Section 140
Original German
140 Indem das Selbstbewußtseyn an seinem Zwecke eine positive Seite, (§. 135.) deren er nothwendig hat, weil er dem Vorsatze des concreten wirklichen Handelns angehört, herauszubringen weiß, so vermag es um solcher, als einer Pflicht und vortreflichen Absicht willen, die Handlung, deren negativer wesentlicher Inhalt zugleich in ihm, als in sich reflectirten, somit des Allgemeinen des Willens sich bewußten, in der Vergleichung mit diesem stehet, andere und sich selbst als gut zu behaupten, — andere, so ist es die Heucheley, sich selbst, — so ist es die noch höhere Spitze der sich als das Absolute behauptenden Subjectivität.
Diese letzte abstruseste Form des Bösen, wodurch das Böse in Gutes, und das Gute in Böses verkehrt wird, das Bewußtseyn sich als diese Macht, und deßwegen sich als absolut weiß, — ist die höchste Spitze der Subjectivität im moralischen Standpunkte, die Form, zu welcher das Böse in unserer Zeit und zwar durch die Philosophie, d. h. eine Seichtigkeit des Gedankens, welche einen tiefen Begriff in diese Gestalt verrückt hat, und sich den Namen der Philosophie, eben so wie sie dem Bösen den Namen des Guten anmaßt, gediehen ist. Ich will in dieser Anmerkung die Hauptgestalten dieser Subjectivität, die gäng und gebe geworden sind, kurz angeben. Was
a) die Heucheley betrifft, so sind in ihr die Momente enthalten α) das Wissen des wahrhaften Allgemeinen, es sey in Form nur des Gefühls von Recht und Pflicht, oder in Form weiterer Kenntniß und Erkenntniß davon β) das Wollen des diesem Allgemeinen widerstrebenden Besonderen und zwar γ) als vergleichendes Wissen beyder Momente, so daß für das wollende Bewußtseyn selbst sein besonderes Wollen als Böses bestimmt ist. Diese Bestimmungen drücken das Handeln mit bösem Gewissen aus, noch nicht die Heucheley als solche. — Es ist eine zu einer Zeit sehr wichtig gewordene Frage gewesen, ob eine Handlung nur insofern böse sey, als sie mit bösem Gewissen geschehen, d. h. mit dem entwickelten Bewußtseyn der so eben angegebenen Momente. — Pascal zieht (Les Provinc. 4e lettre) sehr gut die Folge aus der Bejahung der Frage: Ils seront tous damnés ces demi-pecheurs, qui ont quelque amour pour la vertu. Mais pour ces francs-pecheurs, pecheurs endurcis, pecheurs sans mélange, pleins et achevés, l'enfer ne les tient pas. Ils ont trompé le diable a force de s'y abandonner. — Das subjective Recht des Selbstbewußtseyns, daß es die Handlung unter der Bestimmung wie sie an und für sich gut oder böse ist, wisse, muß mit dem absoluten Rechte der Objectivität dieser Bestimmung nicht so in Collision gedacht werden, daß beyde als trennbar gleichgültig und zufällig gegen einander vorgestellt werden, welches Verhältniß insbesondere auch bey den vormaligen Fragen über die wirksame Gnade zu Grunde gelegt wurde. Das Böse ist nach der formellen Seite das Eigenste des Individuums, indem es eben seine sich schlechthin für sich eigen setzende Subjectivität ist, und damit schlechthin seine Schuld, (s. §. 139. und Anm. zu vorhergeh. §.) und nach der objectiven Seite ist der Mensch, seinem Begriffe nach als Geist, Vernünftiges überhaupt, und hat die Bestimmung der sich wissenden Allgemeinheit schlechthin in sich. Es heißt ihn daher nicht nach der Ehre seines Begriffes behandeln, wenn die Seite des Guten und damit die Bestimmung seiner bösen Handlung als einer bösen von ihm getrennt, und sie ihm nicht als böse zugerechnet würde. Wie bestimmt oder in welchem Grade der Klarheit oder Dunkelheit das Bewußtseyn jener Momente in ihrer Unterschiedenheit zu einem Erkennen entwickelt und in wie fern eine böse Handlung mehr oder weniger mit förmlichem bösen Gewissen vollbracht sey, dieß ist die gleichgültigere, mehr das Empirische betreffende Seite.
Pascal führt daselbst auch die Fürbitte Christi am Kreuze für seine Feinde an: Vater vergieb ihnen, denn sie wissen nicht, was sie thun; — eine überflüssige Bitte, wenn der Umstand, daß sie nicht gewußt, was sie gethan, ihrer Handlung die Qualität ertheilt hatte, nicht böse zu seyn, somit der Vergebung nicht zu bedürfen. Imgleichen führt er die Ansicht des Aristoteles an: (die Stelle steht Eth. Nicom. III. 2.) welcher unterscheidet, ob der Handelnde οὐκ εἰδώς oder ἀγνοῶν sey; in jenem Falle der Unwissenheit handelt er unfreiwillig (diese Unwissenheit bezieht sich auf die äußern Umstände) (s. oben §. 117.) und die Handlung ist ihm nicht zuzurechnen. Ueber den andern Fall aber sagt Aristoteles: „Jeder Schlechte erkennt nicht was zu thun und was zu lassen ist, und eben dieser Mangel (ἁμαρτία) ist es, was die Menschen ungerecht und überhaupt böse macht. Die Nichterkenntniß der Wahl des Guten und Bösen macht nicht, daß eine Handlung unfreiwillig ist (nicht zugerechnet werden kann) sondern nur, daß sie schlecht ist.“ Aristoteles hatte freylich eine tiefere Einsicht in dem Zusammenhang des Erkennens und Wollens, als in einer flachen Philosophie gäng und gebe geworden ist, welche lehrt, daß das Nichterkennen, das Gemüth und die Begeisterung die wahrhaften Principien des sittlichen Handels seyen.
b) Böse aber und mit bösem Gewissen handeln ist noch nicht die Heucheley, in dieser kommt die formelle Bestimmung der Unwahrheit hinzu, das Böse zunächst für andere als gut zu behaupten, und sich überhaupt äußerlich als gut, gewissenhaft, fromm und dergl. zu stellen, was auf diese Weise nur ein Kunststück des Betrugs für andere ist. Der Böse kann aber ferner in seinem sonstigen Gutesthun oder Frömmigkeit, überhaupt in guten Gründen, für sich selbst eine Berechtigung zum Bösen finden, indem er durch sie es für sich zum Guten verkehrt. Diese Möglichkeit liegt in der Subjectivität, welche als abstracte Negativität alle Bestimmungen sich unterworfen, und aus ihr kommend weiß. Zu dieser Verkehrung ist
c) diejenige Gestalt zunächst zu rechnen, welche als der Probabilismus bekannt ist. Er macht zum Prinzip, daß eine Handlung, für die das Bewußtseyn irgend einen guten Grund aufzutreiben weiß, es sey auch nur die Autorität eines Theologen, und wenn es auch andere Theologen von dessen Urtheil noch so sehr abweichend weiß, — erlaubt ist, und daß das Gewissen darüber sicher seyn kann. Selbst bei dieser Vorstellung ist noch dieß richtige Bewußtseyn vorhanden, daß ein solcher Grund und Autorität nur Probabilität gebe, obgleich dieß zur Sicherheit des Gewissens hinreiche; es ist darin zugegeben, daß ein guter Grund nur von solcher Beschaffenheit ist, daß es neben ihm andere, wenigstens eben so gute Gründe geben könne. Auch diese Spur von Objectivität ist noch hiebey zu erkennen, daß es ein Grund seyn soll, der bestimme. Indem aber die Entscheidung des Guten oder Bösen auf die vielen guten Gründe, worunter auch jene Autoritäten begriffen sind, gestellt ist, dieser Gründe aber so viele und entgegengesetzte sind, so liegt hierin zugleich dieß, daß es nicht diese Objectivität der Sache, sondern die Subjectivität ist, welche zu entscheiden hat, — die Seite, wodurch Belieben und Willkühr über gut und böse zum Entscheidenden gemacht wird, und die Sittlichkeit, wie die Religiosität, untergraben ist. Daß es aber die eigene Subjectivität ist, in welche die Entscheidung fällt, dieß ist noch nicht als das Prinzip ausgesprochen, vielmehr wird, wie bemerkt, ein Grund als das Entscheidende ausgegeben, der Probabilismus ist soweit noch eine Gestalt der Heucheley.
