenes Ganzes seyn, anderer Seits ist das fortgehende Bedürfniß neuer gesetzlichen Bestimmungen. Da diese Antinomie aber in die Specialisirung der allgemeinen Grundsätze fällt, welche festbestehen bleiben, so bleibt dadurch das Recht an ein fertiges Gesetzbuch ungeschmälert, so wie daran, daß diese allgemeinen einfachen Grundsätze für sich, unterschieden von ihrer Specialisirung, faßlich und aufstellbar sind.
Eine Hauptquelle der Verwickelung der Gesetzgebung ist zwar, wenn in die ursprünglichen ein Unrecht enthaltenden, somit bloß historischen Institutionen, mit der Zeit das Vernünftige, an und für sich Rechtliche eindringt, wie bei den Römischen oben (§. 180. Anm.) bemerkt worden, dem alten Lehensrechte u. s. f. Aber es ist wesentlich einzusehen, daß die Natur des endlichen Stoffes selbst es mit sich bringt, daß an ihm die Anwendung auch der an und für sich vernünftigen, der in sich allgemeinen Bestimmungen, auf den Progreß ins Unendliche führt. — An ein Gesetzbuch die Vollendung zu fordern, daß es ein absolut fertiges, keiner weitern Fortbestimmung fähiges seyn solle, — eine Forderung, welche vornämlich eine deutsche Krankheit ist, — und aus dem Grunde, weil es nicht so vollendet werden könne, es nicht zu etwas sogenannten Unvollkommenen, d. h. nicht zur Wirklichkeit, kommen zu lassen, beruht beydes auf der Mißkennung der Natur endlicher Gegenstände, wie das Privatrecht ist, als in denen die sogenannte Vollkommenheit das Perenniren der Annäherung ist, und auf der Mißkennung des Unterschiedes des Vernunft-Allgemeinen und des Verstandes-Allgemeinen und dessen Anwenden auf den ins Unendliche gehenden Stoff der Endlichkeit und Einzelnheit. — Le plus grand ennemi du Bien c'est le Meilleur, — ist der Ausdruck des wahrhaften gesunden Menschenverstandes gegen den eitlen raisonnirenden und reflectirenden.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
216 For the public code of law, simple, universal determinations are to be demanded on the one hand; on the other, the nature of finite subject matter leads to endless further determination. On the one hand, the compass of the laws ought to be a finished, closed whole; on the other, there is the continuing need for new legal provisions. But since this antinomy falls within the specialization of the universal principles, which remain firmly established, the right to a finished code of law is left undiminished, as is the right to hold that these universal, simple principles are, in themselves and distinct from their specialization, comprehensible and capable of being set down.
A chief source of complication in legislation is, to be sure, the case where, over time, what is rational and right in and for itself penetrates into original institutions that contain a wrong and are therefore merely historical, as was remarked above of the Roman institutions (§ 180, Remark), of the old feudal law, and so on. But it is essential to see that the very nature of finite subject matter brings it about that the application, even of determinations that are rational in and for themselves and universal in themselves, leads to a progress into the infinite. — To demand of a code of law that it be absolutely finished and incapable of any further determination — a demand that is chiefly a German sickness — and, on the ground that it cannot be completed in this way, not to let it arrive at something merely so-called imperfect, that is, not to let it arrive at actuality, both rest on a misapprehension of the nature of finite objects such as private right, in which so-called perfection is the perennial approximation, and on a misapprehension of the difference between the universal of reason and the universal of the understanding, and of its application to the material of finitude and individuality, which goes on into the infinite. — "Le plus grand ennemi du Bien c'est le Meilleur," that is, the greatest enemy of the good is the better, is the expression of true, sound common sense against vain ratiocinating and reflecting.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
216 For the public code of law, two things are required. On the one hand, it must consist of simple general provisions. On the other hand, the nature of finite material leads to endless further determination. On the one hand, the body of laws should be a finished, closed whole. On the other hand, there is a continuing need for new legal provisions. But this contradiction falls within the particularizing of the general principles, and those principles stay fixed. So the right to a finished code of law remains intact. So does the right to hold that these general, simple principles can be grasped and set out by themselves, apart from their particularizing.
One main source of tangled legislation is this: the original institutions contained an injustice and were therefore merely historical, and over time what is rational and right in and for itself pushed its way into them. This happened with Roman law, as noted above (§ 180, Remark), and with the old feudal law and so on. But we must see that the nature of finite material itself brings it about that applying even provisions that are rational in and for themselves, and universal in themselves, leads to an endless progression. — One demand is that a code of law be absolutely finished and incapable of any further determination. This demand is chiefly a German disease. The other is to refuse, on the ground that a code cannot be perfected in this way, to let it become something merely so-called "imperfect," that is, to let it reach actual reality. Both rest on a misunderstanding of the nature of finite things such as private right, in which so-called perfection is the perpetual approximation. Both also rest on a misunderstanding of the difference between the universal of reason and the universal of the understanding, and of applying it to the endlessly extending material of finitude and individuality. — "Le plus grand ennemi du Bien c'est le Meilleur" ("The greatest enemy of the good is the better") is the saying of true, healthy common sense against vain reasoning and reflection.
About this section
Section 216 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 218 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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