Section 219
Original German
219 c. Das Gericht.
Das Recht in der Form des Gesetzes in das Daseyn getreten, ist für sich, steht dem besondern Wollen und Meynen vom Rechte, selbstständig gegenüber und hat sich als Allgemeines geltend zu machen. Diese Erkenntniß und Verwirklichung des Rechts im besondern Falle, ohne die subjective Empfindung des besondern Interesses, kommt einer öffentlichen Macht, dem Gerichte, zu.
Die historische Entstehung des Richters und der Gerichte mag die Form des patriarchalischen Verhältnisses, oder der Gewalt, oder der freywilligen Wahl gehabt haben; für den Begriff der Sache ist diß gleichgültig. Die Einführung des Rechtsprechens von Seiten der Fürsten und Regierungen als bloße Sache einer beliebigen Gefälligkeit und Gnade anzusehen, wie Herr von Haller (in seiner Restauration der Staatswissenschaft) thut, gehört zu der Gedankenlosigkeit, die davon nichts ahndet, daß beym Gesetz und Staate davon die Rede sey, daß ihre Institutionen überhaupt als vernünftig an und für sich nothwendig sind, und die Form, wie sie entstanden und eingeführt worden, das nicht ist, um das es sich bey Betrachtung ihres vernünftigen Grundes handelt. — Das andere Extrem zu dieser Ansicht ist die Rohheit, die Rechtspflege, wie in den Zeiten des Faustrechts, für ungehörige Gewaltthätigkeit, Unterdrückung der Freyheit, und Despotismus zu achten. Die Rechtspflege ist so sehr als Pflicht wie als Recht der öffentlichen Macht anzusehen, das eben so wenig auf einem Belieben der Individuen, eine Macht damit zu beauftragen oder nicht, beruhet.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
c. The Court of Justice
219 Right, having entered into existence in the form of law, is for itself, stands independent over against particular willing and opining about right, and has to make itself valid as the universal. This cognition and realization of right in the particular case, without the subjective feeling of particular interest, falls to a public power, the court of justice.
The historical origin of the judge and of courts may have had the form of the patriarchal relation, or of force, or of free election; for the concept of the matter this is a matter of indifference. To regard the introduction of the administration of justice by princes and governments as merely a matter of arbitrary favor and grace, as Herr von Haller does (in his Restoration of the Science of the State), belongs to that thoughtlessness which has no inkling that, in the case of law and the state, what is at issue is that their institutions are in general necessary as rational in and for themselves, and that the form in which they arose and were introduced is not what matters in considering their rational ground. — The other extreme to this view is the crudity that, as in the times of the right of the fist, takes the administration of justice for improper violence, oppression of freedom, and despotism. The administration of justice is to be regarded as much a duty as a right of the public power, and this duty and right rests just as little on the pleasure of individuals to entrust a power with it or not.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
219 c. The Court.
Right, having come into existence in the form of law, exists for itself. It stands independent, over against particular willing and opining about right, and must make itself valid as something universal. This knowledge and realization of right in the particular case, without the subjective feeling of particular interest, belongs to a public power, the court.
The historical origin of the judge and the courts may have had the form of a patriarchal relation, or of force, or of free choice. For the concept of the matter this makes no difference. Herr von Haller (in his Restoration of Political Science) treats the introduction of the administration of justice by princes and governments as a mere matter of arbitrary favor and grace. That is thoughtlessness. It has no inkling that, where law and the state are concerned, the point is that their institutions are in general necessary as rational in and for themselves, and that the form in which they arose and were introduced is not what matters when we consider their rational ground. — The opposite extreme to this view is crudeness, which counts the administration of justice, as in the times of the right of the strongest, as improper violence, suppression of freedom, and despotism. The administration of justice must be seen as a duty of the public power as much as a right of it. It rests just as little on the pleasure of individuals, to entrust a power with it or not.
About this section
Section 219 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 221 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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