d) Die nächst höhere Stufe ist, daß der gute Wille darin bestehen soll, daß er das Gute will; dieß Wollen des Abstract-Guten soll hinreichen, ja die einzige Erforderniß seyn, damit die Handlung gut sey. Indem die Handlung als bestimmtes Wollen einen Inhalt hat, das abstracte Gute aber nichts bestimmt, so ist es der besondern Subjectivität vorbehalten, ihm seine Bestimmung und Erfüllung zu geben. Wie im Probabilismus für den, der nicht selbst ein gelehrter Révérend Père ist, es die Autorität eines solchen Theologen ist, auf welche die Subsumtion eines bestimmten Inhalts unter die allgemeine Bestimmung des Guten gemacht werden kann, so ist hier jedes Subject unmittelbar in diese Würde eingesetzt, in das abstracte Gute den Inhalt zu legen, oder was dasselbe ist, einen Inhalt unter ein Allgemeines zu subsumiren. Dieser Inhalt ist an der Handlung als concreter überhaupt eine Seite, deren sie mehrere hat, Seiten, welche ihr vielleicht sogar das Prädicat einer verbrecherischen und schlechten geben können. Jene meine subjective Bestimmung des Guten aber ist das in der Handlung von mir gewußte Gute, die gute Absicht (§. 114.) Es tritt hiermit ein Gegensatz von Bestimmungen ein, nach deren einer die Handlung gut, nach andern aber verbrecherisch ist. Damit scheint auch die Frage bei der wirklichen Handlung einzutreten, ob denn die Absicht wirklich gut sey. Daß aber das Gute wirkliche Absicht ist, dieß kann nun nicht nur überhaupt, sondern muß auf dem Standpunkte, wo das Subject das abstracte Gute zum Bestimmungsgrund hat, sogar immer der Fall seyn können. Was durch eine solche nach andern Seiten sich als verbrecherisch und böse bestimmende Handlung von der guten Absicht verletzt wird, ist freilich auch gut, und es schiene darauf anzukommen, welche unter diesen Seiten die wesentlichste wäre. Aber diese objective Frage fällt hier hinweg, oder vielmehr ist es die Subjectivität des Bewußtseyns selbst, deren Entscheidung das Objective allein ausmacht. Wesentlich und gut sind ohnehin gleichbedeutend; jenes ist eine eben solche Abstraction, wie dieses; gut ist, was in Rücksicht des Willens wesentlich ist, und das Wesentliche in dieser Rücksicht soll eben das seyn, daß eine Handlung für mich als gut bestimmt ist. Die Subsumtion aber jeden beliebigen Inhalts unter das Gute ergiebt sich für sich unmittelbar daraus, daß dieß abstracte Gute, da es gar keinen Inhalt hat, sich ganz nur darauf reducirt, überhaupt etwas Positives zu bedeuten, — etwas, das in irgend einer Rücksicht gilt, und nach seiner unmittelbaren Bestimmung auch als ein wesentlicher Zweck gelten kann; — z. B. Armen Gutes thun, für mich, für mein Leben, für meine Familie sorgen u. s. f. Ferner wie das Gute das Abstracte ist, so ist damit auch das Schlechte das Inhaltslose, das von meiner Subjectivität seine Bestimmung erhält; und es ergiebt sich nach dieser Seite auch der moralische Zweck, das unbestimmte Schlechte zu hassen und auszurotten. — Diebstahl, Feigheit, Mord u. s. f., haben als Handlungen, d. i. überhaupt als von einem subjectiven Willen vollbrachte, unmittelbar die Bestimmung, die Befriedigung eines solchen Willens, hiermit ein positives zu seyn, und um die Handlung zu einer guten zu machen, kommt es nur darauf an, diese positive Seite als meine Absicht bei derselben zu wissen, und diese Seite ist für die Bestimmung der Handlung, daß sie gut ist, die wesentliche, darum weil ich sie als das Gute in meiner Absicht weiß. Diebstahl, um den Armen Gutes zu thun, Diebstahl, Entlaufen aus der Schlacht, um der Pflicht willen für sein Leben, für seine (vielleicht auch dazu arme) Familie zu sorgen — Mord, aus Haß und Rache, d. i. um das Selbstgefühl seines Rechts, des Rechts überhaupt, und das Gefühl der Schlechtigkeit des andern, seines Unrechtes gegen mich oder gegen Andere, gegen die Welt oder das Volk überhaupt, durch die Vertilgung dieses schlechten Menschen, der das Schlechte selbst in sich hat, womit zum Zwecke der Ausrottung des Schlechten wenigstens ein Beytrag geliefert wird, zu befriedigen, sind auf diese Weise, um der positiven Seite ihres Inhalts willen, zur guten Absicht und damit zur guten Handlung gemacht. Es reicht eine höchst geringe Verstandesbildung dazu hin, um, wie jene gelehrte Theologen, für jede Handlung eine positive Seite, und damit einen guten Grund und Absicht herauszufinden. — So hat man gesagt, daß es eigentlich keinen Bösen gebe, denn er will das Böse nicht um des Bösen willen, d. i., nicht das rein-negative als solches, sondern er will immer etwas positives, somit nach diesem Standpunkte ein Gutes. In diesem abstracten Guten ist der Unterschied von Gut und Böse, und alle wirklichen Pflichten verschwunden; deßwegen bloß das Gute wollen, und bei einer Handlung eine gute Absicht haben, dieß ist so vielmehr das Böse, insofern das Gute nur in dieser Abstraction gewollt, und damit die Bestimmung desselben der Willkühr des Subjects vorbehalten wird.
An diese Stelle gehört auch der berüchtigte Satz: der Zweck heiligt die Mittel. — So für sich zunächst ist dieser Ausdruck trivial und nichts sagend. Man kann eben so unbestimmt erwiedern, daß ein heiliger Zweck wohl die Mittel heilige, aber ein unheiliger Zweck sie nicht heilige. Wenn der Zweck recht ist, so sind es auch die Mittel, ist insofern ein tautologischer Ausdruck, als das Mittel eben das ist, was nichts für sich, sondern um eines andern willen ist, und darin, in dem Zwecke, seine Bestimmung und Werth hat, — wenn es nämlich in Wahrheit ein Mittel ist. — Es ist aber mit jenem Satze nicht der bloß formelle Sinn gemeynt, sondern es wird darunter etwas bestimmteres verstanden, daß nämlich für einen guten Zweck etwas als Mittel zu gebrauchen, was für sich schlechthin kein Mittel ist, etwas zu verletzen, was für sich heilig ist, ein Verbrechen also zum Mittel eines guten Zwecks zu machen, erlaubt, ja auch wohl Pflicht sey. Es schwebt bey jenem Satze einer Seits das unbestimmte Bewußtseyn von der Dialektik des vorhin bemerkten Positiven in vereinzelten rechtlichen oder sittlichen Bestimmungen, oder solcher eben so unbestimmten allgemeinen Sätze vor, wie: du sollt nicht tödten, oder: du sollt für dein Wohl, für das Wohl deiner Familie sorgen. Die Gerichte, Krieger haben nicht nur das Recht, sondern die Pflicht, Menschen zu tödten, wo aber genau bestimmt ist, wegen welcher Qualität Menschen und unter welchen Umständen dieß erlaubt und Pflicht sey. So muß auch mein Wohl, meiner Familie Wohl höhern Zwecken nach- und somit zu Mitteln herabgesetzt werden. Was sich aber als Verbrechen bezeichnet, ist nicht so eine unbestimmt gelassene Allgemeinheit, die noch einer Dialektik unterläge, sondern hat bereits seine bestimmte objective Begränzung. Was solcher Bestimmung nun in dem Zwecke, der dem Verbrechen seine Natur benehmen sollte, entgegengestellt wird, der heilige Zweck, ist nichts anders, als die subjective Meynung von dem, was gut und besser sey. Es ist dasselbe, was darin geschieht, daß das Wollen beym Abstractguten stehen bleibt, daß nämlich alle an und für sich seyende und geltende Bestimmtheit des Guten und Schlechten, des Rechts und Unrechts, aufgehoben, und dem Gefühl, Vorstellen und Belieben des Individuums diese Bestimmung zugeschrieben wird. —
Die subjective Meynung wird endlich ausdrücklich als die Regel des Rechts und der Pflicht ausgesprochen, indem e) die Ueberzeugung, welche etwas für recht hält, es seyn soll, wodurch die sittliche Natur einer Handlung bestimmt werde. Das Gute, das man will, hat noch keinen Inhalt, das Prinzip der Ueberzeugung enthält nun dieß Nähere, daß die Subsumtion einer Handlung unter die Bestimmung des Guten dem Subjecte zustehe. Hiermit ist auch der Schein von einer sittlichen Objectivität vollends verschwunden. Solche Lehre hängt unmittelbar mit der öfters erwähnten sich so nennenden Philosophie zusammen, welche die Erkennbarkeit des Wahren, — und das Wahre des wollenden Geistes, seine Vernünftigkeit insofern er sich verwirklicht, sind die sittlichen Gebote, — läugnet. Indem ein solches Philosophiren die Erkenntniß des Wahren für eine leere, den Kreis des Erkennens, der nur das Scheinende sey, überfliegende Eitelkeit ausgiebt, muß es unmittelbar auch das Scheinende in Ansehung des Handelns zum Prinzip machen und das Sittliche somit in die eigenthümliche Weltansicht des Individuums und seine besondere Ueberzeugung setzen. Die Degradation, in welche so die Philosophie herabgesunken ist, erscheint freylich zunächst vor der Welt als eine höchst gleichgültige Begebenheit, die nur dem müssigen Schulgeschwätze widerfahren sey, aber nothwendig bildet sich solche Ansicht in die Ansicht des Sittlichen, als in einen wesentlichen Theil der Philosophie hinein, und dann erst erscheint an der Wirklichkeit und für sie, was an jenen Ansichten ist. — Durch die Verbreitung der Ansicht, daß die subjective Ueberzeugung es sey, wodurch die sittliche Natur einer Handlung allein bestimmt werde, ist es geschehen, daß wohl vormals viel, aber heutiges Tags wenig mehr von Heucheley die Rede ist; denn die Qualificirung des Bösen als Heucheley hat zu Grunde liegen, daß gewisse Handlungen an und für sich Vergehen, Laster und Verbrechen sind, daß, der sie begehe, sie nothwendig als solche wisse, insofern er die Grundsätze und äußern Handlungen der Frömmigkeit und Rechtlichkeit eben in dem Scheine, zu dem er sie mißbraucht, wisse und anerkenne. Oder in Ansehung des Bösen überhaupt galt die Voraussetzung, daß es Pflicht sey, das Gute zu erkennen, und es vom Bösen zu