Section 141
Original German
141 Uebergang von der Moralität in Sittlichkeit.
Für das Gute, als das substantielle Allgemeine der Freyheit, aber noch Abstracte sind daher eben so sehr Bestimmungen überhaupt und das Prinzip derselben, aber als mit ihm identisch, gefodert, wie für das Gewissen, das nur abstracte Prinzip des Bestimmens die Allgemeinheit und Objectivität seiner Bestimmungen gefodert ist. Beyde, jedes so für sich zur Totalität gesteigert, werden zum Bestimmungslosen, das bestimmt seyn soll. — Aber die Integration beyder relativen Totalitäten zur absoluten Identität, ist schon an sich vollbracht, indem eben diese für sich in ihrer Eitelkeit verschwebende Subjectivität der reinen Gewißheit seiner selbst identisch ist mit der abstracten Allgemeinheit des Guten; — die, somit concrete, Identität des Guten und des subjectiven Willens, die Wahrheit derselben ist die Sittlichkeit.
Das Nähere über einen solchen Uebergang des Begriffs macht sich in der Logik verständlich. Hier nur so viel, daß die Natur des Beschränkten und Endlichen, — und solches sind hier das abstracte, nur seyn sollende Gute und die eben so abstracte, nur gut seyn sollende Subjectivität, an ihnen selbst ihr Gegentheil, das Gute seine Wirklichkeit, und die Subjectivität (das Moment der Wirklichkeit des Sittlichen) das Gute, haben, aber daß sie als einseitige, noch nicht gesetzt sind als das was sie an sich sind. Dieß Gesetztwerden erreichen sie in ihrer Negativität, darin daß sie, wie sie sich einseitig, jedes das nicht an ihnen haben zusollen, was an sich an ihnen ist, — das Gute ohne Subjectivität und Bestimmung, und das Bestimmende, die Subjectivität ohne das Ansichseyende — als Totalitäten für sich constituiren, sich aufheben und dadurch zu Momenten herabsetzen, — zu Momenten des Begriffs, der als ihre Einheit offenbar wird und eben durch dieß Gesetztseyn seiner Momente Realität erhalten hat, somit nun als Idee ist, — Begriff der seine Bestimmungen zur Realität herausgebildet und zugleich in ihrer Identität als ihr an sich seyendes Wesen ist. — Das Daseyn der Freyheit, welches unmittelbar als das Recht war, ist in der Reflexion des Selbstbewußtseyns zum Guten bestimmt; das Dritte, hier in seinem Uebergange als die Wahrheit dieses Guten und der Subjectivität, ist daher eben so sehr die Wahrheit dieser und des Rechts. — Das Sittliche ist subjective Gesinnung aber des an sich seyenden Rechts; — daß diese Idee die Wahrheit des Freyheitsbegriffs ist, dieß kann nicht ein vorausgesetztes, aus dem Gefühl oder woher sonst genommenes, sondern — in der Philosophie, — nur ein bewiesenes seyn. Diese Deduction desselben ist allein darin enthalten, daß das Recht und das moralische Selbstbewußtseyn an ihnen selbst sich zeigen, darein als in ihr Resultat zurückzugehen. — Diejenigen, welche des Beweisens und Deducirens in der Philosophie entübrigt seyn zu können glauben, zeigen, daß sie von dem ersten Gedanken dessen, was Philosophie ist, noch entfernt sind und mögen wohl sonst reden, aber in der Philosophie haben die kein Recht mitzureden, die ohne Begriff reden wollen.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
141 Transition from Morality to Ethical Life.
For the good, as the substantial universal of freedom, but still abstract, determinations in general, and the principle of them, are therefore demanded as identical with it, just as, for conscience, which is only the abstract principle of determining, the universality and objectivity of its determinations is demanded. Both, each raised on its own to totality, become the undetermined which is supposed to be determined. — But the integration of the two relative totalities into absolute identity is already accomplished in itself, in that this very subjectivity, hovering in its vanity for itself, of pure certainty of itself is identical with the abstract universality of the good; the identity, thus concrete, of the good and the subjective will, the truth of them, is ethical life.
