Section 131
Original German
131 Für den subjectiven Willen ist das Gute eben so das schlechthin Wesentliche und er hat nur Werth und Würde, insofern er in seiner Einsicht und Absicht demselben gemäß ist. Insofern das Gute hier noch diese abstracte Idee des Guten ist, so ist der subjective Wille noch nicht als in dasselbe aufgenommen und ihm gemäß gesetzt; er steht somit in einem Verhältniß zu demselben und zwar in dem, daß das Gute, für denselben das Substantielle seyn, — daß er dasselbe zum Zwecke machen und vollbringen soll, — wie das Gute seinerseits nur im subjectiven Willen die Vermittlung hat, durch welche es in Wirklichkeit tritt.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
131 For the subjective will the good is likewise the absolutely essential, and it has worth and dignity only insofar as in its insight and intention it accords with it. Insofar as the good is here still this abstract Idea of the good, the subjective will is not yet taken up into it and posited as according with it; it stands, therefore, in a relation to it, and indeed in this, that the good is to be the substantial for it — that it ought to make it its purpose and accomplish it — just as the good, for its part, has its mediation only in the subjective will, through which it enters into actuality.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
131 For the subjective will too, the good is absolutely what is essential, and the will has worth and dignity only insofar as its insight and intention fit the good. Insofar as the good here is still only this abstract idea of the good, the subjective will is not yet taken up into it and set as fitting it. The will therefore stands in a relation to it. In this relation the good is to be the substantial thing for the will, and the will ought to make it its aim and carry it out. The good, for its part, has its mediation, through which it comes into actuality, only in the subjective will.
About this section
Section 131 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 133 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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