unterscheiden zu wissen. Auf allen Fall aber galt die absolute Forderung, daß der Mensch keine lasterhafte und verbrecherische Handlungen begehe, und daß sie ihm, insofern er ein Mensch und kein Vieh ist, als solche zugerechnet werden müssen. Wenn aber das gute Herz, die gute Absicht und die subjective Ueberzeugung für das erklärt wird, was den Handlungen ihren Werth gebe, so giebt es keine Heucheley und überhaupt kein Böses mehr, denn was einer thut, weiß er durch die Reflexion der guten Absichten und Bewegungsgründe zu etwas Gutem zu machen, und durch das Moment seiner Ueberzeugung ist es gut. So giebt es nicht mehr Verbrechen und Laster an und für sich, und an die Stelle des oben angeführten frank und freyen, verhärteten, ungetrübten Sündigens, ist das Bewußtseyn der vollkommenen Rechtfertigung durch die Absicht und Ueberzeugung getreten. Meine Absicht des Guten bey meiner Handlung, und meine Ueberzeugung davon, daß es gut ist, macht sie zum Guten. Insofern von einem Beurtheilen und Richten der Handlung die Rede wird; ist es vermöge dieses Prinzips nur nach der Absicht und Ueberzeugung des Handelnden, nach seinem Glauben, daß er gerichtet werden solle, — nicht in dem Sinne, wie Christus einen Glauben an die objective Wahrheit fodert, so daß für den, der einen schlechten Glauben hat, d. h. eine ihrem Inhalte nach böse Ueberzeugung, auch das Urtheil schlecht, d. h. diesem bösen Inhalte gemäß ausfalle, sondern nach dem Glauben im Sinn der Ueberzeugungstreue, ob der Mensch in seinem Handeln seiner Ueberzeugung treu geblieben, der formellen subjectiven Treue, welche allein das pflichtmäßige enthalte. — Bei diesem Prinzip der Ueberzeugung, weil sie zugleich als ein subjectives bestimmt ist, muß sich zwar auch der Gedanke an die Möglichkeit eines Irrthums aufdringen, worin somit die Voraussetzung eines an und für sich seyenden Gesetzes liegt. Aber das Gesetz handelt nicht, es ist nur der wirkliche Mensch, der handelt, und bei dem Werthe der menschlichen Handlungen kann es nach jenem Prinzipe nur darauf ankommen, inwiefern er jenes Gesetz in seine Ueberzeugung aufgenommen hat. Wenn es aber sonach nicht die Handlungen sind, die nach jenem Gesetze zu beurtheilen, d. h. überhaupt darnach zu bemessen sind, so ist nicht abzusehen, zu was jenes Gesetz noch seyn und dienen soll. Solches Gesetz ist zu einem nur äußern Buchstaben, in der That einem leeren Wort heruntergesetzt, denn erst durch meine Ueberzeugung wird es zu einem Gesetze, einem mich verpflichtenden und bindenden, gemacht. — Daß solches Gesetz die Autorität Gottes, des Staats, für sich hat, auch die Autorität von Jahrtausenden, in denen es das Band war, in welchem die Menschen und alles ihr Thun und Schicksal sich zusammenhält und Bestehen hat, — Autoritäten, welche eine Unzahl Ueberzeugungen von Individuen in sich schließen, — und daß Ich dagegen die Autorität meiner einzelnen Ueberzeugung setze, — als meine subjective Ueberzeugung ist ihre Gültigkeit nur Autorität, — dieser zunächst ungeheuer scheinende Eigendünkel ist durch das Princip selbst beseitigt, als welches die subjective Ueberzeugung zur Regel macht. — Wenn nun zwar durch die höhere Inconsequenz, welche die durch seichte Wissenschaft und schlechte Sophisterey unvertreibliche Vernunft und Gewissen hereinbringen, die Möglichkeit eines Irrthums zugegeben wird, so ist damit, daß das Verbrechen und das Böse überhaupt ein Irrthum sey, der Fehler auf sein Geringstes reducirt. Denn Irren ist menschlich, — wer hätte sich nicht über dieß und jenes, ob ich gestern Kohl oder Kraut zu Mittag gegessen habe, und über Unzähliges, Unwichtigeres und Wichtigeres, geirrt? Jedoch der Unterschied von Wichtigem und Unwichtigem fällt hinweg, wenn es allein die Subjectivität der Ueberzeugung und das Beharren bei derselben ist, worauf es ankommt. Jene höhere Inconsequenz von der Möglichkeit eines Irrthums aber, die aus der Natur der Sache kommt, setzt sich in der Wendung, daß eine schlechte Ueberzeugung nur ein Irrthum ist, in der That nur in die andere Inconsequenz der Unredlichkeit um; das einemal soll es die Ueberzeugung seyn, auf welche das Sittliche und der höchste Werth des Menschen gestellt ist, sie wird hiermit für das Höchste und Heilige erklärt; und das andremal ist es weiter nichts, um das es sich handelt, als ein Irren, mein Ueberzeugtseyn ein geringfügiges und zufälliges, — eigentlich etwas äußerliches, das mir so oder so begegnen kann. In der That ist mein Ueberzeugtseyn etwas höchst geringfügiges, wenn ich nichts Wahres erkennen kann; so ist es gleichgültig wie ich denke, und es bleibt mir zum Denken jenes leere Gute, das Abstractum des Verstandes. — Es ergiebt sich übrigens, um dieß noch zu bemerken, nach diesem Princip der Berechtigung aus dem dem Grunde der Ueberzeugung, die Consequenz für die Handlungsweise Anderer gegen mein Handeln, daß indem sie nach ihrem Glauben und Ueberzeugung meine Handlungen für Verbrechen halten, sie ganz recht daran thun; — eine Consequenz, bei der ich nicht nur nichts zum Voraus behalte, sondern im Gegentheil nur von dem Standpunkte der Freyheit und Ehre in das Verhältniß der Unfreyheit und Unehre herabgesetzt bin, nämlich in der Gerechtigkeit, welche an sich auch das Meinige ist, nur eine fremde subjective Ueberzeugung zu erfahren, und in ihrer Ausübung mich nur von einer äußern Gewalt behandelt zu meynen.
„Daß er sich vollkommen überzeugt fühle, daran zweifle ich nicht im mindesten. Aber wie viele Menschen beginnen nicht aus einer solchen gefühlten Ueberzeugung die ärgsten Frevel. Also, wenn dieser Grund überall entschuldigen mag, so giebt es kein vernünftiges Urtheil mehr über gute und böse, ehrwürdige und verächtliche Entschließungen; der Wahn hat dann gleiche Rechte mit der Vernunft, oder die Vernunft hat dann überhaupt keine Rechte, kein gültiges Ansehen mehr; ihre Stimme ist ein Unding; wer nur nicht zweifelt, der ist in der Wahrheit!
Mir schaudert vor den Folgen einer solchen Toleranz, die eine ausschließende zum Vortheil der Unvernunft wäre.“
Fr. H. Jacobi an den Grafen Holmer. Eutin 5. Aug. 1800. über Gr. Stollbergs Rel. Veränderung. (Brennus. Berlin Aug. 1802.)
f) Die höchste Form endlich, in welcher diese Subjectivität sich vollkommen erfaßt und ausspricht, ist die Gestalt, die man mit einem vom Plato erborgten Namen Ironie genannt hat; — denn nur der Name ist von Plato genommen, der ihn von einer Weise des Sokrates brauchte, welche dieser in einer persönlichen Unterredung gegen die Einbildung des ungebildeten und des sophistischen Bewußtseyns zum Behuf der Idee der Wahrheit und Gerechtigkeit anwandte, aber nur jenes Bewußtseyn, die Idee selbst nicht, ironisch behandelte. Die Ironie betrifft nur ein Verhalten des Gesprächs gegen Personen; ohne die persönliche Richtung ist die wesentliche Bewegung des Gedankens die Dialektik, und Plato war so weit entfernt, das Dialektische für sich oder gar die Ironie für das Letzte und für die Idee selbst zu nehmen, daß er im Gegentheil das Herüber- und Hinübergehen des Gedankens vollends einer subjectiven Meinung, in die Substantialität der Idee versenkte und endigte. — Die hier noch zu betrachtende Spitze der sich als das Letzte erfassenden Subjectivität kann nur dieß seyn, sich noch als jenes Beschließen und Entscheiden über Wahrheit, Recht und Pflicht zu wissen, welches in den vorhergehenden Formen schon an sich vorhanden ist. Sie besteht also darin, das Sittlich-objective wohl zu wissen, aber nicht sich selbst vergessend und auf sich Verzicht thuend in den Ernst desselben sich zu vertiefen und aus ihm zu handeln, sondern in der Beziehung darauf dasselbe zugleich von sich zu halten, und sich als das zu wissen, welches so will und beschließt, und auch eben so gut anders wollen und beschließen kann. — Ihr nehmt ein Gesetz in der That und ehrlicherweise als an und für sich seyend, Ich bin auch dabei und darin, aber auch noch weiter als Ihr, ich bin auch darüber hinaus und kann es so oder so machen. Nicht die Sache ist das Vortreffliche, sondern Ich bin der Vortreffliche, und bin der Meister über das Gesetz und die Sache, der damit, als mit seinem Belieben, nur spielt, und in diesem ironischen Bewußtseyn, in welchem Ich das Höchste untergehen lasse, nur mich genieße. — Diese Gestalt ist nicht nur die Eitelkeit alles sittlichen Inhalts der Rechte, Pflichten, Gesetze, — das Böse, und zwar das in sich ganz allgemeine Böse, sondern sie thut auch die Form, die subjective Eitelkeit, hinzu, sich selbst als diese Eitelkeit alles Inhalts zu wissen, und in diesem Wissen sich als das Absolute zu wissen. — In wie fern diese absolute Selbstgefälligkeit nicht ein einsamer Gottesdienst seiner selbst bleibt, sondern etwa auch eine Gemeinde bilden kann, deren Band und Substanz etwa auch die gegenseitige Versicherung von Gewissenhaftigkeit, guten Absichten, das Erfreuen über diese wechselseitige Reinheit, vornemlich aber das Laben an der Herrlichkeit dieses Sich-wissens und Aussprechens, und an der Herrlichkeit dieses Hegens und Pflegens ist, — in wie fern das, was schöne Seele genannt worden, die in der Eitelkeit aller Objectivität und damit in der Unwirklichkeit ihrer selbst verglimmende edlere Subjectivität, ferner andere Gestaltungen, mit der betrachteten Stufe verwandte Wendungen sind, — habe ich Phänomenologie des Geistes S. 605 ff. abgehandelt, wo der ganze Abschnitt c) das Gewissen, insbesondere auch in Rücksicht des Uebergangs in eine — dort übrigens anders bestimmte, höhere Stufe überhaupt, verglichen werden kann.
