Section 13
Original German
13 Durch das Beschließen setzt der Wille sich als Willen eines bestimmten Individuums und als sich hinaus gegen Anderes unterscheidenden. Ausser dieser Endlichkeit als Bewußtseyn (§. 8.) ist der unmittelbare Wille aber um des Unterschieds seiner Form und seines Inhalts (§. 11.) willen formell, es kommt ihm nur das abstracte Beschließen, als solches, zu, und der Inhalt ist noch nicht der Inhalt und das Werk seiner Freyheit.
Der Intelligenz als denkend bleibt der Gegenstand und Inhalt Allgemeines, sie selbst verhält sich als allgemeine Thätigkeit. Im Willen hat das Allgemeine zugleich wesentlich die Bedeutung des Meinigen, als Einzelnheit und im unmittelbaren d. i. formellen Willen, als der abstracten, noch nicht mit seiner freyen Allgemeinheit erfüllten Einzelnheit. Im Willen beginnt daher die eigene Endlichkeit der Intelligenz und nur dadurch, daß der Wille sich zum Denken wieder erhebt, und seinen Zwecken die immanente Allgemeinheit gibt, hebt er den Unterschied der Form und des Inhalts auf und macht sich zum objectiven, unendlichen Willen. Diejenigen verstehen daher wenig von der Natur des Denkens und Wollens, welche meynen, im Willen überhaupt sey der Mensch unendlich, im Denken aber sey er oder gar die Vernunft beschränkt. Insofern Denken und Wollen noch unterschieden sind, ist vielmehr das Umgekehrte das Wahre und die denkende Vernunft ist als Wille dieß, sich zur Endlichkeit zu entschließen.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
13 Through resolving, the will posits itself as the will of a determinate individual, and as distinguishing itself outwardly from something else. Besides this finitude as consciousness (§ 8), however, the immediate will is formal because of the difference between its form and content (§ 11). Only abstract resolving as such belongs to it; its content is not yet the content and work of its freedom.
For intelligence as thinking, the object and content remain something universal, and intelligence itself acts as universal activity. In the will, the universal also has essentially the meaning of what is mine, as individuality; in the immediate, that is, formal will, it has the meaning of abstract individuality, not yet filled with its free universality. Thus intelligence’s own finitude begins in the will; only by raising itself again to thinking and giving its ends immanent universality does the will sublate the difference between form and content and make itself objective, infinite will. Those who suppose that the human being is infinite in willing in general, but limited in thinking—or even that reason is limited—therefore understand little of the nature of thinking and willing. Insofar as thinking and willing are still distinguished, the reverse is true: as will, thinking reason is the act of resolving upon finitude.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
13 By deciding, the will establishes itself as the will of a particular individual, distinguishing itself outwardly from others. Besides this finitude as consciousness (§ 8), however, the immediate will is formal because of the difference between its form and its content (§ 11). Only the abstract act of deciding, as such, belongs to it. Its content is not yet the content and work of its freedom.
For intelligence as thinking, its object and content remain universal, and intelligence itself acts universally. In the will, the universal also has the essential meaning of being mine, as individuality. In the immediate, that is, formal will, this individuality is abstract, not yet filled with its free universality. Intelligence's own finitude therefore begins in the will. Only by rising again to thinking and giving its purposes an inherent universality does the will overcome the difference between form and content and become an objective, infinite will. People who believe that human beings are infinite in willing as such, but limited in thinking, or even that reason is limited, therefore understand little about the nature of thinking and willing. To the extent that thinking and willing are still distinct, the reverse is true: as will, thinking reason is precisely this act of deciding on finitude.
About this section
Section 13 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 15 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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