Section 124
Original German
124 Indem auch die subjective Befriedigung des Individuums selbst, (darunter die Anerkennung seiner in Ehre und Ruhm) in der Ausführung an und für sich geltender Zwecke enthalten ist, so ist beydes die Foderung, daß nur ein solcher als gewollt und erreicht erscheine, wie die Ansicht, als ob die objectiven und die subjectiven Zwecke einander im Wollen ausschließen, eine leere Behauptung des abstracten Verstandes. Ja sie wird zu etwas Schlechtem, wenn sie darein übergeht, die subjective Befriedigung, weil solche (wie immer in einem vollbrachten Werke) vorhanden, als die wesentliche Absicht des Handelnden und den objectiven Zweck als ein solches zu behaupten, das ihm nur ein Mittel zu jener gewesen sey. — Was das Subject ist, ist die Reihe seiner Handlungen. Sind diese eine Reihe werthloser Productionen, so ist die Subjectivität des Wollens eben so eine werthlose; ist dagegen die Reihe seiner Thaten substantieller Natur, so ist es auch der innere Wille des Individuums.
Das Recht der Besonderheit des Subjects, sich befriedigt zu finden, oder, was dasselbe ist, das Recht der subjectiven Freyheit macht den Wende- und Mittelpunkt in dem Unterschiede des Alterthums und der modernen Zeit. Dieß Recht in seiner Unendlichkeit ist im Christenthum ausgesprochen und zum allgemeinen wirklichen Princip einer neuen Form der Welt gemacht worden. Zu dessen nähern Gestaltungen gehören die Liebe, das Romantische, der Zweck der ewigen Seeligkeit des Individuums, u. s. f. — alsdann die Moralität und das Gewissen, ferner die andern Formen, die theils im Folgenden als Princip der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft und als Momente der politischen Verfassung sich hervorthun werden, theils aber überhaupt in der Geschichte, insbesondere in der Geschichte der Kunst, der Wissenschaften und der Philosophie auftreten. — Dieß Princip der Besonderheit ist nun allerdings ein Moment des Gegensatzes, und zunächst wenigstens eben so wohl identisch mit dem Allgemeinen, als unterschieden von ihm. Die abstracte Reflexion fixirt aber dieß Moment in seinem Unterschiede und Entgegensetzung gegen das Allgemeine und bringt so eine Ansicht der Moralität hervor, daß diese nur als feindseliger Kampf gegen die eigene Befriedigung perennire, — die Foderung „mit Abscheu zu thun was die Pflicht gebeut.“ Eben dieser Verstand bringt diejenige psychologische Ansicht der Geschichte hervor, welche alle große Thaten und Individuen damit klein zu machen und herabzuwürdigen versteht, daß sie Neigungen und Leidenschaften, die aus der substantiellen Wirksamkeit gleichfalls ihre Befriedigung fanden, so wie Ruhm und Ehre und andere Folgen, überhaupt die besondere Seite, welche er vorher zu etwas für sich schlechtem decretirte, zur Haupt-Absicht und wirkenden Triebfeder der Handlungen umschafft; — er versichert, weil große Handlungen und die Wirksamkeit, die in einer Reihe solcher Handlungen bestand, Großes in der Welt hervorgebracht, und für das handelnde Individuum die Folge der Macht, der Ehre und des Ruhms gehabt, so gehöre nicht jenes Große, sondern nur dieß Besondere und Aeußerliche, das davon auf das Individuum fiel, diesem an; weil dieß Besondere Folge, so sey es darum auch als Zweck, und zwar selbst als einziger Zweck gewesen. — Solche Reflexion hält sich an das Subjective der großen Individuen, als in welchem sie selbst steht und übersieht in dieser selbstgemachten Eitelkeit das Substantielle derselben; — es ist die Ansicht „der psychologischen Kammerdiener, für welche es keine Helden giebt, nicht, weil diese keine Helden, sondern, weil jene nur die Kammerdiener sind.“ (Phänomenol. des Geistes S. 616.)
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
124 Since the subjective satisfaction of the individual himself (including the recognition of him in honor and fame) is also contained in the carrying out of purposes that hold in and for themselves, both the demand that only such a purpose appear as willed and attained, and the view that objective and subjective purposes exclude each other in willing, are an empty assertion of the abstract understanding. Indeed it becomes something bad when it passes over into asserting that subjective satisfaction, because it is present (as it always is in a completed work), is the essential intention of the agent, and that the objective purpose was for him only a means to that. — What the subject is, is the series of his actions. If these are a series of worthless productions, then the subjectivity of his willing is equally worthless; if, on the other hand, the series of his deeds is of a substantial nature, so too is the inner will of the individual.
