Section 163
Original German
163 Das Sittliche der Ehe besteht in dem Bewußtseyn dieser Einheit als substantiellen Zweckes, hiemit in der Liebe, dem Zutrauen und der Gemeinsamkeit der ganzen individuellen Existenz, — in welcher Gesinnung und Wirklichkeit der natürliche Trieb zur Modalität eines Naturmoments, das eben in seiner Befriedigung zu erlöschen bestimmt ist, herabgesetzt wird, das geistige Band in seinem Rechte als das Substantielle, hiemit als das über die Zufälligkeit der Leidenschaften und des zeitlichen besondern Beliebens erhabene, an sich unauflösliche sich heraushebt.
Daß die Ehe nicht das Verhältniß eines Vertrags über ihre wesentliche Grundlage ist, ist oben bemerkt worden, (§. 75.) denn sie ist gerade dies, vom Vertrags-Standpunkte, der in ihrer Einzelnheit selbstständigen Persönlichkeit, auszugehen, um ihn aufzuheben. Die Identificirung der Persönlichkeiten, wodurch die Familie Eine Person ist, und die Glieder derselben Accidenzen (die Substanz ist aber wesentlich das Verhältniß von ihr selbst von Accidenzen (s. Encyklop. der phil. Wissensch. §. 98.)) ist der sittliche Geist, der für sich, abgestreift von der mannichfaltigen Aeußerlichkeit, die er in seinem Daseyn, als in diesen Individuen und den in der Zeit und auf mancherley Weisen bestimmten Interessen der Erscheinung hat, — als eine Gestalt für die Vorstellung herausgehoben, als die Penaten u. s. f. verehrt worden ist, und überhaupt das ausmacht, worin der religiöse Charakter der Ehe und Familie, die Pietät liegt. Es ist eine weitere Abstraction, wenn das Göttliche, Substantielle von seinem Daseyn getrennt, und so auch die Empfindung und das Bewußtseyn der geistigen Einheit, als fälschlich sogenannte platonische Liebe fixirt worden ist; diese Trennung hängt mit der mönchischen Ansicht zusammen, durch welche das Moment der natürlichen Lebendigkeit als das schlechthin Negative bestimmt, und ihm eben durch diese Trennung eine unendliche Wichtigkeit für sich gegeben wird.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
163 The ethical aspect of marriage consists in the consciousness of this unity as a substantial end, hence in love, trust and the community of the whole individual existence—in which disposition and actuality the natural drive is reduced to the modality of a natural moment, one destined to be extinguished precisely in its satisfaction, while the spiritual bond raises itself out in its right as the substantial, hence as that which is exalted above the contingency of the passions and of temporary, particular liking, and is in itself indissoluble.
That marriage is not a relation of contract in regard to its essential basis has been remarked above (§ 75), for it is precisely this: to start from the standpoint of contract, from the personality that is self-sufficient in its individuality, in order to sublate it. The identification of the personalities, by which the family is one person and its members are accidents (substance, however, is essentially the relation of itself to accidents; see Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, § 98), is ethical spirit, which, for itself, stripped of the manifold externality that it has in its existence, in these individuals and in the interests of appearance determined in time and in many ways, has been raised out as a shape for representation and revered as the Penates and so on, and in general constitutes that in which the religious character of marriage and the family, piety, lies. It is a further abstraction when the divine, the substantial, is separated from its existence, and so too the feeling and consciousness of the spiritual unity is fixed as the falsely so-called Platonic love; this separation is connected with the monastic view, by which the moment of natural vitality is determined as the absolutely negative, and precisely through this separation is given an infinite importance on its own account.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
163 The ethical side of marriage consists in the awareness of this unity as a substantial purpose, and so in love, trust and the sharing of the whole individual existence. In this attitude and this actuality, the natural drive is reduced to the status of a natural moment, one that is meant to die away in its very satisfaction. The spiritual bond asserts its own right as the substantial thing, and so as the thing that is raised above the accidents of passion and of the passing, particular whims of the moment, and that is in itself indissoluble.
It was noted above (§ 75) that marriage is not a contract as far as its essential basis goes. Marriage is precisely the case of starting from the standpoint of contract, that is, from personalities that are independent in their individuality, in order to cancel that standpoint. The identification of the personalities, by which the family is one person and its members are accidents (a substance, however, is essentially the relation of itself to accidents; see Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, § 98), is ethical spirit. Stripped of the manifold externality it has in its existence, in these individuals and in the interests of appearance that are fixed in time and in many ways, ethical spirit was lifted out as a figure for the imagination and worshiped as the Penates and so on. It is also what makes up the religious character of marriage and the family, their piety. It is a further abstraction when the divine, the substantial, is separated from its existence, and with it the feeling and awareness of the spiritual unity is fixed as what is wrongly called platonic love. This separation goes with the monastic view, which defines the moment of natural life as simply negative, and by that very separation gives it an infinite importance of its own.
About this section
Section 163 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 165 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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