Section 164
Original German
164 Wie die Stipulation des Vertrags schon für sich den wahrhaften Uebergang des Eigenthums enthält, (§. 79.) so macht die feierliche Erklärung der Einwilligung zum sittlichen Bande der Ehe und die entsprechende Anerkennung und Bestätigung desselben durch die Familie und Gemeinde (daß in dieser Rücksicht die Kirche eintritt, ist eine weitere hier nicht auszuführende Bestimmung) — die förmliche Schließung und Wirklichkeit der Ehe aus, so daß diese Verbindung nur durch das Vorangehen dieser Ceremonie als der Vollbringung des Substantiellen durch das Zeichen, die Sprache, als das geistigste Daseyn des Geistigen, (§. 78.) als sittlich constituirt ist. Damit ist das sinnliche, der natürlichen Lebendigkeit angehörige Moment, in sein sittliches Verhältniß als eine Folge und Accidentalität gesetzt, welche dem äußerlichen Daseyn der sittlichen Verbindung angehört, die auch in der gegenseitigen Liebe und Beyhülfe allein erschöpft seyn kann.
Wenn darnach gefragt wird, was als der Hauptzweck der Ehe angesehen werden müsse, um daraus die gesetzlichen Bestimmungen schöpfen oder beurtheilen zu können, so wird unter diesem Hauptzwecke verstanden, welche von den einzelnen Seiten ihrer Wirklichkeit als die vor den andern wesentliche angenommen werden müsse. Aber keine für sich macht den ganzen Umfang ihres an und für sich seyenden Inhalts, des Sittlichen, aus, und die eine oder die andere Seite ihrer Existenz kann, unbeschadet des Wesens der Ehe, fehlen. — Wenn das Schließen der Ehe als solches, die Feyerlichkeit, wodurch das Wesen dieser Verbindung als ein über das Zufällige der Empfindung und besonderer Neigung erhabenes Sittliches ausgesprochen und constatirt wird, für eine äußerliche Formalität und ein sogenanntes bloß bürgerliches Gebot genommen wird, so bleibt diesem Acte nichts übrig, als etwa den Zweck der Erbaulichkeit und der Beglaubigung des bürgerlichen Verhältnisses zu haben, oder gar die bloß positive Willkühr eines bürgerlichen oder kirchlichen Gebotes zu seyn, das der Natur der Ehe nicht nur gleichgültig sey, sondern das auch, insofern von dem Gemüth von wegen des Gebots ein Werth auf dieß förmliche Schließen gelegt, und als voranzugehende Bedingung der gegenseitigen vollkommenen Hingebung angesehen werde, die Gesinnung der Liebe veruneinige und als ein Fremdes der Innigkeit dieser Einigung zuwiderlaufe. Solche Meynung, indem sie den höchsten Begriff von der Freyheit, Innigkeit und Vollendung der Liebe zu geben die Prätension hat, leugnet vielmehr das Sittliche der Liebe, die höhere Hemmung und Zurücksetzung des bloßen Naturtriebs, welche schon auf eine natürliche Weise in der Scham enthalten ist, und durch das bestimmtere geistige Bewußtseyn zur Keuschheit und Zucht erhoben ist. Näher ist durch jene Ansicht die sittliche Bestimmung verworfen, die darin besteht, daß das Bewußtseyn sich aus seiner Natürlichkeit und Subjectivität zum Gedanken des Substantiellen sammelt, und statt sich das Zufällige und die Willkühr der sinnlichen Neigung immer noch vorzubehalten, die Verbindung dieser Willkühr entnimmt und dem Substantiellen, den Penaten sich verpflichtend, übergiebt, und das sinnliche Moment zu einem von dem Wahrhaften und Sittlichen des Verhältnisses und der Anerkennung der Verbindung als einer sittlichen, nur bedingten herabsetzt. — Es ist die Frechheit und der sie unterstützende Verstand, welcher die spekulative Natur des substantiellen Verhältnisses nicht zu fassen vermag, der aber das sittliche unverdorbene Gemüthe, wie die Gesetzgebungen christlicher Völker entsprechend sind.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
164 As the stipulation of a contract already contains in itself the true transfer of property (§ 79), so the solemn declaration of consent to the ethical bond of marriage, and the corresponding recognition and confirmation of it by the family and the community (that the church enters in this respect is a further determination, not to be developed here), constitute the formal conclusion and actuality of marriage, so that this union is constituted as ethical only through the preceding of this ceremony, as the accomplishment of the substantial by means of the sign, language, as the most spiritual existence of the spiritual (§ 78). With this the sensuous moment, which belongs to natural vitality, is placed in its ethical relation as a consequence and accidentality, belonging to the external existence of the ethical union, which can also be exhausted in mutual love and assistance alone.
