Section 132
Original German
132 Das Recht des subjectiven Willens ist, daß das, was er als gültig anerkennen soll, von ihm als gut eingesehen werde, und daß ihm eine Handlung, als der in die äußerliche Objectivität tretende Zweck, nach seiner Kenntniß von ihrem Werthe, den sie in dieser Objectivität, als rechtlich oder unrechtlich, gut oder böse, gesetzlich oder ungesetzlich zugerechnet werde.
Das Gute ist überhaupt das Wesen des Willens in seiner Substantialität und Allgemeinheit, — der Wille in seiner Wahrheit; — es ist deswegen schlechthin nur im Denken und durch das Denken. Die Behauptung daher, daß der Mensch das Wahre nicht erkennen könne, sondern es nur mit Erscheinungen zu thun habe, — daß das Denken dem guten Willen schade, diese und dergleichen Vorstellungen nehmen wie den intellectuellen, eben so allen sittlichen Werth und Würde aus dem Geiste hinweg. — Das Recht, nichts anzuerkennen, was Ich nicht als vernünftig einsehe, ist das höchste Recht des Subjects, aber durch seine subjective Bestimmung, zugleich formell, und das Recht des Vernünftigen als des Objectiven an das Subject bleibt dagegen fest stehen. — Wegen ihrer formellen Bestimmung ist die Einsicht eben sowohl fähig, wahr, als bloße Meynung und Irrthum zu seyn. Daß das Individuum zu jenem Rechte seiner Einsicht gelange, dieß gehört nach dem Standpunkte der noch moralischen Sphäre, seiner besondern subjectiven Bildung an. Ich kann an mich die Foderung machen, und es als ein subjectives Recht in mir ansehen, daß Ich eine Verpflichtung aus guten Gründen einsehe und die Ueberzeugung von derselben habe, und noch mehr, daß ich sie aus ihrem Begriffe und Natur erkenne. Was ich für die Befriedigung meiner Ueberzeugung von dem Guten, Erlaubten oder Unerlaubten einer Handlung und damit von ihrer Zurechnungsfähigkeit in dieser Rücksicht, fodere, thut aber dem Rechte der Objectivität keinen Eintrag. — Dieses Recht der Einsicht in das Gute ist unterschieden vom Recht der Einsicht (§. 117.) in Ansehung der Handlung als solcher; das Recht der Objectivität hat nach dieser die Gestalt, daß da die Handlung eine Veränderung ist, die in einer wirklichen Welt existiren soll, also in dieser anerkannt seyn will, sich dem, was darin gilt, überhaupt gemäß seyn muß. Wer in dieser Wirklichkeit handeln will, hat sich eben damit ihren Gesetzen unterworfen, und das Recht der Objectivität anerkannt. — Gleicherweise hat im Staate, als der Objectivität des Vernunftbegriffs, die gerichtliche Zurechnung nicht bey dem stehen zu bleiben, was einer seiner Vernunft gemäß hält, oder nicht, nicht bey der subjectiven Einsicht in die Rechtlichkeit oder Unrechtlichkeit, in das Gute oder Böse, und bey den Foderungen die er für die Befriedigung seiner Ueberzeugung macht. In diesem objectiven Felde gilt das Recht der Einsicht als Einsicht in das Gesetzliche oder Ungesetzliche, als in das geltende Recht, und sie beschränkt sich auf ihre nächste Bedeutung, nemlich Kenntniß als Bekanntschaft mit dem zu seyn, was gesetzlich und insofern verpflichtend ist. Durch die Oeffentlichkeit der Gesetze und durch die allgemeinen Sitten benimmt der Staat dem Rechte der Einsicht die formelle Seite und die Zufälligkeit für das Subject, welche dieß Recht auf dem dermaligen Standpunkte noch hat. Das Recht des Subjects, die Handlung in der Bestimmung des Guten oder Bösen, des Gesetzlichen oder Ungesetzlichen zu kennen, hat bey Kindern, Blödsinnigen, Verrückten die Folge, auch nach dieser Seite die Zurechnungsfähigkeit zu vermindern oder aufzuheben. Eine bestimmte Gränze läßt sich jedoch für diese Zustände und deren Zurechnungsfähigkeit nicht festsetzen. Verblendung des Augenblicks aber, Gereitztheit der Leidenschaft, Betrunkenheit, überhaupt was man die Stärke sinnlicher Triebfedern nennt, (insofern das, was ein Nothrecht (§. 120.) begründet, ausgeschlossen ist), zu Gründen in der Zurechnung und der Bestimmung des Verbrechens selbst und seiner Strafbarkeit zu machen, und solche Umstände anzusehen, als ob durch sie die Schuld des Verbrechers hinweggenommen werde, heißt ihn gleichfalls (vergl. §. 100. 119. Anm.) nicht nach dem Rechte und der Ehre des Menschen behandeln, als dessen Natur eben dieß ist, wesentlich ein Allgemeines, nicht ein abstract-Augenblickliches und Vereinzeltes des Wissens zu seyn. — Wie der Mordbrenner nicht diese zollgroße Fläche eines Holzes, die er mit dem Lichte berührte als isolirt, sondern in ihr das Allgemeine, das Haus, in Brand gesteckt hat, so ist er als Subject nicht das Einzelne dieses Augenblicks oder diese isolirte Empfindung der Hitze der Rache; so wäre er ein Thier, das wegen seiner Schädlichkeit und der Unsicherheit, Anwandlungen der Wuth unterworfen zu seyn, vor den Kopf geschlagen werden müßte. — Daß der Verbrecher im Augenblick seiner Handlung sich das Unrecht und die Strafbarkeit derselben deutlich müsse vorgestellt haben, um ihm als Verbrechen zugerechnet werden zu können — diese Forderung, die ihm das Recht seiner moralischen Subjectivität zu bewahren scheint, spricht ihm vielmehr die innewohnende intelligente Natur ab, die in ihrer thätigen Gegenwärtigkeit nicht an die Wolfisch-psychologische Gestalt von deutlichen Vorstellungen gebunden, und nur im Falle des Wahnsinns so verrückt ist, um von dem Wissen und Thun einzelner Dinge getrennt zu seyn. — Die Sphäre, wo jene Umstände als Milderungsgründe der Strafe, in Betracht kommen, ist eine andere als die des Rechts, die Sphäre der Gnade.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