Mein verstorbener College, Professor Solger, hat zwar den vom Herrn Fried. v. Schlegel in einer frühern Periode seiner schriftstellerischen Laufbahn aufgebrachten und bis zu jener sich selbst als das Höchste wissenden Subjectivität gesteigerten Ausdruck der Ironie aufgenommen, aber sein von solcher Bestimmung entfernter besserer Sinn und seine philosophische Einsicht hat darin nur vornehmlich die Seite des eigentlichen Dialektischen, des bewegenden Pulses der spekulativen Betrachtung ergriffen und festgehalten. Ganz klar aber kann ich das nicht finden, noch mit den Begriffen übereinstimmen, welche derselbe noch in seiner letzten, gehaltvollen Arbeit, einer ausführlichen Kritik über die Vorlesungen des Herrn August Wilhelm v. Schlegel über dramatische Kunst und Literatur (Wiener Jahrb. VII. Bd. S. 90 ff.) entwickelt. „Die wahre Ironie, sagt Solger daselbst S. 92., geht von dem Gesichtspunkt aus, daß der Mensch, so lange er in dieser gegenwärtigen Welt lebt, seine Bestimmung auch im höchsten Sinne des Worts, nur in dieser Welt erfüllen kann. Alles, womit wir über endliche Zwecke hinauszugehen glauben, ist eitle und leere Einbildung. — Auch das Höchste ist für unser Handeln nur in begrenzter endlicher Gestaltung da.“ Dieß ist, richtig verstanden, platonisch und sehr wahr gegen das daselbst vorher erwähnte leere Streben in das (abstracte) Unendliche gesagt. Daß aber das Höchste in begrenzter endlicher Gestaltung ist, wie das Sittliche, und das Sittliche ist wesentlich als Wirklichkeit und Handlung, diß ist sehr verschieden davon, daß es ein endlicher Zweck sey; die Gestaltung, die Form des Endlichen, benimmt dem Inhalt, dem Sittlichen nichts von seiner Substantialität und der Unendlichkeit, die es in sich selbst hat. Es heißt weiter: „Und eben deswegen ist es (das Höchste) an uns so nichtig, als das Geringste, und gehet nothwendig mit uns und unserm nichtigen Sinne unter, denn in Wahrheit ist es nur da in Gott, und in diesem Untergange verklärt es sich als ein Göttliches, an welchem wir nicht Theil haben würden, wenn es nicht eine unmittelbare Gegenwart dieses Göttlichen gäbe, die sich eben im Verschwinden unserer Wirklichkeit offenbart; die Stimmung aber, welcher dieses unmittelbar in den menschlichen Begebenheiten selbst einleuchtet, ist die tragische Ironie.“ Auf den willkührlichen Namen Ironie käme es nicht an, aber darin liegt etwas Unklares, daß es das Höchste sey, was mit unserer Nichtigkeit untergehe, und daß erst im Verschwinden unserer Wirklichkeit das Göttliche sich offenbare, wie es auch S. 91 ebendas. heißt: „wir sehen die Helden irre werden an dem Edelsten und Schönsten in ihren Gesinnungen und Gefühlen, nicht bloß in Rücksicht des Erfolgs, sondern auch ihrer Quelle und ihres Werthes, ja wir erheben uns an dem Untergange des Besten selbst.“ Daß der tragische Untergang höchst sittlicher Gestalten nur insofern interessiren, (der gerechte Untergang aufgespreitzter reiner Schurken und Verbrecher, wie z. B. der Held in einer modernen Tragödie, der Schuld, einer ist, hat zwar ein criminaljuristisches Interesse, aber keines für die wahre Kunst, von der hier die Rede ist), erheben und mit sich selbst versöhnen kann, als solche Gestalten gegen einander mit gleich berechtigten unterschiedenen sittlichen Mächten, welche durch Unglück in Collision gekommen, auftreten und so nun durch diese ihre Entgegensetzung gegen ein Sittliches Schuld haben, woraus das Recht und das Unrecht beyder, und damit die wahre sittliche Idee gereinigt und triumphirend über diese Einseitigkeit, somit versöhnt in uns, hervorgeht, daß sonach nicht das Höchste in uns es ist, welches untergeht, und wir uns nicht am Untergange des Besten, sondern im Gegentheil am Triumphe des Wahren erheben, — daß dieß das wahrhafte rein sittliche Interesse der antiken Tragödie ist (in der romantischen erleidet diese Bestimmung noch eine weitere Modification) habe ich in der Phänomenologie des Geistes (S. 404 ff. vergl. 683 ff.) ausgeführt. Die sittliche Idee aber ohne jenes Unglück der Collision und den Untergang der in diesem Unglück befangenen Individuen, ist in der sittlichen Welt wirklich und gegenwärtig und daß dieß Höchste sich nicht in seiner Wirklichkeit als ein Nichtiges darstellt, dieß ist es, was die reale sittliche Existenz, der Staat, bezweckt und bewirkt, und was in ihm das sittliche Selbstbewußtseyn besitzt, anschaut und weiß, und das denkende Erkennen begreift.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
140 Since self-consciousness knows how to bring out in its purpose a positive side (§ 135), which it necessarily has because it belongs to the intention of concrete actual action, it is able, for the sake of such a side as a duty and an excellent intention, to assert both others and itself to be good by means of the action, whose negative essential content stands at the same time in comparison within it, as reflected into itself and so conscious of the universal of the will. Where it asserts others to be good, this is hypocrisy; where it asserts itself, this is the still higher peak of subjectivity asserting itself as the absolute.
This last, most abstruse form of evil, by which evil is turned into good and good into evil, and consciousness knows itself as this power and therefore as absolute, is the highest peak of subjectivity in the moral standpoint. It is the form to which evil has grown in our time, and indeed through philosophy, that is, through a shallowness of thought which has twisted a profound concept into this shape and arrogates to itself the name of philosophy, just as it arrogates to evil the name of good. In this remark I will briefly indicate the main shapes of this subjectivity that have become current. As to
a) hypocrisy, it contains the moments α) knowledge of the truly universal, whether only in the form of the feeling of right and duty, or in the form of further acquaintance and cognition of it; β) the willing of the particular that resists this universal, and indeed γ) as a comparing knowledge of both moments, so that for the willing consciousness itself its particular willing is determined as evil. These determinations express acting with a bad conscience, not yet hypocrisy as such. — It was at one time a very important question whether an action is evil only insofar as it is done with a bad conscience, that is, with the developed consciousness of the moments just indicated. — Pascal (Provincial Letters, fourth letter) draws very well the consequence of answering the question in the affirmative: "They will all be damned, these half-sinners who have some love for virtue. But as for these frank sinners, hardened sinners, sinners without admixture, full and complete, hell does not hold them. They have deceived the devil by abandoning themselves to him." — The subjective right of self-consciousness to know the action under the determination of its being good or evil in and for itself must not be thought to collide with the absolute right of the objectivity of this determination in such a way that the two are represented as separable, indifferent and contingent with respect to each other, a relation which was also made the basis in particular of the former questions about efficacious grace. According to the formal side, evil is the most proper possession of the individual, since it is precisely his subjectivity positing itself absolutely as its own for itself, and thereby it is absolutely his guilt (see § 139 and the remark to the preceding section); and according to the objective side, the human being, according to his concept, is spirit, rational in general, and has within him absolutely the determination of self-knowing universality. It is therefore not treating him according to the honor of his concept if the side of the good, and with it the determination of his evil action as evil, is separated from him and the action is not imputed to him as evil. How determinately, or in what degree of clarity or obscurity, the consciousness of those moments in their distinctness is developed into cognition, and to what extent an evil action is carried out with more or less formal bad conscience, is the more indifferent side, concerned rather with the empirical.
