Section 15
Original German
15 Die Freyheit des Willens ist nach dieser Bestimmung Willkühr — in welcher dieß beydes enthalten ist, die freye von allem abstrahirende Reflexion und die Abhängigkeit von dem innerlich oder äußerlich gegebenen Inhalte und Stoffe. Weil dieser an sich als Zweck nothwendige Inhalt, zugleich gegen jene Reflexion als Möglicher bestimmt ist, so ist die Willkühr die Zufälligkeit, wie sie als Wille ist.
Die gewöhnlichste Vorstellung, die man bey der Freyheit hat, ist die der Willkühr, — die Mitte der Reflexion zwischen dem Willen als bloß durch die natürlichen Triebe bestimmt, und dem an und für sich freyen Willen. Wenn man sagen hört, die Freyheit überhaupt sey dieß, daß man thun könne, was man wolle, so kann solche Vorstellung nur für gänzlichen Mangel an Bildung des Gedankens genommen werden, in welcher sich von dem, was der an und für sich freye Wille, Recht, Sittlichkeit u. s. f. ist, noch keine Ahndung findet. Die Reflexion, die formelle Allgemeinheit und Einheit des Selbstbewußtseyns, ist die abstracte Gewißheit des Willens von seiner Freyheit, aber sie ist noch nicht die Wahrheit derselben, weil sie sich noch nicht selbst zum Inhalt und Zwecke hat, die subjective Seite also noch ein anderes ist, als die gegenständliche; der Inhalt dieser Selbstbestimmung bleibt deswegen auch schlechthin nur ein Endliches. Die Willkühr ist, statt der Wille in seiner Wahrheit zu seyn, vielmehr der Wille als der Widerspruch. — In dem zur Zeit der Wolfischen Metaphysik vornehmlich geführten Streit, ob der Wille wirklich frey, oder ob das Wissen von seiner Freyheit nur eine Täuschung sey, war es die Willkühr, die man vor Augen gehabt. Der Determinismus hat mit Recht der Gewißheit jener abstracten Selbstbestimmung den Inhalt entgegengehalten, der als ein vorgefundener nicht in jener Gewißheit enthalten und daher ihr von Außen kommt, obgleich dieß Außen der Trieb, Vorstellung, überhaupt das, auf welche Weise es sey, so erfüllte Bewußtseyn ist, daß der Inhalt nicht das Eigene der selbst bestimmenden Thätigkeit als solcher ist. Indem hiemit nur das formelle Element der freyen Selbstbestimmung in der Willkühr immanent, das andere Element aber ein ihr gegebenes ist, so kann die Willkühr allerdings, wenn sie die Freyheit seyn soll, eine Täuschung genannt werden. Die Freyheit in aller Reflexionsphilosophie, wie in der Kantischen und dann der Friesischen vollendeten Verseichtung der Kantischen, ist nichts anders, als jene formale Selbstthätigkeit.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
15 According to this determination, freedom of the will is arbitrary choice, which contains both free reflection abstracting from everything and dependence on the content and material given inwardly or outwardly. Because this content, necessary in itself as an end, is at the same time determined as possible in relation to that reflection, arbitrary choice is contingency in the form of will.
The commonest conception of freedom is that of arbitrary choice: reflection’s middle position between a will determined merely by natural drives and the will free in and for itself. When we hear it said that freedom in general means being able to do whatever one wills, such a conception can be taken only as a complete lack of cultivation in thought, in which there is not yet even an inkling of what the will free in and for itself, right, ethical life, and so forth are. Reflection, the formal universality and unity of self-consciousness, is the abstract certainty the will has of its freedom; but it is not yet the truth of that freedom, because it does not yet have itself as its content and end. The subjective side is therefore still different from the objective side, and the content of this self-determination consequently remains simply something finite. Instead of being the will in its truth, arbitrary choice is rather the will as contradiction.—In the debate conducted chiefly in the time of Wolffian metaphysics, as to whether the will was actually free or its knowledge of its freedom was merely an illusion, it was arbitrary choice that people had in view. Determinism rightly opposed to the certainty of that abstract self-determination the content, which, as something found, is not contained in that certainty and therefore comes to it from outside—even though this outside is drive, representation, or, in general, consciousness filled in whatever way, such that the content does not belong to self-determining activity as such. Since only the formal element of free self-determination is thus immanent in arbitrary choice, while the other element is given to it, arbitrary choice, if it is supposed to be freedom, can indeed be called an illusion. Freedom in every philosophy of reflection, as in Kant’s, and then in Fries’s complete trivialization of Kant’s, is nothing other than this formal self-activity.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
15 On this account, the will's freedom is arbitrary choice. This contains both free reflection that abstracts from everything and dependence on content and material given from within or from outside. This content, though necessary in itself as a purpose, is at the same time only a possibility in relation to that reflection. Arbitrary choice is therefore contingency in the form of will.
The most common conception of freedom is arbitrary choice. This is reflection's middle position between a will determined only by natural drives and a will that is free in and for itself. We hear people say that freedom in general means being able to do whatever one wants. Such a conception can only be taken as showing a complete lack of developed thought, with not even an inkling of what the will free in and for itself, right, ethical life, and so on are. Reflection—the formal universality and unity of self-consciousness—is the will's abstract certainty of its freedom. But it is not yet the truth of that freedom, because it does not yet have itself as its content and purpose. Its subjective side is therefore still different from its objective side. Consequently, the content of this self-determination also remains simply something finite. Instead of being the will in its truth, arbitrary choice is the will as contradiction.—The dispute conducted chiefly in the time of Wolff's metaphysics, over whether the will really is free or whether its knowledge of its freedom is only an illusion, had arbitrary choice in view. Determinism rightly set against the certainty of that abstract self-determination its content. As something found already there, this content is not contained in that certainty and therefore comes to it from outside. This outside may be a drive, a representation, or, in general, consciousness filled in whatever way; the point is that the content is not the self-determining activity's own content as such. Thus, only the formal element of free self-determination belongs inherently to arbitrary choice, while the other element is given to it. Arbitrary choice can therefore indeed be called an illusion if it is supposed to be freedom. Freedom in every philosophy of reflection, as in Kant's, and then in Fries's completed trivialization of Kant's philosophy, is nothing other than that formal activity of the self.
About this section
Section 15 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 17 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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