132 The right of the subjective will is that what it is to recognize as valid be seen into by it as good, and that an action, as the purpose entering into external objectivity, be imputed to it according to its knowledge of the worth that the action has in this objectivity, as right or wrong, good or evil, lawful or unlawful.
The good is in general the essence of the will in its substantiality and universality — the will in its truth; — it is therefore absolutely only in thinking and through thinking. The assertion, therefore, that man cannot know the true but has to do only with appearances — that thinking harms the good will — these and similar notions take away from spirit all ethical worth and dignity, as they do the intellectual. — The right to recognize nothing that I do not see into as rational is the highest right of the subject, but through its subjective determination it is at the same time formal, and the right of the rational, as the objective, over the subject remains firmly in place. — Because of its formal determination, insight is just as capable of being true as of being mere opinion and error. That the individual attain to that right of his insight belongs, from the standpoint of the still moral sphere, to his particular subjective formation. I can make the demand upon myself, and regard it as a subjective right in me, that I have insight into an obligation on good grounds and have conviction of it, and still more, that I know it from its concept and nature. What I demand for the satisfaction of my conviction as to the good, the permitted, or the forbidden character of an action, and with that as to its imputability in this respect, does no harm, however, to the right of objectivity. — This right of insight into the good is distinct from the right of insight (§ 117) with regard to the action as such; the right of objectivity has in the latter the shape that, since the action is a change that is to exist in an actual world and therefore wants to be recognized in it, it must in general accord with what holds in it. Whoever wants to act in this actuality has thereby submitted himself to its laws, and recognized the right of objectivity. — Likewise, in the state, as the objectivity of the concept of reason, judicial imputation is not to stop at what someone holds to accord with his reason or not, not at the subjective insight into rightfulness or wrongfulness, into good or evil, and at the demands he makes for the satisfaction of his conviction. In this objective field the right of insight holds as insight into the lawful or unlawful, as into the right that holds, and it limits itself to its nearest meaning, namely knowledge as acquaintance with what is lawful and to that extent obligatory. Through the publicity of the laws and through general customs, the state takes from the right of insight the formal side and the contingency for the subject which this right still has on the present standpoint. The right of the subject to know the action in the determination of the good or evil, of the lawful or unlawful, has for children, the feeble-minded, and the insane the consequence of diminishing or canceling imputability on this side too. A definite limit, however, cannot be fixed for these states and their imputability. But to make blindness of the moment, the excitement of passion, drunkenness, in general what one calls the strength of sensuous motives (insofar as what grounds a right of necessity (§ 120) is excluded), into grounds in imputation and in the determination of the crime itself and its punishability, and to regard such circumstances as if the guilt of the criminal were thereby taken away, means likewise (cf. §§ 100, 119, Remark) not to treat him according to the right and honor of man, whose nature is precisely this: to be essentially a universal, not an abstractly momentary and isolated piece of knowing. — As the arsonist has set fire not to this inch-wide surface of wood that he touched with the light, as isolated, but in it to the universal, the house, so he is as subject not the single of this moment or this isolated feeling of the heat of revenge; were he that, he would be an animal that, on account of its harmfulness and the insecurity of being subject to fits of rage, would have to be knocked on the head. — The demand that the criminal at the moment of his action must have clearly represented to himself its wrongfulness and punishability in order to be imputed with it as a crime — this demand, which seems to preserve for him the right of his moral subjectivity, rather denies him the intelligent nature inherent in him, which in its active presence is not bound to the Wolffian-psychological shape of clear representations, and is so deranged only in the case of madness as to be separated from the knowing and doing of single things. — The sphere where those circumstances come into consideration as grounds for mitigating punishment is other than that of right: the sphere of mercy.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
132 The right of the subjective will is that what it is to recognize as valid is seen by it to be good. It is also that an action, as the aim stepping into external objectivity, is imputed to it, according to its knowledge of the worth the action has in that objectivity, as lawful or unlawful, good or evil, legal or illegal.