Pascal also cites there the intercession of Christ on the cross for his enemies: Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do—a superfluous prayer if the circumstance that they did not know what they did had given their action the quality of not being evil and so of not needing forgiveness. Likewise he cites the view of Aristotle (the passage is Nic. Eth. III. 2), who distinguishes whether the agent acts without knowing (οὐκ εἰδώς) or in ignorance (ἀγνοῶν); in the former case of ignorance he acts involuntarily (this ignorance refers to the external circumstances) (see above § 117) and the action is not to be imputed to him. But about the other case Aristotle says: "Every bad man does not know what he ought to do and what to refrain from, and it is just this defect (ἁμαρτία) that makes men unjust and in general evil. Ignorance in the choice of good and evil does not make an action involuntary (incapable of being imputed) but only makes it bad." Aristotle certainly had a deeper insight into the connection of cognition and willing than has become current in a shallow philosophy, which teaches that not-knowing, the heart, and enthusiasm are the true principles of ethical action.
b) To act evilly and with a bad conscience is, however, not yet hypocrisy; in the latter there is added the formal determination of untruth, namely at first to assert evil to be good for others, and in general to present oneself outwardly as good, conscientious, pious, and the like, which in this way is only an artifice of deception for others. But the evil man can further find, in his other good-doing or piety, in good reasons in general, a justification for himself for evil, in that through them he turns it for himself into good. This possibility lies in subjectivity, which as abstract negativity knows all determinations as subjected to it and as proceeding from it. To this perversion
c) there belongs first of all that shape which is known as probabilism. It makes it a principle that an action for which consciousness can find some good reason, even if only the authority of one theologian, and even if it knows other theologians to differ from his judgment ever so greatly, is permitted, and that conscience can be secure about it. Even in this notion there is still present the correct awareness that such a reason and authority give only probability, although this suffices for the security of conscience; it is admitted in it that a good reason is only of such a kind that beside it there can be other reasons at least as good. This trace of objectivity too is still to be recognized here, that it is supposed to be a reason that determines. But since the decision between good and evil is placed on the many good reasons, among which those authorities are included, and since these reasons are so many and so opposed, it lies in this at the same time that it is not this objectivity of the matter but subjectivity that has to decide—the side by which whim and arbitrary choice are made the decider over good and evil, and ethical life, like religiosity, is undermined. That it is one's own subjectivity in which the decision falls is not yet pronounced as the principle; rather, as noted, a reason is put forward as the decisive thing, and probabilism is thus far still a shape of hypocrisy.
d) The next higher stage is that the good will is supposed to consist in its willing the good; this willing of the abstract good is supposed to suffice, indeed to be the sole requirement, for the action to be good. Since the action, as determinate willing, has a content, while the abstract good determines nothing, it is reserved for particular subjectivity to give it its determination and fulfillment. As in probabilism, for one who is not himself a learned Reverend Father, it is the authority of such a theologian on which the subsumption of a determinate content under the universal determination of the good can be based, so here every subject is immediately installed in this dignity, to put the content into the abstract good, or, what is the same, to subsume a content under a universal. This content, as something concrete, is in the action only one side among several, sides which perhaps may even give it the predicate of being criminal and bad. But that determination of the good of mine is the good known by me in the action, the good intention (§ 114). Here an opposition of determinations enters, according to one of which the action is good, but according to others criminal. With this the question seems to arise, in the actual action, whether the intention is really good. That the good is the actual intention, however, not only can be the case in general but must always be able to be the case at the standpoint where the subject has the abstract good as its determining ground. What is injured by the good intention through such an action, which by other sides determines itself as criminal and evil, is of course also good, and it would seem to depend on which of these sides is the most essential. But this objective question drops out here, or rather it is the subjectivity of consciousness itself whose decision alone constitutes the objective. Essential and good are in any case synonymous; the one is just as much an abstraction as the other; good is what is essential with regard to the will, and the essential in this regard is supposed to be precisely that an action is determined as good for me. The subsumption of any content one pleases under the good results immediately in itself from the fact that this abstract good, since it has no content at all, reduces itself wholly to signifying in general something positive—something that counts in some respect and by its immediate determination can also count as an essential purpose—for example, doing good to the poor, caring for myself, for my life, for my family, and so on. Further, as the good is the abstract, so the bad too is the contentless, which receives its determination from my subjectivity; and from this side there results also the moral purpose of hating and eradicating the indeterminate bad. — Theft, cowardice, murder, and so on, as actions, that is, as carried out by a subjective will, have immediately the determination of being the satisfaction of such a will and hence of being positive, and to make the action a good one all that matters is to know this positive side as my intention in it, and this side is the essential one for the determination of the action as good, because I know it as the good in my intention. Theft in order to do good to the poor; theft, or running away from battle, for the sake of the duty to care for one's life, for one's family (perhaps poor besides); murder out of hatred and revenge, that is, in order to satisfy the sense of one's own right, of right in general, and the feeling of the badness of the other, of his wrong against me or against others, against the world or the people in general, through the destruction of this bad man, who has the bad itself within him, whereby at least a contribution is made toward the purpose of eradicating the bad—these are in this way, for the sake of the positive side of their content, made into the good intention and thereby into the good action. A very slight cultivation of the understanding suffices, like those learned theologians, to find for every action a positive side, and with it a good reason and intention. — Thus it has been said that there is strictly no evil man, for he does not will evil for the sake of evil, that is, not the purely negative as such, but always wills something positive, and so from this standpoint something good. In this abstract good the distinction between good and evil, and all actual duties, have vanished; hence merely to will the good, and to have a good intention in an action, is rather evil, insofar as the good is willed only in this abstraction and thereby the determination of it is reserved to the arbitrary choice of the subject.
To this place belongs also the notorious proposition: the end sanctifies the means. — Taken by itself, this expression is at first trivial and says nothing. One can just as indeterminately reply that a holy end indeed sanctifies the means, but an unholy end does not sanctify them. If the end is right, then so are the means—this is a tautological expression, insofar as the means is precisely what is nothing for itself but exists for the sake of another, and has in that, in the end, its determination and worth, if, that is, it is truly a means. — But that proposition does not mean the merely formal sense; something more determinate is understood by it, namely that, for a good end, it is permitted, indeed perhaps even a duty, to use as means something that is absolutely no means in itself, to violate something that is holy in itself, thus to make a crime the means of a good end. In that proposition there floats before the mind, on the one side, the indeterminate consciousness of the dialectic of the positive noted before in isolated determinations of right or ethics, or in such equally indeterminate universal propositions as: you shall not kill, or: you shall care for your welfare, for the welfare of your family. Courts and soldiers have not only the right but the duty to kill human beings, though it is precisely determined on account of what quality in human beings and under what circumstances this is permitted and a duty. So too my welfare and the welfare of my family must be subordinated to higher ends and thus lowered to means. But what designates itself as a crime is not such an indeterminately left universality, still subject to a dialectic, but already has its determinate objective boundary. What is now set against such a determination in the end that is supposed to take from the crime its nature, the holy end, is nothing other than the subjective opinion of what is good and better. It is the same thing that happens when willing stops at the abstract good, namely that all determinacy of good and bad, of right and wrong, existing and valid in and for itself, is sublated, and this determination is ascribed to the feeling, representing, and pleasure of the individual. —
Finally, subjective opinion is expressly pronounced to be the rule of right and duty, in that e) it is supposed to be the conviction, which holds something to be right, by which the ethical nature of an action is determined. The good that one wills still has no content; the principle of conviction now contains this further point, that the subsumption of an action under the determination of the good belongs to the subject. With this the semblance of an ethical objectivity has also vanished entirely. Such a doctrine is directly connected with the oft-mentioned so-called philosophy which denies the knowability of the true—and the true of the willing spirit, its rationality insofar as it actualizes itself, is the ethical commandments. Since such philosophizing declares the cognition of the true to be an empty vanity that flies beyond the circle of cognition, which is supposed to be only what appears, it must immediately also make what merely appears the principle with regard to action, and so place the ethical in the peculiar view of the world held by the individual and in his particular conviction. The degradation into which philosophy has thus sunk appears at first, before the world, as a most indifferent occurrence, one that has befallen only idle school chatter; but necessarily such a view works itself into the view of the ethical, as an essential part of philosophy, and only then does what lies in those views appear in actuality and for it. — Through the spread of the view that it is subjective conviction by which the ethical nature of an action is alone determined, it has come about that formerly much was said of hypocrisy, but nowadays little; for the qualification of evil as hypocrisy has for its ground that certain actions are offenses, vices and crimes in and for themselves, that he who commits them must necessarily know them as such, insofar as he knows and acknowledges the principles and outward acts of piety and uprightness precisely in the semblance for which he misuses them. Or, with regard to evil in general, the presupposition held that it is a duty to recognize the good and to know how to distinguish it from evil. In any case, however, the absolute demand held that the human being commit no vicious and criminal actions, and that they must be imputed to him as such insofar as he is a human being and not a beast. But if the good heart, the good intention, and subjective conviction are declared to be what gives actions their worth, then there is no hypocrisy and in general no evil any more, for whatever one does, he knows how to make into something good through the reflection of good intentions and motives, and by the moment of his conviction it is good. Thus there are no longer crimes and vices in and for themselves, and in place of the frank and free, hardened, untroubled sinning cited above, the consciousness of complete justification by intention and conviction has stepped in. My intention of the good in my action, and my conviction that it is good, make it good. Insofar as there is talk of judging and passing sentence on the action, by this principle it is only according to the intention and conviction of the agent, according to his faith, that he is to be judged—not in the sense in which Christ demands a faith in the objective truth, so that for one who has a bad faith, that is, a conviction evil in its content, the judgment too turns out bad, that is, in accordance with this evil content, but according to faith in the sense of fidelity to conviction, whether the human being in his acting has remained true to his conviction, to the formal subjective fidelity, which alone contains what accords with duty. — With this principle of conviction, because it is at the same time determined as a subjective one, the thought of the possibility of an error must indeed also press itself forward, and in this lies the presupposition of a law that exists in and for itself. But the law does not act; it is only the actual human being who acts, and in the worth of human actions, by that principle, all that can matter is how far he has taken up that law into his conviction. But if it is thus not the actions that are to be judged by that law, that is, in general measured by it, it is impossible to see what that law is still to be and to serve for. Such a law is reduced to a merely external letter, in fact an empty word, for only through my conviction is it made a law, one obliging and binding me. — That such a law has on its side the authority of God, of the state, also the authority of millennia in which it was the bond by which human beings and all their doing and fate are held together and have their subsistence—authorities which include in themselves an uncountable number of the convictions of individuals—and that I oppose to it the authority of my single conviction—as my subjective conviction its validity is only authority—this arrogance, at first seemingly monstrous, is removed by the principle itself, which makes subjective conviction the rule. — Now if, through the higher inconsistency which reason and conscience, ineradicable by shallow science and bad sophistry, bring in, the possibility of an error is conceded, then by regarding crime and evil in general as an error, the fault is reduced to its least. For to err is human—who has not erred about this or that, whether I ate kohl or kraut yesterday at noon, and about countless things less important and more important? But the distinction between the important and the unimportant drops away if all that matters is the subjectivity of conviction and persistence in it. That higher inconsistency concerning the possibility of an error, however, which comes from the nature of the matter, is transformed, in the turn that a bad conviction is only an error, in fact only into the other inconsistency, of dishonesty: one time it is supposed to be conviction on which the ethical and the highest worth of the human being are based, and it is thereby declared the highest and holiest thing; and the other time nothing more is at issue than an erring, my being convinced something slight and contingent—in truth something external that can happen to me one way or another. In fact my being convinced is something utterly slight if I cannot cognize anything true; then it is a matter of indifference how I think, and what is left to me to think is that empty good, the abstraction of the understanding. — Moreover, to remark this too, there follows from this principle of justification by the ground of conviction the consequence for the way others act toward my acting, that when they hold my actions to be crimes according to their faith and conviction, they do quite right—a consequence in which I not only reserve nothing in advance but on the contrary am only lowered from the standpoint of freedom and honor into the relation of unfreedom and dishonor, namely in justice, which in itself is also mine, to experience only a foreign subjective conviction, and in its administration to suppose that I am treated only by an external force.
