Section 14
Original German
14 Der endliche Wille, als nur nach der Seite der Form sich in sich reflectirendes und bey sich selbst seyendes unendliches Ich (§. 5.) steht über dem Inhalt, den unterschiedenen Trieben, so wie über den weitern einzelnen Arten ihrer Verwirklichung und Befriedigung, wie es zugleich, als nur formell unendliches, an diesen Inhalt, als die Bestimmungen seiner Natur und seiner äußern Wirklichkeit, jedoch als unbestimmtes nicht an diesen oder jenen Inhalt, gebunden ist (§. 6. 11.). Derselbe ist insofern für die Reflexion des Ich in sich nur ein Möglicher, als der Meinige zu seyn oder auch nicht, und Ich die Möglichkeit, mich zu diesem oder einem andern zu bestimmen, — unter diesen für dasselbe nach diese Seite äußern Bestimmungen zu wählen.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
14 The finite will, as an infinite I reflecting into itself and being with itself only on the side of form (§ 5), stands above the content—the differentiated drives—as also above the further particular ways of actualizing and satisfying them. At the same time, as only formally infinite, it is bound to this content as the determinations of its nature and its external actuality, though, as indeterminate, it is not bound to this or that content (§§ 6, 11). For the I’s reflection into itself, this content is therefore only something possible, which may or may not be mine; and I am the possibility of determining myself to this content or another—of choosing among these determinations, which on this side are external to the I.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
14 The finite will is an infinite I that reflects into itself and is at home with itself, but only in its form (§ 5). As such, it stands above its content, the different drives, and above the further particular ways of realizing and satisfying them. At the same time, since it is infinite only formally, it is bound to this content as the determinations of its nature and of its external actual reality. Yet, as undetermined, it is not bound to this or that content (§§ 6, 11). For the I's reflection into itself, this content is therefore only something that may or may not be mine. And I am the possibility of determining myself to this content or another: of choosing among these determinations, which in this respect are external to the I.
About this section
Section 14 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 16 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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