Section 139
Original German
139 Das Selbstbewußtseyn in der Eitelkeit aller sonst geltenden Bestimmungen und in der reinen Innerlichkeit des Willens, ist eben so sehr die Möglichkeit, das an und für sich allgemeine, als die Willkühr die eigene Besonderheit über das Allgemeine zum Principe zu machen, und sie durch Handeln zu realisiren — böse zu seyn.
Das Gewissen ist als formelle Subjectivität schlechthin dieß, auf dem Sprunge zu seyn, ins Böse umzuschlagen; an der für sich seyenden, für sich wissenden und beschließenden Gewißheit seiner selbst haben beyde, die Moralität und das Böse, ihre gemeinschaftliche Wurzel.
Der Ursprung des Bösen überhaupt, liegt in dem Mysterium, d. i. in dem Speculativen der Freyheit, ihrer Nothwendigkeit, aus der Natürlichkeit des Willens herauszugehen, und gegen sie innerlich zu seyn. Es ist diese Natürlichkeit des Willens, welche als der Widerspruch seiner selbst, und mit sich unverträglich in jenem Gegensatz zur Existenz kommt, und es ist so diese Besonderheit des Willens selbst, welche sich weiter als das Böse bestimmt. Die Besonderheit ist nämlich nur als das Gedoppelte, hier der Gegensatz der Natürlichkeit gegen die Innerlichkeit des Willens, welche in diesem Gegensatze nur ein relatives und formelles Fürsichseyn ist, das seinen Inhalt allein aus den Bestimmungen des natürlichen Willens, der Begierde, Trieb, Neigung u. s. f. schöpfen kann. Von diesen Begierden, Trieben u. s. f. heißt es nun, daß sie gut oder auch böse seyn können. Aber indem der Wille sie in dieser Bestimmung von Zufälligkeit, die sie als natürliche haben, und damit die Form, die er hier hat, die Besonderheit selbst zur Bestimmung seines Inhaltes macht, so ist er der Allgemeinheit, als dem innern Objectiven, dem Guten, welches zugleich mit der Reflexion des Willens in sich und dem erkennenden Bewußtseyn, als das andere Extrem zur unmittelbaren Objectivität, dem bloß Natürlichen, eintritt, entgegengesetzt, und so ist diese Innerlichkeit des Willens böse. Der Mensch ist daher zugleich sowohl an sich oder von Natur, als durch seine Reflexion in sich, böse, so daß weder die Natur als solche, d. i. wenn sie nicht Natürlichkeit des in ihrem besonderen Inhalte bleibenden Willens wäre, noch die in sich gehende Reflexion, das Erkennen überhaupt, wenn es sich nicht in jenem Gegensatz hielte, für sich das Böse ist. — Mit dieser Seite der Nothwendigkeit des Bösen ist eben so absolut vereinigt, daß dieß Böse bestimmt ist als das, was nothwendig nicht seyn soll, — d. i. daß es aufgehoben werden soll, nicht daß jener erste Standpunkt der Entzweyung überhaupt nicht hervortreten solle, — er macht vielmehr die Scheidung des unvernünftigen Thieres und des Menschen aus, — sondern daß nicht auf ihm stehen geblieben, und die Besonderheit nicht zum Wesentlichen gegen das Allgemeine festgehalten, daß er als nichtig überwunden werde. Ferner bey dieser Nothwendigkeit des Bösen ist es die Subjectivität, als die Unendlichkeit dieser Reflexion, welche diesen Gegensatz vor sich hat und in ihm ist; wenn sie auf ihm stehen bleibt, d. i. böse ist, so ist sie somit für sich, hält sich als Einzelne und ist selbst diese Willkühr. Das einzelne Subject als solches hat deswegen schlechthin die Schuld seines Bösen.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
139 Self-consciousness, in the vanity of all otherwise valid determinations and in the pure inwardness of the will, is just as much the possibility of making the universal in and for itself its principle as of making, through arbitrary choice, its own particularity its principle above the universal, and of realizing it through action—of being evil.
Conscience, as formal subjectivity, is simply this: to stand on the brink of turning over into evil; in the certainty of itself, which exists for itself, knows for itself and resolves for itself, both morality and evil have their common root.
