Section 150
Original German
150 Das Sittliche insofern es sich an dem individuellen durch die Natur bestimmten Charakter als solchem reflektirt, ist die Tugend, die insofern sie nichts zeigt, als die einfache Angemessenheit des Individuums an die Pflichten der Verhältnisse, denen es angehört, Rechtschaffenheit ist.
Was der Mensch thun müsse, welches die Pflichten sind, die er zu erfüllen hat, um tugendhaft zu seyn, ist in einem sittlichen Gemeinwesen leicht zu sagen, — es ist nichts anderes von ihm zu thun, als was ihm in seinen Verhältnissen vorgezeichnet, ausgesprochen und bekannt ist. Die Rechtschaffenheit ist das Allgemeine, was an ihn theils rechtlich, theils sittlich gefodert werden kann. Sie erscheint aber für den moralischen Standpunkt leicht als etwas untergeordneteres, über das man an sich und andere noch mehr fodern müsse; denn die Sucht, etwas besonderes zu seyn, genügt sich nicht mit dem, was das An- und für sich-seyende und Allgemeine ist; sie findet erst in einer Ausnahme das Bewußtseyn der Eigenthümlichkeit. — Die verschiedenen Seiten der Rechtschaffenheit können eben so gut auch Tugenden genannt werden, weil sie eben so sehr Eigenthum, — obwohl in der Vergleichung mit andern nicht besonderes, — des Individuums sind. Das Reden aber von der Tugend gränzt leicht an leere Deklamation, weil damit nur von einem Abstracten und Unbestimmten gesprochen wird, so wie auch solche Rede mit ihren Gründen und Darstellungen sich an das Individuum als an eine Willkühr und subjectives Belieben wendet. Unter einem vorhandenen sittlichen Zustande, dessen Verhältnisse vollständig entwickelt und verwirklicht sind, hat die eigentliche Tugend nur in außerordentlichen Umständen und Collisionen jener Verhältnisse ihre Stelle und Wirklichkeit; — in wahrhaften Collisionen, denn die moralische Reflexion kann sich allenthalben Collisionen erschaffen und sich das Bewußtseyn von etwas Besonderem und von gebrachten Opfern geben. Im ungebildeten Zustande der Gesellschaft und des Gemeinwesens kommt deswegen mehr die Form der Tugend als solcher vor, weil hier das Sittliche und dessen Verwirklichung mehr ein individuelles Belieben und eine eigenthümliche geniale Natur des Individuums ist, wie denn die Alten besonders von Herkules die Tugend prädicirt haben. Auch in den alten Staaten, weil in ihnen die Sittlichkeit nicht zu diesem freyen System einer selbstständigen Entwickelung und Objectivität gediehen war, mußte es die eigenthümliche Genialität der Individuen seyn, welche diesen Mangel ersetzte. — Die Lehre von den Tugenden, insofern sie nicht bloß Pflichtenlehre ist, somit das Besondere, auf Naturbestimmtheit Gegründete des Charakters umfaßt, wird hiermit eine geistige Naturgeschichte seyn.
Indem die Tugenden das Sittliche in der Anwendung auf das Besondere, und nach dieser subjectiven Seite ein Unbestimmtes sind, so tritt für ihre Bestimmung das Quantitative des Mehr und Weniger ein; ihre Betrachtung führt daher die gegenüberstehenden Mängel oder Laster herbey, wie bey Aristoteles, der die besondere Tugend daher seinem richtigen Sinne nach, als die Mitte zwischen einem Zuviel und einem Zuwenig bestimmte. — Derselbe Inhalt, welcher die Form von Pflichten und dann von Tugenden annimmt, ist es auch der die Form von Trieben hat (§. 19. Anm.). Auch sie haben denselben Inhalt zu ihrer Grundlage, aber weil er in ihnen noch dem unmittelbaren Willen und der natürlichen Empfindung angehört, und zur Bestimmung der Sittlichkeit nicht heraufgebildet ist, so haben sie mit dem Inhalte der Pflichten und Tugenden nur den abstracten Gegenstand gemein, der als bestimmungslos in sich selbst, die Grenze des Guten oder Bösen für sie nicht enthält, — oder sie sind nach der Abstraction des Positiven, gut, und umgekehrt nach der Abstraction des Negativen, böse (§. 18.).
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
150 The ethical, insofar as it is reflected in the individual character determined by nature as such, is virtue, which, insofar as it shows nothing but the simple fitness of the individual to the duties of the relations to which he belongs, is uprightness.
