Section 130
Original German
130 Das Wohl hat in dieser Idee keine Gültigkeit für sich als Daseyn des einzelnen besondern Willens, sondern nur als allgemeines Wohl und wesentlich als allgemein an sich d. i. nach der Freiheit; — das Wohl ist nicht ein Gutes ohne das Recht. Eben so ist das Recht nicht das Gute ohne das Wohl (fiat justitia soll nicht pereat mundus zur Folge haben). Das Gute hiemit, als die Nothwendigkeit wirklich zu seyn durch den besondern Willen und zugleich als die Substanz desselben, hat das absolute Recht gegen das abstracte Recht des Eigenthums und die besondern Zwecke des Wohls. Jedes dieser Momente, insofern es von dem Guten unterschieden wird, hat nur Gültigkeit, insofern es ihm gemäß und ihm untergeordnet ist.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
130 Welfare has in this Idea no validity for itself as the being-there of the single particular will, but only as universal welfare, and essentially as universal in itself, that is, according to freedom; — welfare is not a good without right. Equally, right is not the good without welfare ("let justice be done" should not have "let the world perish" as its consequence). The good, accordingly, as the necessity of being actual through the particular will and at the same time as its substance, has the absolute right against the abstract right of property and the particular purposes of welfare. Each of these moments, insofar as it is distinguished from the good, has validity only insofar as it accords with it and is subordinate to it.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
130 In this idea welfare has no validity for itself as the existence of the single, particular will. It has validity only as universal welfare, and essentially as universal in itself, that is, according to freedom. Welfare is not a good without right. Likewise right is not the good without welfare (let justice be done must not mean that the world perishes). The good, then, as the necessity of being actual through the particular will, and at the same time as that will's substance, has absolute right against the abstract right of property and the particular aims of welfare. Each of these moments, insofar as it is distinguished from the good, has validity only insofar as it fits the good and is subordinate to it.
About this section
Section 130 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 132 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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