"That he feels perfectly convinced, I do not doubt in the least. But how many human beings begin the worst outrages from such a felt conviction! So, if this ground can excuse everywhere, there is no rational judgment any longer about good and evil, honorable and contemptible resolutions; delusion then has equal rights with reason, or reason has then no rights at all, no valid standing any more; its voice is a nonentity; whoever merely does not doubt is in the truth!
I shudder at the consequences of such a tolerance, which would be an exclusive one to the advantage of unreason."
Fr. H. Jacobi to Count Holmer. Eutin, 5 Aug. 1800, on Count Stolberg's change of religion. (Brennus. Berlin, Aug. 1802.)
f) The highest form, finally, in which this subjectivity grasps and expresses itself completely is the shape which has been called, with a name borrowed from Plato, irony—for only the name is taken from Plato, who used it of a manner of Socrates, which the latter applied in personal conversation against the conceit of uneducated and sophistical consciousness for the sake of the Idea of truth and justice, but treated ironically only that consciousness, not the Idea itself. Irony concerns only a conduct of conversation toward persons; without the personal direction, the essential movement of thought is dialectic, and Plato was so far from taking the dialectical for itself, or indeed irony, as the final thing and as the Idea itself, that on the contrary he sank and ended the going over and back of thought, rather than leaving it to a subjective opinion, in the substantiality of the Idea. — The peak of subjectivity, grasping itself as the final thing, which remains to be considered here, can be only this: to know itself still as that resolving and deciding about truth, right and duty which is already present implicitly in the preceding forms. It consists, then, in knowing the ethical-objective well, but not, forgetting itself and renouncing itself, in sinking into its seriousness and acting out of it; rather, in relation to it, at the same time in holding it away from itself and knowing itself as that which so wills and resolves and can just as well will and resolve otherwise. — You take a law, in fact and honestly, as existing in and for itself; I too am in it and at it, but also still further than you; I am also beyond it and can make it this way or that. It is not the matter that is excellent, but I am the excellent one, and am the master over the law and the matter, who only plays with it as with his whim, and in this ironic consciousness, in which I let the highest perish, and enjoy only myself. — This shape is not only the vanity of all ethical content of rights, duties and laws—evil, and indeed evil wholly universal in itself—but it adds also the form, the subjective vanity, of knowing itself as this vanity of all content, and in this knowing of knowing itself as the absolute. — To what extent this absolute self-complacency does not remain a solitary worship of itself, but can perhaps also form a congregation, whose bond and substance is perhaps the mutual assurance of conscientiousness and good intentions, rejoicing over this reciprocal purity, but above all the refreshment in the glory of this self-knowing and self-pronouncing, and in the glory of this cherishing and tending—to what extent what has been called the beautiful soul, the nobler subjectivity that smolders away in the vanity of all objectivity and thereby in the unreality of itself, and further other configurations, are turns akin to the stage considered—I have treated in the Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 605 ff., where the whole section c) Conscience can be compared, especially also with regard to the transition into a higher stage in general, determined there otherwise.
My late colleague, Professor Solger, did indeed take up the expression irony, brought up by Herr Fr. von Schlegel in an earlier period of his career as a writer and raised to that subjectivity which knows itself as the highest; but his better sense, remote from such a determination, and his philosophical insight, seized and held fast in it chiefly the side of the properly dialectical, the moving pulse of speculative consideration. Yet I cannot find this quite clear, nor can I agree with the concepts which he developed even in his last substantial work, an extended critique of Herr August Wilhelm von Schlegel's Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature (Vienna Annals, vol. VII, p. 90 ff.). "True irony," says Solger there, p. 92, "proceeds from the point of view that the human being, so long as he lives in this present world, can fulfill his vocation, even in the highest sense of the word, only in this world. Everything with which we believe we go beyond finite purposes is vain and empty imagination. — Even the highest is there for our action only in limited finite shape." This, rightly understood, is Platonic and very true as said against the empty striving toward the (abstract) infinite mentioned there before. But that the highest is in a limited finite shape, like the ethical, and the ethical is essentially as actuality and action, is very different from its being a finite purpose; the shape, the form of the finite, takes nothing from the content, from the ethical, of its substantiality and the infinity that it has in itself. He goes on: "And precisely for that reason it (the highest) is in us as null as the least, and necessarily perishes with us and our null sense, for in truth it is there only in God, and in this perishing it is transfigured as a divine thing, in which we should have no share if there were not an immediate presence of this divine, which reveals itself precisely in the vanishing of our actuality; the mood, however, to which this shines forth immediately in human events themselves is tragic irony." The arbitrary name irony would not matter, but there is something unclear in this, that it is the highest which perishes with our nullity, and that only in the vanishing of our actuality does the divine reveal itself, as it also says on p. 91 of the same work: "we see the heroes become confused about the noblest and most beautiful in their dispositions and feelings, not merely with regard to success but also with regard to their source and their worth, indeed we are uplifted by the perishing of the best itself." That the tragic perishing of highly ethical figures can interest (the just perishing of puffed-up pure villains and criminals, such as the hero in a modern tragedy, the tragedy of Guilt, is one, has indeed a criminal-legal interest, but none for true art, which is at issue here), uplift and reconcile us with ourselves only insofar as such figures confront one another as equally entitled, different ethical powers that have come into collision through misfortune and so, through this their opposition to something ethical, have guilt—from which the right and the wrong of both, and with them the true ethical Idea, emerge purified and triumphant over this one-sidedness, thus reconciled in us—so that it is not the highest in us that perishes, and we are uplifted not by the perishing of the best but on the contrary by the triumph of the true—that this is the truly pure ethical interest of ancient tragedy (in romantic tragedy this determination undergoes a further modification) I have set out in the Phenomenology of Spirit (p. 404 ff., compare 683 ff.). The ethical Idea, however, without that misfortune of collision and the perishing of the individuals caught in this misfortune, is actual and present in the ethical world; and that this highest does not present itself in its actuality as a nullity, this is what real ethical existence, the state, aims at and brings about, and what ethical self-consciousness possesses, beholds and knows in it, and what thinking cognition comprehends.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
140 Self-consciousness can bring out a positive side in its purpose (§ 135). It necessarily has such a side, because the purpose belongs to the resolve of concrete, actual action. Because of such a side, taken as a duty and an excellent intention, self-consciousness is able to claim that an action is good, for others and for itself. The action's negative, essential content is at the same time in it, as it is reflected into itself and so aware of the universal of the will, and it stands compared with that universal. If self-consciousness claims this for others, it is hypocrisy. If it claims it for itself, it is the still higher peak of subjectivity that asserts itself as the absolute.
