Section 149
Original German
149 Als Beschränkung kann die bindende Pflicht nur gegen die unbestimmte Subjectivität oder abstracte Freyheit, und gegen die Triebe des natürlichen, oder das sein unbestimmtes Gute aus seiner Willkühr bestimmenden moralischen Willens erscheinen. Das Individuum hat aber in der Pflicht vielmehr seine Befreyung theils von der Abhängigkeit, in der es in dem bloßen Naturtriebe stehet, so wie von der Gedrücktheit, in der es als subjective Besonderheit in den moralischen Reflexionen des Sollens und Mögens ist, theils von der unbestimmten Subjectivität, die nicht zum Daseyn und der objectiven Bestimmtheit des Handelns kommt, und in sich und als eine Unwirklichkeit bleibt. In der Pflicht befreit das Individuum sich zur substantiellen Freyheit.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
149 Binding duty can appear as a limitation only against indeterminate subjectivity or abstract freedom, and against the drives of the natural will, or of the moral will that determines its indeterminate good out of its arbitrary choice. The individual, however, has in duty rather his liberation: partly from the dependence in which he stands in the mere natural drive, and from the oppression in which, as subjective particularity, he is in the moral reflections of ought and may; partly from the indeterminate subjectivity which does not come to existence and to the objective determinacy of action, and remains within itself and as an unreality. In duty the individual liberates himself to substantial freedom.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
149 The binding duty can appear as a limitation only against undetermined subjectivity or abstract freedom, and against the drives of the natural will, or of the moral will that determines its undetermined good out of its arbitrary choice. But in duty the individual has rather his liberation. In part it frees him from the dependence in which he stands under mere natural drive. It frees him from the oppression in which, as subjective particularity, he is held in the moral reflections of ought and may. And in part it frees him from undetermined subjectivity, which does not reach existence and the objective determinacy of action, and stays in itself and remains an unreality. In duty the individual liberates himself into substantial freedom.
About this section
Section 149 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 151 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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