Section 123
Original German
123 Für den Inhalt dieser Zwecke ist hier nur α) die formelle Thätigkeit selbst vorhanden, — daß das Subject bey dem, was es als seinen Zweck ansehen und befördern soll, mit seiner Thätigkeit sey; — wofür sich die Menschen als für das ihrige interessiren oder interessiren sollen, dafür wollen sie thätig seyn. β) Weiter bestimmten Inhalt aber hat die noch abstracte und formelle Freyheit der Subjectivität nur an ihrem natürlichen subjectiven Daseyn, Bedürfnissen, Neigungen, Leidenschaften, Meynungen, Einfällen u. s. f. Die Befriedigung dieses Inhalts ist das Wohl oder die Glückseeligkeit in ihren besondern Bestimmungen und im Allgemeinen, die Zwecke der Endlichkeit überhaupt.
Es ist dieß als der Standpunkt des Verhältnisses (§. 108.) auf dem das Subject zu seiner Unterschiedenheit bestimmt, somit als Besonderes gilt, der Ort, wo der Inhalt des natürlichen Willens (§. 11.) eintritt; er ist hier aber nicht, wie er unmittelbar ist, sondern dieser Inhalt ist als dem in sich reflectirten Willen angehörig, zu einem allgemeinen Zwecke, des Wohls oder der Glückseeligkeit (Encykl. §. 395. ff.) erhoben, — dem Standpunkt des, den Willen noch nicht in seiner Freyheit erfassenden, sondern über seinen Inhalt als einen natürlichen und gegebenen reflectirenden Denkens, — wie z. B. zu Crösus und Solons Zeit.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
123 For the content of these purposes there is present here only α) the formal activity itself — that the subject be with his activity in what he is to regard and further as his purpose; — people want to be active for what interests them, or ought to interest them, as their own. β) A more determinate content, however, the still abstract and formal freedom of subjectivity has only in its natural subjective being-there: needs, inclinations, passions, opinions, fancies, and so on. The satisfaction of this content is welfare, or happiness, in its particular determinations and in general: the purposes of finitude as such.
This is, as the standpoint of the relation (§ 108), on which the subject is determined to its distinctness and so counts as particular, the place where the content of the natural will (§ 11) enters; but it is here not as it is immediately; rather, this content, as belonging to the will reflected into itself, is raised to a universal purpose, that of welfare or happiness (Encykl. § 395 ff.) — the standpoint of a thinking that does not yet grasp the will in its freedom, but reflects on its content as a natural and given one — as, for example, in the time of Croesus and Solon.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
123 As the content of these aims, only α) the formal activity itself is present here: that the subject is active in what it is to regard and promote as its aim. People want to be active for whatever they take an interest in as their own, or ought to take an interest in. β) The still abstract and formal freedom of subjectivity has further determinate content only in its natural subjective existence: needs, inclinations, passions, opinions, fancies and so on. The satisfaction of this content is welfare or happiness, in its particular forms and in general. These are the aims of finitude as such.
This is the standpoint of the relation (§ 108), where the subject is determined as distinct and so counts as particular. It is the place where the content of the natural will (§ 11) enters. Here, however, that content is not as it is immediately. As belonging to the will reflected into itself, it is raised to a universal aim, that of welfare or happiness (Encycl. § 395 ff.). This is the standpoint of a thinking that does not yet grasp the will in its freedom, but reflects on its content as something natural and given. It is the standpoint, for example, of the time of Croesus and Solon.
About this section
Section 123 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 125 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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