Section 148
Original German
148 Als diese substantiellen Bestimmungen sind sie für das Individuum, welches sich von ihnen als das Subjective und in sich Unbestimmte oder als besonders Bestimmte unterscheidet, hiermit im Verhältnisse zu ihnen als zu seinem Substantiellen steht, — Pflichten für seinen Willen bindend.
Die ethische Pflichtenlehre d. i. wie sie objectiv ist, nicht in dem leeren Prinzip der moralischen Subjectivität befaßt seyn soll, als welches vielmehr nichts bestimmt (§. 134.) — ist daher die in diesem dritten Theile folgende systematische Entwickelung des Kreises der sittlichen Nothwendigkeit. Der Unterschied dieser Darstellung von der Form einer Pflichtenlehre liegt allein darin, daß in dem Folgenden die sittlichen Bestimmungen sich als die nothwendigen Verhältnisse ergeben, hiebey stehen geblieben und nicht zu jeder derselben, noch der Nachsatz gefügt wird, also ist diese Bestimmung für den Menschen eine Pflicht. — Eine Pflichtenlehre, insofern sie nicht philosophische Wissenschaft ist, nimmt aus den Verhältnissen als Vorhandenen, ihren Stoff und zeigt den Zusammenhang desselben mit den eigenen Vorstellungen, allgemein sich vorfindenden Grundsätzen und Gedanken, Zwecken, Trieben, Empfindungen u. s. f. und kann als Gründe die weiteren Folgen einer jeden Pflicht in Beziehung auf die andern sittlichen Verhältnisse, so wie auf das Wohl und die Meynung hinzu fügen. Eine immanente und consequente Pflichtenlehre kann aber nichts anders seyn, als die Entwickelung der Verhältnisse, die durch die Idee der Freyheit nothwendig, und daher wirklich in ihrem ganzen Umfange, im Staat sind.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
148 As these substantial determinations, they are, for the individual, who distinguishes himself from them as the subjective and in himself undetermined, or as particularly determined, and who thereby stands in a relation to them as to his substantial element—duties binding his will.
The ethical doctrine of duties, that is, as it is objective and is not to be comprised in the empty principle of moral subjectivity, which on the contrary determines nothing (§ 134), is therefore the systematic development of the circle of ethical necessity that follows in this third part. The difference of this exposition from the form of a doctrine of duties lies solely in this, that in what follows the ethical determinations emerge as the necessary relations, and one stops with this, without adding to each of them the further clause, therefore this determination is a duty for the human being. — A doctrine of duties, insofar as it is not philosophical science, takes its material from the relations as existing, and shows its connection with one's own representations, with generally found principles and thoughts, with purposes, drives, feelings, and so on, and can add as reasons the further consequences of each duty in relation to the other ethical relations, as well as to welfare and opinion. An immanent and consistent doctrine of duties, however, can be nothing other than the development of the relations which are necessary through the Idea of freedom, and therefore actual in their whole extent, in the state.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
148 The individual distinguishes himself from these substantial determinations as the subjective, undetermined in himself, or as particularly determined. In this way he stands in a relation to them, as to his substantial being. As such substantial determinations they are duties that bind his will.
The ethical teaching of duties, as it is objective, is not to be comprised in the empty principle of moral subjectivity, which in fact determines nothing (§ 134). It is therefore the systematic development of the circle of ethical necessity, which follows in this third part. The only difference between this presentation and the form of a teaching of duties lies in this. In what follows, the ethical determinations come out as the necessary relations. We stop there, and we do not add to each of them the further sentence, so this determination is a duty for the human being. — A teaching of duties, so far as it is not philosophical science, takes its material from the relations as they exist. It shows how this material connects with one's own ideas, with generally found principles and thoughts, with purposes, drives, feelings and so on. It can add, as reasons, the further consequences of each duty in relation to the other ethical relations, and in relation to well-being and opinion. But a teaching of duties that is immanent and consistent can be nothing other than the development of the relations which are necessary through the Idea of freedom, and which therefore are actual in their whole extent in the state.
About this section
Section 148 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 150 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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