Section 162
Original German
162 Als subjectiver Ausgangspunkt der Ehe kann mehr die besondere Neigung der beyden Personen, die in dieß Verhältniß treten, oder die Vorsorge und Veranstaltung der Eltern u. s. f. erscheinen; der objective Ausgangspunkt aber ist die freye Einwilligung der Personen und zwar dazu, Eine Person auszumachen, ihre natürliche und einzelne Persönlichkeit in jener Einheit aufzugeben, welche nach dieser Rücksicht eine Selbstbeschränkung, aber eben, indem sie in ihr ihr substantielles Selbstbewußtseyn gewinnen, ihre Befreyung ist.
Die objective Bestimmung, somit die sittliche Pflicht, ist, in den Stand der Ehe zu treten. Wie der äußerliche Ausgangspunkt beschaffen ist, ist seiner Natur nach zufällig, und hängt insbesondere von der Bildung der Reflexion ab. Die Extreme hierin sind das eine, daß die Veranstaltung der wohlgesinnten Eltern den Anfang macht, und in den zur Vereinigung der Liebe für einander bestimmt werdenden Personen hieraus, daß sie sich, als hiezu bestimmt, bekannt werden, die Neigung entsteht, — das andere, daß die Neigung in den Personen, als in diesen unendlich partikularisirten zuerst erscheint. — Jenes Extrem oder überhaupt der Weg, worin der Entschluß zur Verehelichung den Anfang macht, und die Neigung zur Folge hat, so daß bei der wirklichen Verheyratung nun beydes vereinigt ist, kann selbst als der sittlichere Weg angesehen werden. — In dem andern Extrem ist es die unendlich besondere Eigenthümlichkeit, welche ihre Prätensionen geltend macht und mit dem subjectiven Princip der modernen Welt (s. oben §. 124. Anm.) zusammenhängt. — In die modernen Dramen und anderen Kunstdarstellungen aber, wo die Geschlechterliebe das Grundinteresse ausmacht, wird das Element von durchdringender Frostigkeit, das darin angetroffen wird, in die Hitze der dargestellten Leidenschaft durch die damit verknüpfte gänzliche Zufälligkeit, dadurch nemlich gebracht, daß das ganze Interesse als nur auf diesen beruhend, vorgestellt wird, was wohl für diese von unendlicher Wichtigkeit seyn kann, aber es an sich nicht ist.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
162 As the subjective point of departure of marriage there may appear rather the particular inclination of the two persons who enter into this relation, or the foresight and arrangement of the parents, and so on; but the objective point of departure is the free consent of the persons, and indeed their consent to make up one person, to give up their natural and single personality within that unity, which in this respect is a self-limitation, but precisely because they gain in it their substantial self-consciousness, is their liberation.
The objective determination, and so the ethical duty, is to enter the estate of marriage. How the external point of departure is constituted is by its nature contingent, and depends in particular on the cultivation of reflection. The extremes here are, on one side, that the arrangement of well-meaning parents makes the beginning, and that in the persons destined for union in love, the inclination arises from their becoming acquainted with each other as destined for this; on the other side, that the inclination first appears in the persons as in these infinitely particularized individuals.—The former extreme, or generally the path in which the decision to marry makes the beginning and the inclination follows, so that in the actual wedding both are united, can itself be regarded as the more ethical way.—In the other extreme it is the infinitely particular peculiarity that asserts its pretensions, and this is connected with the subjective principle of the modern world (see above § 124, Remark).—But in modern dramas and other artistic representations in which the love of the sexes forms the fundamental interest, the element of penetrating frostiness that is found in them is brought into the heat of the passion portrayed by the wholly contingent character bound up with it, namely because the whole interest is represented as resting only on this one, who may well be of infinite importance for this person, but is not so in itself.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
162 Subjectively, marriage may seem to start more from the particular inclination of the two people who enter the relationship, or from the planning and arrangements of their parents, and so on. Objectively, however, it starts from the free consent of the persons, and specifically their consent to make up one person, to give up their natural and individual personality within that unity. From this point of view that is a self-limitation. But since they gain their substantial self-awareness in it, it is also their liberation.
The objective determination, and so the ethical duty, is to enter the married state. How the external starting point comes about is by its nature accidental, and depends especially on how far reflection has developed. The two extremes are these. In one, well-meaning parents make the arrangements first, and the inclination arises in the persons who are meant to be united in love, because they become acquainted with each other as destined for this. In the other, the inclination appears first in the persons, as in these infinitely particularized individuals. The first extreme, or in general the path where the decision to marry comes first and the inclination follows, so that both are united at the actual wedding, can itself be seen as the more ethical path. In the other extreme, it is infinitely particular individuality that asserts its claims, and this is connected with the subjective principle of the modern world (see § 124 above, Remark). In modern dramas and other works of art, where love between the sexes is the basic interest, there is an element of penetrating coldness. It is brought into the heat of the passion portrayed by the complete accidentality tied up with it. That is, the whole interest is presented as resting only on this person, and while it may be of infinite importance for this person, it is not so in itself.
About this section
Section 162 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 164 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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