Section 119
Original German
119 Zweyter Abschnitt.
Die Absicht und das Wohl.
Das äußerliche Daseyn der Handlung ist ein mannichfaltiger Zusammenhang, der, unendlich in Einzelnheiten getheilt, betrachtet werden kann und die Handlung so, daß sie nur eine solche Einzelnheit zunächst berührt habe. Aber die Wahrheit des Einzelnen ist das Allgemeine und die Bestimmtheit der Handlung ist für sich nicht ein zu einer äußerlichen Einzelnheit isoliter, sondern den mannichfaltigen Zusammenhang in sich enthaltender allgemeiner Inhalt. Der Vorsatz, als von einem Denkenden ausgehend, enthält nicht blos die Einzelnheit, sondern wesentlich jene allgemeine Seite, — die Absicht.
Absicht enthält etymologisch die Abstraction, theils die Form der Allgemeinheit, theils das Herausnehmen einer besondern Seite der concreten Sache. Das Bemühen der Rechtfertigung durch die Absicht ist das Isoliren einer einzelnen Seite überhaupt, die als das subjective Wesen der Handlung behauptet wird. — Das Urtheil über eine Handlung als äußerliche That noch ohne die Bestimmung ihrer rechtlichen oder unrechtlichen Seite, ertheilt derselben ein allgemeines Prädicat, daß sie Brandstiftung, Tödtung u. s. f. ist. — Die vereinzelte Bestimmtheit der äußerlichen Wirklichkeit zeigt das, was ihre Natur ist, als äußerlichen Zusammenhang. Die Wirklichkeit wird zunächst nur an einem einzelnen Punkte berührt, (wie die Brandstiftung nur einen kleinen Punkt des Holzes unmittelbar trifft, was nur einen Satz, kein Urtheil gibt) aber die allgemeine Natur dieses Punktes enthält seine Ausdehnung. Im Lebendigen ist das Einzelne unmittelbar nicht als Theil, sondern als Organ, in welchem das Allgemeine als solches gegenwärtig existirt, so daß beim Morde nicht ein Stück Fleisch, als etwas einzelnes, sondern darin selbst das Leben verletzt wird. Es ist eines Theils die subjective Reflexion, welche die logische Natur des Einzelnen und Allgemeinen nicht kennt, die sich in die Zersplitterung in Einzelnheiten und Folgen einläßt, andererseits ist es die Natur der endlichen That selbst, solche Absonderungen der Zufälligkeiten zu enthalten. — Die Erfindung des dolus indirectus hat in dem Betrachteten ihren Grund.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
119 Second Section.
Intention and Welfare.
The external being-there of the action is a manifold connection which, divided infinitely into singularities, can be considered, and the action so considered as if it had at first touched only one such singularity. But the truth of the single is the universal, and the determinacy of the action is for itself not something isolated into an external singularity, but a universal content containing the manifold connection within itself. The resolve, as proceeding from a thinking being, contains not merely singularity but essentially that universal side — the intention.
Intention (Absicht) contains etymologically abstraction, partly the form of universality, partly the taking out of a particular side of the concrete matter. The effort at justification through intention is the isolating of a single side, which is asserted to be the subjective essence of the action. — The judgment on an action as an external deed, still without determination of its side of right or wrong, bestows on it a universal predicate: that it is arson, killing, and so on. — The isolated determinacy of external actuality shows what its nature is, as external connection. Actuality is at first touched only at a single point (as arson directly strikes only a small point of the wood, which yields only a proposition, no judgment), but the universal nature of this point contains its extension. In the living, the single is immediately not a part but an organ, in which the universal as such is present and exists, so that in murder it is not a piece of flesh, as something single, that is injured, but life itself in it. It is in part subjective reflection, which does not know the logical nature of the single and the universal, that engages in the fragmentation into singularities and consequences; on the other hand it is the nature of the finite deed itself to contain such separations of contingencies. — The invention of the dolus indirectus has its ground in what has been considered.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
119 Second Section.
Intention and Welfare.
The external existence of an action is a manifold connection. It can be considered as divided infinitely into single details, and the action can be taken as having at first touched only one such detail. But the truth of the single thing is the universal. The character of the action is not, in itself, something isolated in one external detail. It is a universal content that holds the manifold connection within itself. The purpose, since it proceeds from a thinking being, contains not only the single detail but essentially that universal side — the intention.
Intention (Absicht) contains, by its derivation, abstraction: partly the form of universality, partly the taking out of a particular side of the concrete matter. The effort to justify oneself by intention is the isolating of one single side, which is then claimed to be the subjective essence of the action. — A judgment on an action as an external deed, still without determining its side of right or wrong, gives it a universal predicate: that it is arson, killing, and so on. — The isolated character of external actuality shows what its nature is, as an external connection. Actuality is at first touched only at a single point (as arson directly affects only a small point of the wood, which yields only a proposition, not a judgment). But the universal nature of this point includes its extension. In a living being the single thing is not directly a part but an organ, in which the universal as such is present and exists. So in murder it is not a piece of flesh, as something single, that is injured, but life itself in it. On the one hand it is subjective reflection that does not know the logical nature of the single and the universal, and that gets lost in splitting things into details and consequences. On the other hand it is the nature of the finite deed itself to contain such separations of contingencies. — The invention of the dolus indirectus has its ground in what has been considered here.
About this section
Section 119 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 121 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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