Section 118
Original German
118 Die Handlung ferner als in äußerliches Daseyn versetzt, das sich nach seinem Zusammenhange in äußerer Nothwendigkeit nach allen Seiten entwickelt, hat mannichfaltige Folgen. Die Folgen, als die Gestalt, die den Zweck der Handlung zur Seele hat, sind das ihrige, (das der Handlung angehörige,) — zugleich aber ist sie, als der in die Aeußerlichkeit gesetzte Zweck, den äußerlichen Mächten preis gegeben, welche ganz Anderes daran knüpfen, als sie für sich ist und sie in entfernte, fremde Folgen fortwälzen. Es ist eben so das Recht des Willens, sich nur das Erstere zuzurechnen, weil nur sie in seinem Vorsatze liegen.
Was zufällige und was nothwendige Folgen sind, enthält die Unbestimmtheit dadurch, daß die innere Nothwendigkeit am Endlichen als äußere Nothwendigkeit, als ein Verhältniß von einzelnen Dingen zu einander ins Daseyn tritt, die als selbstständige gleichgültig gegen einander und äußerlich zusammen kommen. Der Grundsatz: bey den Handlungen die Consequenzen verachten, und der andere: die Handlungen aus den Folgen beurtheilen, und sie zum Maaßstaabe dessen, was Recht und Gut sey, zu machen — ist beydes gleich abstracter Verstand. Die Folgen, als die eigene immanente Gestaltung der Handlung, manifestiren nur deren Natur und sind nichts anderes als sie selbst; die Handlung kann sie daher nicht verleugnen und verachten. Aber umgekehrt ist unter ihnen eben so das äußerlich Eingreifende und zufällig Hinzukommende begriffen, was die Natur der Handlung selbst nichts angeht. — Die Entwickelung des Widerspruchs, den die Nothwendigkeit des Endlichen enthält, ist im Daseyn eben das Umschlagen von Nothwendigkeit in Zufälligkeit und umgekehrt. Handeln heißt daher nach dieser Seite, sich diesem Gesetze preis geben. — Hierin liegt, daß es dem Verbrecher, wenn seine Handlung weniger schlimme Folgen hat, zu Gute kommt, so wie die gute Handlung es sich muß gefallen lassen, keine oder weniger Folgen gehabt zu haben, und daß dem Verbrechen, aus dem sich die Folgen vollständiger entwickelt haben, diese zur Last fallen. — Das heroische Selbstbewußtseyn (wie in den Tragödien der Alten, Oedips u. s. f.) ist aus seiner Gediegenheit noch nicht zur Reflexion des Unterschiedes von That und Handlung, der äußerlichen Begebenheit und dem Vorsatze und Wissen der Umstände, so wie zur Zersplitterung der Folgen fortgegangen, sondern übernimmt die Schuld im ganzen Umfange der That.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
118 Action, furthermore, as set into external being-there, which develops on all sides according to its connection in external necessity, has manifold consequences. The consequences, as the shape that has the purpose of the action for its soul, are its own (those belonging to the action); but at the same time the action, as the purpose set into externality, is given over to external powers, which attach to it something quite other than it is for itself and roll it onward into remote, alien consequences. It is equally the right of the will to impute to itself only the former, because only they lie in its resolve.
What are contingent and what are necessary consequences contains indeterminacy, because inner necessity in the finite enters into being-there as external necessity, as a relation of single things to one another, which as self-subsistent come together indifferently to one another and externally. The principle of despising the consequences in actions, and the other, of judging actions from their consequences and making them the standard of what is right and good, are both equally abstract understanding. The consequences, as the action's own immanent configuration, only manifest its nature and are nothing other than the action itself; the action therefore cannot disown and despise them. But conversely, there is equally comprised among them what intervenes from outside and is added by chance, which does not concern the nature of the action itself. — The development of the contradiction that the necessity of the finite contains is, in being-there, precisely the turning over of necessity into contingency and conversely. To act therefore means, on this side, to give oneself over to this law. — It follows from this that the criminal benefits if his action has less evil consequences, just as the good action must put up with having had no consequences or fewer, and that the consequences, when they have developed more fully from a crime, are charged against it. — The heroic self-consciousness (as in the tragedies of the ancients, of Oedipus and so on) has not yet advanced from its solidity to the reflection of the distinction between deed and action, between the external event and the resolve and knowledge of the circumstances, nor to the fragmentation of the consequences, but takes the guilt upon itself in the whole extent of the deed.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
118 Once an action is placed in external existence, that existence develops on every side according to its own connections, in external necessity. The action therefore has many consequences. The consequences, as the shape that has the aim of the action as its soul, belong to the action. But at the same time, as an aim placed into externality, the action is left exposed to external powers. These attach to it something quite different from what it is in itself, and roll it on into remote and alien consequences. It is equally the right of the will to impute to itself only the former, because only they lie in its purpose.
What counts as contingent and what as necessary consequences is left indefinite. The reason is that, in finite things, inner necessity appears in existence as external necessity, as a relation of single things to one another. These are independent, indifferent to one another, and come together from outside. One principle says that in actions we should disregard the consequences. Another says that we should judge actions by their consequences and make these the measure of what is right and good. Both are equally abstract understanding. The consequences, as the action's own immanent shape, only show its nature and are nothing other than the action itself. The action therefore cannot disown them or disregard them. But conversely, they also include what intrudes from outside and is added by chance, which has nothing to do with the nature of the action itself. — The development of the contradiction contained in the necessity of the finite is, in existence, precisely the turning of necessity into contingency and the reverse. To act, on this side, therefore means to expose oneself to this law. — It follows that a criminal benefits if his action has less harmful consequences, just as a good action must put up with having had no consequences or fewer. And a crime whose consequences have developed more fully must bear them as a burden. — Heroic self-consciousness (as in the tragedies of the ancients, such as Oedipus and the like) has not yet advanced, out of its solid unity, to reflecting on the difference between deed and action, between the external event and the purpose and knowledge of the circumstances, nor to splitting up the consequences. It takes on the guilt for the whole extent of the deed.
About this section
Section 118 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 120 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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