The origin of evil in general lies in the mystery, that is, in the speculative element of freedom, in its necessity to go out of the naturalness of the will and to be inward against it. It is this naturalness of the will which, as the contradiction of itself and incompatible with itself, comes into existence in that opposition, and it is thus this particularity of the will itself which further determines itself as evil. For particularity exists only as the doubled, here the opposition of naturalness to the inwardness of the will, which in this opposition is only a relative and formal being-for-itself that can draw its content solely from the determinations of the natural will, from desire, drive, inclination, and so on. Of these desires, drives, and so on it is then said that they can be good or also evil. But since the will makes them, in this determination of contingency which they have as natural, and with it the form which it has here, particularity itself, into the determination of its content, it is opposed to universality, to the inner objective, the good, which enters together with the will's reflection into itself and with cognizing consciousness, as the other extreme to immediate objectivity, the merely natural; and so this inwardness of the will is evil. The human being is therefore evil at once both in himself or by nature and through his reflection into himself, in such a way that neither nature as such, that is, if it were not the naturalness of the will remaining in its particular content, nor reflection going into itself, cognition in general, if it did not hold itself in that opposition, is evil in itself. — United just as absolutely with this side of the necessity of evil is that this evil is determined as what necessarily ought not to be—that is, that it ought to be sublated, not that that first standpoint of disunion should not emerge at all—it rather constitutes the separation of the irrational animal and the human being—but that one should not remain standing on it, nor hold fast to particularity as the essential against the universal, and that it should be overcome as null. Further, in this necessity of evil it is subjectivity, as the infinity of this reflection, which has this opposition before it and is in it; if it remains standing on it, that is, is evil, then it is thereby for itself, holds itself as single, and is itself this arbitrary choice. The single subject as such therefore has simply the guilt of its evil.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
139 Self-consciousness sees the emptiness of all the determinations that otherwise count, and it stands in the pure inwardness of the will. In this state it is just as much the possibility of making into its principle what is universal in and for itself as of making its own particularity its principle, placing it above the universal by arbitrary choice, and carrying it out in action. That is, it is the possibility of being evil.
Conscience, as formal subjectivity, is precisely this: it is on the verge of turning into evil. Both morality and evil have their common root in the self-certainty that exists for itself, knows for itself and makes decisions for itself.
The origin of evil in general lies in the mystery, that is, in the speculative side of freedom. Freedom has a necessity to go out from the naturalness of the will and to be inward against it. It is this naturalness of the will which comes into existence in that opposition, as the will's contradiction of itself and as incompatible with itself. And so it is this particularity of the will itself which determines itself further as evil. Particularity exists only as doubled. Here it is the opposition of naturalness against the inwardness of the will. In this opposition inwardness is only a relative and formal being-for-itself, which can draw its content only from the determinations of the natural will, that is, from appetite, drive, inclination and so on. Now of these appetites, drives and so on, it is said that they can be good or evil. But the will makes them, in this character of contingency which they have as natural, and with them the form it has here, particularity itself, the determination of its content. In doing so it is set against universality, the inner objective, the good. The good enters along with the reflection of the will into itself and with knowing consciousness, as the other extreme to immediate objectivity, the merely natural. And so this inwardness of the will is evil. The human being is therefore evil both in himself or by nature and through his reflection into himself. Nature as such, that is, if it were not the naturalness of the will remaining in its particular content, is not evil in itself. Neither is reflection going into itself, knowing in general, if it did not hold itself in that opposition. — Joined just as absolutely with this side of the necessity of evil is the fact that this evil is determined as what necessarily ought not to be, that is, that it ought to be sublated. This does not mean that the first standpoint of division in general should not appear at all; it in fact makes up the separation between the unreasoning animal and the human being. It means that one should not stay standing at it, that particularity should not be held to as the essential thing against the universal, and that this standpoint should be overcome as null. Further, given this necessity of evil, it is subjectivity, as the infinity of this reflection, which has this opposition before it and is in it. If subjectivity stays standing at this opposition, that is, if it is evil, then it is for itself, holds itself as an individual, and is itself this arbitrary choice. The single subject as such therefore has absolutely the guilt of its evil.
About this section
Section 139 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 141 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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