What a human being must do, what the duties are which he has to fulfill in order to be virtuous, is easy to say in an ethical community—there is nothing else for him to do than what is prescribed, declared and known to him in his relations. Uprightness is the universal that can be demanded of him partly in terms of right, partly in terms of ethics. For the moral standpoint, however, it easily appears as something subordinate, beyond which one must demand still more of oneself and others; for the craving to be something particular is not satisfied with what is in and for itself and universal; it finds the consciousness of peculiarity only in an exception. — The various sides of uprightness may just as well be called virtues, because they are just as much the property of the individual, although in comparison with others not something particular. But talk of virtue easily borders on empty declamation, because it speaks only of something abstract and indeterminate, just as such talk with its reasons and exhibitions addresses the individual as an arbitrary choice and subjective whim. Under an existing ethical condition whose relations are fully developed and realized, virtue proper has its place and actuality only in extraordinary circumstances and collisions of those relations—in true collisions, for moral reflection can create collisions everywhere and give itself the consciousness of something particular and of sacrifices made. In the uncultivated condition of society and community, therefore, the form of virtue as such occurs more, because here the ethical and its realization is more an individual whim and a peculiar, inspired nature of the individual, as the ancients especially predicated virtue of Hercules. In the ancient states too, because ethical life in them had not matured into this free system of independent development and objectivity, it had to be the peculiar genius of individuals that made up for this lack. — The doctrine of virtues, insofar as it is not merely a doctrine of duties and so embraces the particular, what in the character is grounded in natural determinacy, will accordingly be a spiritual natural history.
Since the virtues are the ethical in application to the particular, and on this subjective side something indeterminate, the quantitative element of more and less enters for their determination; their consideration therefore brings in the opposite defects or vices, as in Aristotle, who accordingly determined the particular virtue, in its right sense, as the mean between an excess and a deficiency. — The same content which takes the form of duties and then of virtues also has the form of drives (§ 19, remark). They too have the same content as their foundation; but because in them it still belongs to the immediate will and natural feeling, and has not been raised to the determination of ethical life, they have in common with the content of duties and virtues only the abstract object, which, as undetermined in itself, does not contain for them the limit of good or evil—or, according to the abstraction of the positive, they are good, and conversely, according to the abstraction of the negative, evil (§ 18).
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
150 The ethical, so far as it is reflected in the individual character as determined by nature, is virtue. When virtue shows nothing more than the individual's simple fit with the duties of the relations to which he belongs, it is uprightness.
In an ethical community it is easy to say what a person must do, and what duties he has to fulfill in order to be virtuous. He has nothing to do except what is laid out for him, stated and known in his relations. Uprightness is the universal thing that can be demanded of him, partly as a matter of right and partly as a matter of ethics. But from the moral standpoint it easily looks like something of lower rank, about which one must demand still more of oneself and of others. For the craving to be something special is not satisfied with what is in and for itself and universal. It finds the awareness of its own peculiarity only in an exception. — The different sides of uprightness can equally well be called virtues. They are just as much the property of the individual, although compared with others they are nothing special. But talk about virtue easily borders on empty declamation. It speaks only of something abstract and undetermined. Such talk, with its reasons and presentations, also appeals to the individual as to an arbitrary choice and subjective liking. Where an ethical condition exists and its relations are fully developed and made actual, virtue proper has its place and actuality only in extraordinary circumstances and in collisions of those relations. These must be true collisions, for moral reflection can create collisions everywhere, and can give itself the awareness of something special and of sacrifices made. In an uncultivated state of society and community, therefore, the form of virtue as such occurs more. For here the ethical and its realization is more a matter of individual liking and of the individual's own peculiar, inspired nature. The ancients, in particular, ascribed virtue to Hercules in this way. In the ancient states too, ethical life had not matured into this free system of independent development and objectivity. So the peculiar genius of individuals had to make up for this lack. — The teaching of virtues, so far as it is not merely a teaching of duties, and so takes in what is particular in character and based on natural determination, will therefore be a natural history of spirit.
Virtues are the ethical as applied to the particular, and on that subjective side they are undetermined. So the quantitative terms of more and less come in to determine them. Considering them therefore brings in the opposite defects or vices. This is the case with Aristotle, who defined the particular virtue, in its right sense, as the mean between too much and too little. — The same content that takes the form of duties and then of virtues also takes the form of drives (§ 19, note). They too have the same content as their foundation. But in them it still belongs to the immediate will and natural feeling, and it has not been raised up to the determination of ethical life. So they share with the content of duties and virtues only the abstract object. That object, being without determination in itself, does not contain for them the boundary of good or evil. Or, according to the abstraction of the positive, they are good, and conversely, according to the abstraction of the negative, they are evil (§ 18).
About this section
Section 150 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 152 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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