If it is asked what must be regarded as the chief end of marriage, in order to draw from it or to judge by it the legal provisions, then by this chief end is meant which of the individual aspects of its actuality must be taken as essential before the others. But none of them by itself makes up the whole compass of its content, which exists in and for itself, the ethical, and one or another aspect of its existence can be lacking without harm to the essence of marriage.—If the conclusion of marriage as such, the solemnity through which the essence of this union is declared and established as an ethical bond exalted above the contingency of feeling and of particular inclination, is taken for an external formality and a so-called merely civil requirement, then nothing remains for this act except perhaps the purpose of edification and the authentication of the civil relation, or even to be the merely positive arbitrary choice of a civil or ecclesiastical command, one that is not only indifferent to the nature of marriage, but that also, insofar as the heart on account of the command places a value on this formal conclusion and regards it as a preceding condition of the perfect mutual surrender, divides the disposition of love and, as something alien, runs counter to the intimacy of this union. Such an opinion, while it pretends to give the highest concept of the freedom, intimacy and perfection of love, rather denies the ethical character of love, the higher restraint and subordination of the mere natural drive, which is already contained in a natural way in shame, and is raised by the more determinate spiritual consciousness to chastity and modesty. More closely, that view rejects the ethical determination, which consists in this: that consciousness gathers itself out of its naturalness and subjectivity to the thought of the substantial, and instead of still reserving to itself the contingency and arbitrary choice of sensuous inclination, withdraws the union from this arbitrary choice and hands it over to the substantial, pledging itself to the Penates, and reduces the sensuous moment to something merely conditioned by the true and ethical element of the relation and by the recognition of the union as an ethical one.—It is impudence, and the understanding that supports it, which cannot grasp the speculative nature of the substantial relation, but to which, however, the ethical, uncorrupted heart, as well as the legislations of Christian peoples, corresponds.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
164 A contract's stipulation already contains in itself the real transfer of property (§ 79). In the same way, the solemn declaration of consent to the ethical bond of marriage, and the matching recognition and confirmation of it by the family and the community, make up the formal conclusion and the actuality of the marriage. (That the church steps in here is a further point that cannot be worked out here.) So this union is constituted as ethical only when this ceremony comes first. The ceremony is the carrying out of the substantial thing through the sign, language, which is the most spiritual existence of what is spiritual (§ 78). With this, the sensual moment, which belongs to natural life, is placed within the ethical relation as a consequence and an accident. It belongs to the external existence of the ethical union, which can also be exhausted in mutual love and support alone.
When people ask what must be regarded as the main purpose of marriage, so that legal provisions can be drawn from it or judged by it. By this main purpose they mean which of the single sides of marriage's actual reality must be taken as more essential than the others. But no one side by itself makes up the whole range of its content, which exists in and for itself, the ethical. And one side or another of its existence can be missing without harm to the essence of marriage. Suppose the conclusion of the marriage as such is taken to be an external formality and a so-called merely civil requirement. This conclusion is the ceremony in which the essence of this union is declared and established as something ethical, raised above the accidents of feeling and particular inclination. Then nothing is left for this act but perhaps to serve edification and to certify the civil relationship. Or it becomes merely the positive arbitrary choice of a civil or church requirement, which is not only indifferent to the nature of marriage but also does harm. For if the heart values this formal conclusion because it is required, and treats it as a condition that must come before complete mutual surrender, it divides the attitude of love, and as something foreign it runs against the inwardness of that union. Such an opinion claims to give the highest idea of the freedom, inwardness and fulfillment of love. In fact it denies the ethical side of love, the higher restraint and holding back of the mere natural drive, which is already contained in a natural way in shame and is raised by more definite spiritual awareness to chastity and discipline. More precisely, that view throws out the ethical determination, which consists in this: consciousness gathers itself out of its naturalness and subjectivity to the thought of the substantial. Instead of still keeping the accidental and the arbitrary choice of sensual inclination for itself, consciousness takes the union away from that arbitrary choice and hands it over to the substantial, pledging itself to the Penates. And that view lowers the sensual moment to something only conditional, relative to what is true and ethical in the relationship and to the recognition of the union as ethical. It is impudence, supported by the understanding that cannot grasp the speculative nature of the substantial relationship, that holds this view. The unspoiled ethical heart, by contrast, is in accord with the legislation of Christian peoples.
About this section
Section 164 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 166 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the European tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.