Section 147
Original German
147 Andererseits sind sie dem Subjecte nicht ein Fremdes, sondern es giebt das Zeugniß des Geistes von ihnen als von seinem eigenen Wesen, in welchem es sein Selbstgefühl hat, und darin als seinem von sich ununterschiedenen Elemente lebt, — ein Verhältniß, das unmittelbar noch identischer, als selbst Glaube und Zutrauen ist.
Glaube und Zutrauen gehören der beginnenden Reflexion an und setzen eine Vorstellung und Unterschied voraus; — wie es z. B. verschieden wäre, an die heydnische Religion glauben, und ein Heyde seyn. Jenes Verhältniß oder vielmehr Verhältniß-lose Identität, in der das Sittliche die wirkliche Lebendigkeit des Selbstbewußtseyns ist, kann allerdings in ein Verhältniß des Glaubens und der Ueberzeugung, und in ein durch weitere Reflexion vermitteltes übergehen, in eine Einsicht durch Gründe, die auch von irgend besonderen Zwecken, Interessen und Rücksichten, von Furcht oder Hoffnung, oder von geschichtlichen Voraussetzungen anfangen können. Die adäquate Erkenntniß derselben aber gehört dem denkenden Begriffe an.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
147 On the other hand they are not something alien to the subject; rather, it bears the witness of spirit to them as to its own essence, in which it has its self-feeling and lives in it as in its element, undistinguished from itself—a relation that is immediately still more identical than even faith and trust.
Faith and trust belong to incipient reflection and presuppose a representation and a difference; as it would be, for example, different to believe in the pagan religion and to be a pagan. That relation, or rather relationless identity, in which the ethical is the actual livingness of self-consciousness, can indeed pass over into a relation of faith and conviction, and into one mediated by further reflection, into an insight through reasons, which may also begin from some particular purposes, interests and considerations, from fear or hope, or from historical presuppositions. The adequate cognition of them, however, belongs to the thinking concept.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
147 On the other side, these laws are not something alien to the subject. The subject gives the testimony of spirit about them as about its own essence. In that essence it has its self-feeling, and it lives in it as in its own element, undifferentiated from itself. This relation is even more immediately identical than faith and trust.
Faith and trust belong to reflection when it is just beginning, and they presuppose an idea and a difference. For example, believing in the pagan religion would be different from being a pagan. That relation, or rather that identity without any relation, in which the ethical is the actual livingness of self-consciousness, can certainly pass over into a relation of faith and conviction. It can also pass into one mediated by further reflection, into an insight through reasons. These reasons may also begin from particular purposes, interests and considerations, from fear or hope, or from historical presuppositions. But the adequate knowledge of them belongs to the thinking concept.
About this section
Section 147 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 149 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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