The details of such a transition of the concept are made intelligible in the Logic. Here only so much: that the nature of the limited and finite—and such are here the abstract good, which only ought to be, and the equally abstract subjectivity, which only ought to be good—has in themselves its opposite, the good its actuality, and subjectivity (the moment of the actuality of the ethical) the good, but that, as one-sided, they are not yet posited as what they are in themselves. They attain this positing in their negativity, in that, as each constitutes itself one-sidedly, as a totality for itself, without what is in itself in it—the good without subjectivity and determination, and the determining, subjectivity, without the in-itself—they sublate themselves and thereby lower themselves to moments, to moments of the concept, which becomes manifest as their unity and has received reality precisely through this positedness of its moments, and so now is as Idea—concept that has developed its determinations into reality and is at the same time in their identity their essence existing in itself. — The existence of freedom, which was immediately as right, is determined in the reflection of self-consciousness as the good; the third, here in its transition as the truth of this good and of subjectivity, is therefore just as much the truth of the latter and of right. — The ethical is subjective disposition, but of right existing in itself; that this Idea is the truth of the concept of freedom cannot be something presupposed, taken from feeling or from wherever else, but—in philosophy—only something proved. The deduction of it is contained solely in this, that right and moral self-consciousness show themselves in themselves to return into it as into their result. — Those who believe they can be spared proving and deducing in philosophy show that they are still remote from the first thought of what philosophy is, and may talk elsewhere, but in philosophy those have no right to join the talk who want to talk without the concept.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
141 Transition from Morality to Ethical Life.
The good is the substantial universal of freedom, but it is still abstract. It therefore requires determinations in general, and requires their principle, as something identical with itself. In the same way, conscience is only the abstract principle of determining, and it requires universality and objectivity for its determinations. Each of the two, raised by itself to a totality, becomes something without determination that is supposed to be determined. — But the joining of these two relative totalities into absolute identity has already been accomplished in itself. For this very subjectivity, hovering in its own emptiness, the subjectivity of the pure certainty of itself, is identical with the abstract universality of the good. The identity of the good and the subjective will, an identity that is therefore concrete, and the truth of both of them, is ethical life.
The logic makes the details of such a transition of the concept understandable. Here it is enough to say this. The nature of what is limited and finite is that, in themselves, they have their opposite. Here the limited and finite are the abstract good that merely ought to be, and the equally abstract subjectivity that merely ought to be good. The good has its actuality in itself, and subjectivity (the moment of the actuality of the ethical) has the good in itself. But as one-sided things, they are not yet posited as what they are in themselves. They reach this positing through their negativity. Each of them, in a one-sided way, is not supposed to have in itself what it has in itself: the good without subjectivity and determination, and the determining subjectivity without what is in itself. Each sets itself up as a totality on its own, sublates itself, and so is reduced to a moment. They become moments of the concept, which shows itself as their unity. Through this positing of its moments, the concept has gained reality, and so it now exists as the Idea. The concept has developed its determinations into reality and at the same time, in their identity, is their essence that exists in itself. — The existence of freedom, which was immediate as right, is determined as the good in the reflection of self-consciousness. The third, here in its transition as the truth of this good and of subjectivity, is therefore just as much the truth of subjectivity and of right. — The ethical is subjective disposition, but the disposition of right that exists in itself. That this Idea is the truth of the concept of freedom cannot be something presupposed, taken from feeling or from anywhere else. In philosophy it can only be something proved. The deduction of it is contained solely in this: that right and moral self-consciousness show, in themselves, that they return into it as into their result. — Those who think they can be spared proving and deducing in philosophy show that they are still far from the first thought of what philosophy is. They may talk about other things. But in philosophy those who want to speak without concept have no right to speak.
About this section
Section 141 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 143 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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