This last and most obscure form of evil is the one by which evil is turned into good, and good into evil. Consciousness knows itself as this power, and therefore knows itself as absolute. It is the highest peak of subjectivity at the moral standpoint. In our time evil has reached this form, and indeed through philosophy, that is, through a shallowness of thought. This shallowness has twisted a deep concept into this shape, and it claims the name of philosophy, just as it claims for evil the name of good. In this note I will briefly state the main shapes of this subjectivity that have become current. As for
a) hypocrisy, it contains these moments: α) the knowing of the truly universal, whether only in the form of a feeling for right and duty, or in the form of further acquaintance with it and knowledge of it; β) the willing of the particular that resists this universal; and γ) the comparing knowledge of both moments, so that for the willing consciousness itself its particular willing is determined as evil. These determinations express acting with a bad conscience, not yet hypocrisy as such. — At one time it became a very important question whether an action is evil only so far as it is done with a bad conscience, that is, with the developed consciousness of the moments just stated. — Pascal (Les Provinciales, fourth letter) draws very well the conclusion that follows from answering this question yes: "They will all be damned, these half-sinners, who have some love for virtue. But as for those outright sinners, hardened sinners, sinners without mixture, full and complete, hell does not hold them. They have tricked the devil by giving themselves up to it so completely." — The subjective right of self-consciousness to know the action under the determination of whether it is good or evil in and for itself must not be thought of as colliding with the absolute right of the objectivity of this determination in such a way that the two are pictured as separable, indifferent and accidental to each other. This relation was also taken as the basis in particular in the earlier questions about efficacious grace. On the formal side, evil is the most personal thing of the individual, since it is precisely his subjectivity setting itself absolutely as his own for itself, and so it is absolutely his guilt (see § 139 and the note to the preceding section). On the objective side, the human being, by his concept, is spirit, is rational in general, and has the determination of self-knowing universality absolutely within himself. So it means not treating him according to the honor of his concept if the side of the good, and with it the determination of his evil action as evil, is separated from him, and the action is not charged to him as evil. How definitely, or to what degree of clarity or obscurity, the consciousness of those moments in their distinctness is developed into knowledge, and how far an evil action is done more or less with a formal bad conscience, is the more indifferent side, concerned rather with the empirical.
Pascal also cites there Christ's plea on the cross for his enemies: "Father, forgive them, for they do not know what they are doing." This would be an unnecessary plea if the fact that they did not know what they were doing had given their action the quality of not being evil, and so of not needing forgiveness. He likewise cites the view of Aristotle (the passage is in the Nicomachean Ethics III, 2). Aristotle distinguishes whether the agent is οὐκ εἰδώς (not knowing) or ἀγνοῶν (acting in ignorance). In the former case of ignorance he acts involuntarily (this ignorance concerns the external circumstances; see § 117 above), and the action cannot be charged to him. But about the other case Aristotle says: "Every bad person fails to know what to do and what to refrain from, and this very failing (ἁμαρτία) is what makes people unjust and, in general, evil. Not knowing how to choose between good and evil does not make an action involuntary (so that it could not be charged to him), but only makes it bad." Aristotle certainly had a deeper insight into the connection between knowing and willing than has become current in a shallow philosophy. That philosophy teaches that not knowing, the heart and enthusiasm are the true principles of ethical action.
b) But acting evilly and with a bad conscience is not yet hypocrisy. In hypocrisy the formal determination of untruth is added: first, to claim evil as good for others, and in general to present oneself outwardly as good, conscientious, pious and the like. In this way it is only a trick of deceit for others. But the evil person can also find, for himself, a justification for evil in his other good deeds or piety, in general in good reasons. In this way he turns it for himself into good. This possibility lies in subjectivity, which as abstract negativity knows all determinations as subjected to it and as coming from it. To this perversion belongs first
c) the form known as probabilism. It makes it a principle that an action is permitted, and that conscience can be secure about it, if consciousness can find any good reason for it. The reason may be only the authority of one theologian, even when consciousness knows that other theologians differ greatly from his judgment. Even in this idea there is still the correct awareness that such a reason and authority give only probability, though this is enough for the security of conscience. It is admitted in it that a good reason is only of the kind where other reasons, at least equally good, can exist beside it. This trace of objectivity can also still be recognized in it: that it is supposed to be a reason that decides. But the decision between good and evil is placed on the many good reasons, which include those authorities. These reasons are so many and so opposed to each other that this itself implies that it is not the objectivity of the matter but subjectivity that has to decide. This is the side through which liking and arbitrary choice are made the deciding factor over good and evil, and ethical life, like religious devotion, is undermined. But that the decision falls to one's own subjectivity is not yet stated as the principle. Instead, as noted, a reason is given out as what decides. So far, probabilism is still a form of hypocrisy.
d) The next higher stage is that the good will is supposed to consist in willing the good. This willing of the abstract good is supposed to be enough, indeed the only requirement, for the action to be good. An action, as a determinate willing, has a content, but the abstract good determines nothing. So it is left to particular subjectivity to give the good its determination and its filling. In probabilism, someone who is not himself a learned Reverend Father can base the placing of a determinate content under the universal determination of the good on the authority of such a theologian. Here, in the same way, every subject is immediately given the dignity of putting content into the abstract good, or, what is the same thing, of placing a content under a universal. As a concrete thing, the action has this content as one side among several. Those other sides might even give it the label of criminal and bad. But my subjective determination of the good is the good that I know in the action, the good intention (§ 114). So an opposition of determinations arises. By one the action is good, by others it is criminal. With this, the question also seems to arise, for the actual action, whether the intention is really good. But it is possible, and at the standpoint where the subject has the abstract good as its ground of determination it must always be possible, that the good is the actual intention. What the good intention harms by an action that other sides mark as criminal and evil is certainly also good, and it would seem to depend on which of these sides is the most essential. But this objective question drops out here. Or rather, it is the subjectivity of consciousness itself whose decision alone makes up the objective. In any case essential and good mean the same thing. The one is an abstraction just like the other. What is essential for the will is good, and what is essential in this respect is supposed to be just that an action is determined as good for me. Placing any content one likes under the good follows directly from this. The abstract good has no content at all, and so it comes down entirely to meaning something positive in general. That is something that counts in some respect, and by its immediate determination it can also count as an essential purpose. For example: doing good to the poor, caring for myself, for my life, for my family, and so on. Further, as the good is the abstract, so the bad is the contentless, which gets its determination from my subjectivity. On this side a moral purpose also follows: to hate and root out the undetermined bad. — Theft, cowardice, murder and so on are actions, that is, in general, things carried out by a subjective will. As such they immediately have the determination of being the satisfaction of such a will, and so of being positive. To make the action a good one, all that matters is to know this positive side as my intention in it. And this side is the essential one for determining that the action is good, because I know it as the good in my intention. Theft to do good to the poor. Theft, running away from battle, out of the duty to care for one's life and for one's family (who may be poor besides). Murder out of hatred and revenge, that is, to satisfy the self-feeling of one's own right, and of right in general. It satisfies the feeling of the other's wickedness and his wrong against me or against others, against the world or the people in general, by wiping out this wicked person, who has the bad itself in him, so that at least a contribution is made toward the aim of rooting out the bad. In this way all of these, because of the positive side of their content, are turned into a good intention and so into a good action. It takes only a very slight training of the understanding, like that of those learned theologians, to find for any action a positive side, and with it a good reason and intention. — So it has been said that there is really no evil person, for he does not will evil for the sake of evil, that is, not the purely negative as such. He always wills something positive, and so from this standpoint something good. In this abstract good the difference between good and evil, and all actual duties, have vanished. So merely willing the good, and having a good intention in an action, is rather evil. This is because the good is willed only in this abstraction, and so its determination is left to the arbitrary choice of the subject.