The right of the particularity of the subject to find itself satisfied, or, what is the same, the right of subjective freedom, constitutes the turning point and center of the difference between antiquity and modern times. This right in its infinity has been pronounced in Christianity and made the universal actual principle of a new form of the world. Among its closer configurations belong love, the romantic, the purpose of the individual's eternal blessedness, and so on — then morality and conscience, and further the other forms, some of which will come forward in what follows as the principle of civil society and as moments of the political constitution, while others appear in history generally, in particular in the history of art, of the sciences, and of philosophy. — This principle of particularity is, to be sure, a moment of opposition, and at first at least just as much identical with the universal as distinct from it. But abstract reflection fixes this moment in its distinction from and opposition to the universal, and thus produces a view of morality as perennial only as a hostile struggle against one's own satisfaction — the demand "to do with disgust what duty commands." This same understanding produces that psychological view of history which knows how to belittle and degrade all great deeds and individuals by transforming inclinations and passions, which likewise found their satisfaction in substantial activity, together with fame and honor and other consequences, in general the particular side, which it had previously decreed to be something bad in itself, into the chief intention and operative mainspring of the actions; — it assures us that, because great actions and the activity that consisted in a series of such actions produced something great in the world, and for the acting individual had the consequence of power, honor, and fame, it is not that greatness but only this particular and external part of it that fell to the individual that belongs to him; because this particular was a consequence, it was therefore also the purpose, indeed even the sole purpose. — Such reflection clings to the subjective side of great individuals, in which it itself stands, and in this vanity of its own making overlooks what is substantial in them; — it is the view of "the psychological valets, for whom there are no heroes, not because these are no heroes, but because those are only valets." (Phänomenol. des Geistes p. 616.)
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
124 The subjective satisfaction of the individual himself (including the recognition of himself in honor and fame) is also contained in carrying out aims that hold in and for themselves. So the demand that only an aim of that kind should appear as willed and achieved is an empty claim of abstract understanding, and so is the view that objective and subjective aims exclude each other in willing. The claim turns into something bad when it goes on to assert that, because subjective satisfaction is present (as it always is in a finished work), it was the essential intention of the acting person, and that the objective aim was only a means to it. — What the subject is, is the series of his actions. If these are a series of worthless products, then the subjectivity of his willing is worthless as well. If instead the series of his deeds is of a substantial nature, then so is the individual's inner will.
The right of the subject's particularity to find itself satisfied, or, what is the same, the right of subjective freedom, makes up the turning point and center in the difference between antiquity and modern times. This right in its infinity is expressed in Christianity and made the universal, actual principle of a new form of the world. Its closer forms include love, the romantic, the aim of the individual's eternal blessedness, and so on. After these come morality and conscience, and then the other forms. Some of these will come forward in what follows as the principle of civil society and as moments of the political constitution. Others appear in history generally, especially in the history of art, the sciences and philosophy. — This principle of particularity is certainly a moment of opposition, and at first at least it is just as much identical with the universal as it is distinct from it. But abstract reflection fixes this moment in its difference from and opposition to the universal. It thereby produces a view of morality in which morality lasts only as a hostile struggle against one's own satisfaction — the demand "to do with disgust what duty commands." This same understanding produces the psychological view of history. That view knows how to make all great deeds and individuals small and to belittle them. It turns inclinations and passions, which likewise found their satisfaction in substantial activity, along with fame, honor and other consequences — in general, the particular side, which it had first decreed to be bad in itself — into the main intention and driving force of the actions. It assures us that, because great actions and the activity that consisted in a series of such actions produced something great in the world, and brought the acting individual the consequences of power, honor and fame, not that greatness but only this particular and external side that fell to the individual belongs to him. Because this particular side was a consequence, it claims, it was therefore also the aim, and even the only aim. — Such reflection holds on to the subjective side of great individuals, because it stands in that side itself, and in this self-made vanity it overlooks what is substantial in them. It is the view of "the psychological valets, for whom there are no heroes, not because the latter are not heroes, but because the former are only valets." (Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 616.)
About this section
Section 124 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 126 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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