The good is in general the essence of the will in its substantiality and universality. It is the will in its truth. For that reason it exists absolutely only in thinking and through thinking. So the claim that human beings cannot know the truth but only deal with appearances, and the claim that thinking harms the good will, along with similar ideas, take away from spirit all ethical worth and dignity, just as they take away its intellectual worth. — The right to recognize nothing that I do not see as rational is the highest right of the subject. But because of its subjective character it is at the same time formal, and over against it the right of what is rational, as the objective, over the subject stays firm. — Because of its formal character, insight is as capable of being true as of being mere opinion and error. That the individual comes to this right of his insight belongs, on the standpoint of the still moral sphere, to his particular subjective education. I can demand of myself, and regard it as a subjective right in me, that I see an obligation on good grounds and have conviction of it, and still more that I know it from its concept and nature. But what I demand for the satisfaction of my conviction about the good, the permitted or the forbidden character of an action, and with it about its being imputable in this respect, does no harm to the right of objectivity. — This right of insight into the good is different from the right of insight (§ 117) with regard to the action as such. According to the latter, the right of objectivity takes this form: an action is a change that is to exist in an actual world and so wants to be recognized in it. It must therefore fit what holds there in general. Whoever wants to act in this actuality has by that very fact submitted to its laws and recognized the right of objectivity. — In the same way, in the state, as the objectivity of the concept of reason, judicial imputation must not stop at what someone holds to be in accord with his reason or not. It must not stop at his subjective insight into right or wrong, good or evil, or at the demands he makes for the satisfaction of his conviction. In this objective field the right of insight counts as insight into what is legal or illegal, into the right that is in force. It is limited to its nearest meaning, namely knowledge, as acquaintance with what is lawful and to that extent binding. Through the public nature of the laws and through the general customs, the state removes from the right of insight the formal side and the contingency for the subject that this right still has on the present standpoint. The subject's right to know the action in the character of good or evil, legal or illegal, has the consequence, in the case of children, the feeble-minded and the insane, of reducing or removing responsibility on this side as well. No definite boundary can be fixed, however, for these states and for responsibility in them. But to make the blindness of the moment, the excitement of passion, drunkenness, or in general what is called the strength of sensuous drives (insofar as what grounds a right of necessity (§ 120) is excluded), into grounds for imputation and for determining the crime itself and its punishability, and to regard such circumstances as if they took away the criminal's guilt, is likewise (compare §§ 100, 119 Remark) not to treat him according to the right and honor of a human being. The nature of a human being is precisely to be essentially a universal, not an abstractly momentary and isolated piece of knowing. — The arsonist has not set fire to this inch-wide patch of wood that he touched with the flame, as something isolated. In it he has set fire to the universal, the house. In the same way, as a subject he is not the single thing of this moment, or this isolated feeling of the heat of revenge. If he were, he would be an animal that, because of its harmfulness and the danger of being subject to fits of rage, would have to be knocked on the head. — It is demanded that the criminal must, at the moment of his action, have had a clear idea of the wrong and the punishability of it, in order to be held responsible for it as a crime. This demand seems to preserve for him the right of his moral subjectivity. In fact it denies him the intelligent nature that dwells in him. In its active presence that nature is not bound to the Wolffian-psychological form of clear ideas, and is so deranged as to be cut off from the knowing and doing of single things only in the case of madness. — The sphere where such circumstances come into account as grounds for lessening the punishment is a different one from that of right. It is the sphere of mercy.
About this section
Section 132 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 134 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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