The notorious saying belongs here too: the end justifies the means. — Taken by itself, this expression is at first trivial and says nothing. One could just as vaguely reply that a holy end does make the means holy, but an unholy end does not. "If the end is right, so are the means" is a tautological expression, in that the means is exactly what is nothing in itself but exists for the sake of something else, and has its determination and value in that other, the end — if it is in truth a means. — But that saying does not mean the merely formal sense. Something more definite is understood by it: that for a good end it is permitted, even a duty, to use as a means something that is absolutely no means in itself, to violate something that is holy in itself, and so to make a crime the means of a good end. On one side, the saying carries an unclear awareness of the dialectic of the positive noted earlier, in individual determinations of right or ethics, or in equally undetermined general sayings such as: you shall not kill, or: you shall care for your well-being and the well-being of your family. Courts and soldiers have not only the right but the duty to kill human beings. But it is exactly determined on account of what quality in those human beings, and under what circumstances, this is permitted and a duty. So too my well-being and my family's well-being must give way to higher purposes, and so be lowered to means. But what is marked as a crime is not a universality left undetermined and still subject to a dialectic. It already has its determinate objective limit. What is now set against such a determination, in the end that was supposed to take away the crime's nature, the holy end, is nothing other than the subjective opinion of what is good and better. It is the same thing that happens when willing stops at the abstract good. All the determinateness of good and bad, of right and wrong, that exists and counts in and for itself is sublated, and this determination is assigned to the individual's feeling, imagining and liking. —
Finally, subjective opinion is expressly declared to be the rule of right and duty. For e) it is conviction, which holds something to be right, that is supposed to determine the ethical nature of an action. The good that one wills has no content yet. The principle of conviction now adds this further point: that placing an action under the determination of the good belongs to the subject. With this the appearance of ethical objectivity has also completely vanished. Such a doctrine is directly connected with the so-called philosophy mentioned often before. That philosophy denies that the true can be known. The true of the willing spirit, its rationality so far as it makes itself actual, is the ethical commandments. Such philosophizing declares that knowledge of the true is an empty vanity that flies beyond the circle of knowing, which is supposed to be only what appears. So it must at once make what appears the principle in the matter of action as well, and place the ethical in the individual's peculiar view of the world and his particular conviction. The degradation into which philosophy has sunk in this way does at first look to the world like a quite indifferent event, one that has befallen only idle school chatter. But this view necessarily works its way into the view of the ethical, as an essential part of philosophy, and only then does it show in actuality, and for actuality, what these views amount to. — Because the view has spread that subjective conviction alone determines the ethical nature of an action, there was once much talk of hypocrisy, but today there is little. For calling evil hypocrisy rests on this: certain actions are offenses, vices and crimes in and for themselves. The person who commits them necessarily knows them as such, in so far as he knows and recognizes the principles and outward acts of piety and honesty in just the appearance for which he abuses them. Or, with regard to evil in general, the presupposition held that it is a duty to know the good and to know how to tell it from evil. In any case, the absolute demand held that a human being must not commit vicious and criminal actions, and that, so far as he is a human being and not a beast, they must be charged to him as such. But if the good heart, the good intention and the subjective conviction are declared to be what gives actions their worth, then there is no more hypocrisy and no evil in general. For whatever someone does, he knows how to turn it into something good by reflecting on good intentions and motives, and through the moment of his conviction it is good. So there are no longer crimes and vices in and for themselves. In place of the frank, free, hardened, undisturbed sinning cited above, there has come the consciousness of complete justification through intention and conviction. My intention of the good in my action, and my conviction that it is good, make it good. When there is talk of judging and passing sentence on the action, then by this principle it should be judged only by the intention and conviction of the agent, by his faith. This is not faith in the sense in which Christ demands a faith in objective truth, so that for someone who has a bad faith, that is, a conviction evil in its content, the judgment too turns out bad, that is, in line with this evil content. It is faith in the sense of fidelity to conviction: whether the person in his acting has stayed true to his conviction. That formal, subjective fidelity alone is supposed to contain what is in line with duty. — With this principle of conviction, since conviction is at the same time determined as something subjective, the thought of the possibility of an error must force itself in. In that thought lies the presupposition of a law that exists in and for itself. But the law does not act. Only the actual human being acts. And in judging the worth of human actions, by that principle, all that can matter is how far he has taken up that law into his conviction. But if it is not the actions that are to be judged by that law, that is, measured by it at all, then it is hard to see what that law is still supposed to be or to serve for. Such a law is reduced to a merely external letter, in fact an empty word. For only through my conviction is it made into a law, one that obligates and binds me. — That such a law has the authority of God and of the state behind it, and also the authority of thousands of years, in which it was the bond holding human beings and all their doing and fate together and giving them standing — authorities that enclose countless convictions of individuals — and that I set against them the authority of my single conviction — as my subjective conviction, its validity is only authority — this self-conceit, which at first seems monstrous, is removed by the principle itself, which makes subjective conviction the rule. — Now by a higher inconsistency, which reason and conscience bring in, since shallow science and bad sophistry cannot drive them out, the possibility of an error is admitted. By saying that crime and evil in general is an error, the fault is reduced to its smallest. For to err is human. Who has not been wrong about this or that, say whether I ate cabbage or greens at noon yesterday, and about countless things, less important and more important? But the difference between the important and the unimportant drops away when all that matters is the subjectivity of the conviction and sticking to it. That higher inconsistency about the possibility of an error, which comes from the nature of the matter, turns in fact, in the move that a bad conviction is only an error, into the other inconsistency of dishonesty. One time it is conviction on which the ethical and the highest worth of the human being is based, and so conviction is declared the highest and holiest thing. Another time all that is at stake is an error, and my being convinced is trifling and accidental, really something external which can happen to me one way or the other. In fact my being convinced is something highly trifling if I cannot know anything true. Then it does not matter how I think, and for thinking I am left with that empty good, the abstraction of the understanding. — To note this besides: from this principle of justification by the ground of conviction, a consequence follows for how others act toward my acting. Since they hold my actions to be crimes according to their faith and conviction, they do quite right. This is a consequence by which I not only keep nothing in advance, but on the contrary am lowered from the standpoint of freedom and honor into the relation of unfreedom and dishonor. For in justice, which in itself is also mine, I experience only a foreign subjective conviction, and in its execution I think I am treated only by an external force.
"That he feels fully convinced, I do not doubt in the least. But how many people begin the worst outrages out of such a felt conviction? So if this ground can excuse everything, then there is no longer any rational judgment about good and evil, honorable and contemptible decisions. Delusion then has the same rights as reason, or reason then has no rights at all, no valid standing any more. Its voice is an absurdity. Whoever merely does not doubt is in the truth!
I shudder at the consequences of such a tolerance, which would be an exclusive one in favor of unreason."
Fr. H. Jacobi to Count Holmer, Eutin, 5 August 1800, on Count Stollberg's change of religion. (Brennus, Berlin, August 1802.)
f) Finally, the highest form in which this subjectivity fully grasps and expresses itself is the shape that has been called irony, a name borrowed from Plato. Only the name is taken from Plato, who used it for a manner of Socrates. Socrates used it in personal conversation against the conceit of the uneducated and the sophistic consciousness, for the sake of the Idea of truth and justice. But he treated only that consciousness ironically, not the Idea itself. Irony concerns only a way of conducting a conversation toward persons. Without the personal direction, the essential movement of thought is dialectic. Plato was so far from taking the dialectical by itself, or irony as the final thing and the Idea itself, that he did the opposite. He sank and ended the back-and-forth movement of thought, and every subjective opinion with it, in the substantiality of the Idea. — The peak of subjectivity that grasps itself as the final thing, which we still have to consider here, can only be this: to know itself as that resolving and deciding about truth, right and duty, which is already present in itself in the preceding forms. It consists, then, in knowing the ethically objective well, but not in forgetting itself, giving itself up, and sinking into the seriousness of that objective and acting out of it. Instead, in relation to it, it holds it at the same time away from itself, and knows itself as the one that wills and decides in this way, and could just as well will and decide otherwise. — You take a law, honestly and in fact, as existing in and for itself. I am also there with it and in it, but I go further than you. I am also beyond it and can do it this way or that way. It is not the matter that is excellent. I am the excellent one, and I am the master over the law and the matter, who merely plays with them as with his liking. In this ironic consciousness, in which I let the highest perish, I enjoy only myself. — This shape is not only the vanity of all the ethical content of rights, duties and laws. It is evil, and indeed evil entirely universal in itself. It also adds the form, the subjective vanity, of knowing itself as this vanity of all content, and in this knowing, of knowing itself as the absolute. — How far this absolute self-satisfaction does not remain a solitary worship of oneself, but may also form a community, whose bond and substance may be the mutual assurance of conscientiousness and good intentions, the delight in this mutual purity, and above all the feasting on the splendor of this self-knowing and self-declaring and of this cherishing and tending. And how far what has been called the beautiful soul, the nobler subjectivity that flickers out in the vanity of all objectivity and so in its own unreality, and further other shapes, are turns related to the stage considered here. I have dealt with these in the Phenomenology of Spirit, page 605 and following. There the whole section c) on conscience can be compared, especially also with regard to the transition into a higher stage in general, determined differently there.
My late colleague, Professor Solger, did take up the expression irony. Herr Friedrich von Schlegel had brought it up in an earlier period of his writing career and had pushed it to the point of that subjectivity which knows itself as the highest. But Solger's better sense, far from such a determination, and his philosophical insight, seized and held onto in it chiefly the side of the properly dialectical, the moving pulse of speculative consideration. Yet I cannot find this quite clear, nor can I agree with the concepts which he developed in his last, substantial work, a detailed critique of Herr August Wilhelm von Schlegel's lectures on dramatic art and literature (Wiener Jahrbücher, vol. 7, p. 90 and following). "True irony," says Solger there, p. 92, "starts from the point of view that the human being, as long as he lives in this present world, can fulfill his destiny, even in the highest sense of the word, only in this world. Everything with which we think we go beyond finite purposes is vain and empty imagination. — Even the highest exists for our action only in limited, finite shape." Rightly understood, this is Platonic, and very true against the empty striving toward the (abstract) infinite mentioned there earlier. But that the highest is in a limited finite shape, as the ethical is, and the ethical is essentially as actuality and action, is very different from its being a finite purpose. The shape, the form of the finite, takes nothing from the content, the ethical, of its substantiality and of the infinity that it has in itself. He goes on: "And for this very reason it (the highest) is in us as null as the least thing, and necessarily perishes with us and our null mind. For in truth it exists only in God, and in this perishing it is transfigured as something divine. We would have no share in it if there were not an immediate presence of this divine, which reveals itself precisely in the vanishing of our actuality. The mood in which this becomes immediately clear in human events themselves is tragic irony." The arbitrary name irony does not matter. But something is unclear in saying that it is the highest which perishes with our nullity, and that only in the vanishing of our actuality does the divine reveal itself. The same is said on p. 91 of the same work: "We see the heroes become unsure about the noblest and most beautiful in their dispositions and feelings, not merely with regard to the outcome, but also with regard to its source and its worth. Indeed we are lifted up by the perishing of the best itself." The tragic downfall of supremely ethical figures can interest us, lift us up, and reconcile us with ourselves only in this way. (The just downfall of puffed-up, pure villains and criminals, such as the hero of a modern tragedy of guilt, does have a criminal-law interest, but none for the true art that is in question here.) Such figures stand against each other, with equally justified, different ethical powers, which have come into collision through misfortune. Through their opposition to something ethical they now have guilt. From this the right and the wrong of both emerges, and with them the true ethical Idea, purified and triumphant over this one-sidedness, and so reconciled within us. So it is not the highest in us that perishes, and we are lifted up not by the perishing of the best, but on the contrary by the triumph of the true. That this is the truly, purely ethical interest of ancient tragedy (in romantic tragedy this determination undergoes a further modification), I have set out in the Phenomenology of Spirit (p. 404 and following; compare 683 and following). But the ethical Idea without that misfortune of collision and the perishing of the individuals caught in that misfortune is actual and present in the ethical world. That this highest does not show itself in its actuality as a null thing is what real ethical existence, the state, aims at and brings about. It is what ethical self-consciousness possesses, sees and knows in the state, and what thinking knowledge grasps.
About this section
Section 140 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 142 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the European tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.